Kiddushin 13bקידושין י״ג ב
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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13bי״ג ב

מי כתיב ופרצו פרצו כתיב

The Gemara explains: Is it written: And they break all bounds, with the conjunction: And, which would indicate that all the sins are included as one unit? Rather, it is written: “They break all bounds,” from which it may be inferred that this punishment is given separately for each one of these sins.

הדור יתבי וקאמרי הא דתנן האשה שהביאה חטאתה ומתה יביאו יורשין עולתה אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל והוא שהפרישתה מחיים אבל לא הפרישתה מחיים לא

§ They then sat and said additional statements in the name of Rav Asi, one of which concerned that which we learned in a mishna (Kinnim 2:5): With regard to a woman after childbirth who brought her sin-offering for her ritual purification and died, the heirs bring her burnt-offering to fulfill her remaining sacrificial obligations. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: And this is the halakha only when the woman herself had already separated, i.e., designated, the animal for the burnt-offering in her lifetime. But if she had not separated it in her lifetime, no, the heirs are not required to bring a burnt-offering on her behalf.

אלמא קסבר שיעבודא לאו דאורייתא אמר רב אסי א"ר יוחנן אע"ג שלא הפרישה מחיים אלמא קסבר שיעבודא הוה דאורייתא

The Gemara concludes: Apparently, Shmuel maintains that the property of a debtor is not liened by Torah law. In other words, one does not say that because she was required to bring a burnt-offering there is a lien on her property and the debt must be paid even if she did not set aside the animal before her death. Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is the halakha even though she did not separate the burnt-offering in her lifetime. Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the property of a debtor is liened by Torah law.

והא פליגי בה חדא זימנא דרב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו מלוה על פה אינה גובה מן היורשין ולא מן הלקוחות ור' יוחנן ור"ל דאמרי תרוייהו מלוה על פה גובה בין מן היורשין בין מן הלקוחות

The Gemara asks: But these Sages already disagreed about this issue once; why would they engage in the same dispute with regard to multiple applications? As Rav and Shmuel both say: With regard to a loan granted by oral agreement, i.e., without a document that places a lien on the land, if the debtor dies, the creditor cannot collect the loan from the heirs or from those who purchased the land. This is the halakha even if it is clear that there was a loan and the debtors do not dispute this fact. And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: With regard to a loan by oral agreement, the creditor can collect from the heirs and from those who purchased from the debtor. This shows that those same Sages already disagreed as to whether a lien on a property exists by Torah law in the absence of a document.

צריכא דאי איתמר בהא בהך קאמר שמואל משום דלא מלוה כתובה בתורה היא אבל בהך אימא מודה להו לרבי יוחנן ולר"ל

The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach both cases as, if it were stated only about this case of a loan, one might say: It is only with regard to this situation that Shmuel says there is no lien on property, because it is a loan that is not written in the Torah. This loan is merely a private agreement between two individuals. But with regard to this obligation of a woman to bring a burnt-offering, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan and to Reish Lakish. Since this woman’s obligation to bring a burnt-offering is written in the Torah, perhaps it creates a lien on her property despite the fact that there is no document to that effect.

ואי אשמעינן בהא בהא קאמר ר' יוחנן דמלוה כתובה בתורה ככתובה בשטר דמיא אבל בהך אימא מודה ליה לשמואל צריכא

And conversely, had the amora’im taught us about their dispute only in this case of the burnt-offering of a woman following childbirth, one might say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the Torah imposes a lien only in this case of the burnt-offering, as a loan written in the Torah is like one written in a document. But with regard to this private loan, one might say that he concedes to Shmuel that the lien does not apply by Torah law. Therefore, it is necessary to state the dispute in both cases.

אמר רב פפא הילכתא מלוה על פה גובה מן היורשין ואינו גובה מן הלקוחות גובה מן היורשין שיעבודא דאורייתא ואינו גובה מן הלקוחות דלית ליה קלא :

Rav Pappa said that the halakha is as follows: With regard to a loan by oral agreement, the creditor can collect from the heirs but he cannot collect from those who purchased from the debtor. The reason he can collect from the heirs is that the accepted opinion is that the property of a debtor is liened by Torah law. But he cannot collect from those who purchased from the debtor, because a loan by oral agreement does not generate publicity, i.e., people will not have heard about it. Therefore, they are not careful to avoid buying property from the debtor. These purchasers should not suffer due to a lien that was not well known.

וקונה את עצמה בגט ובמיתת הבעל : בשלמא גט דכתיב (דברים כד, א) וכתב לה ספר כריתות

§ The mishna teaches: And a woman acquires herself through a bill of divorce or through the death of the husband. The Gemara asks: Granted, this is the halakha with regard to a bill of divorce, as it is written explicitly in the Torah: “And he writes for her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand, and sends her out of his house; and she departs out of his house and she goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:1–2). This indicates that a bill of divorce enables a woman to marry whomever she wishes after the divorce.

אלא מיתת הבעל מנלן סברא הוא הוא אסרה והוא שרתה

But from where do we derive that the death of the husband also enables a woman to remarry? The Gemara answers: This is based on logical reasoning: He, the husband, rendered her forbidden to every man, and he has permitted her. Since the husband is no longer alive, there is no one who renders her forbidden.

והא עריות דאסר להו ולא שרי להו אלא מדאמר רחמנא יבמה שאין לה בנים אסורה הא יש לה בנים מותרת

The Gemara asks: But consider the status of those with whom relations are forbidden, as he renders her forbidden to them, and yet he does not permit her to them when he dies. For example, one may not marry one’s father’s wife even after the father dies. Rather, from the fact that the Merciful One states that a yevama who does not have children from her deceased husband is prohibited from marrying anyone besides the yavam, it may be inferred that a widow who has children from her deceased husband is permitted to remarry.

ודילמא אין לה בנים אסורה לעלמא ושריא ליבם ויש לה בנים לכולי עלמא נמי אסורה אלא מדאמר רחמנא אלמנה לכה"ג אסורה הא לכהן הדיוט שריא

The Gemara asks: But perhaps one should infer the following from that halakha: A woman who does not have children from her deceased husband is forbidden to everyone and permitted to the yavam, and a woman who has children from her deceased husband is forbidden to everyone also. Rather, the halakha that the death of the husband permits a woman to marry another man is derived from the fact that the Merciful One states that a widow is forbidden to a High Priest. This indicates that it is permitted for her to marry a common priest, and the same certainly applies to a non-priest.

ודילמא לכה"ג בלאו לכולי עלמא בעשה האי עשה מאי עבידתיה אי דאהניא מיתת הבעל תישתרי לגמרי אי דלא אהניא מיתת הבעל תוקמה במילתא קמייתא

The Gemara asks: But perhaps one can say that she is forbidden to a High Priest by a prohibition, whereas she is forbidden to everyone else only by dint of a positive mitzva. The Gemara asks: This positive mitzva, what is its purpose? If the death of the husband affects her status, she should be entirely permitted, and if the death of the husband does not affect her status she remains in her initial state when her husband was alive, and therefore those who engage in sexual intercourse with her would be liable to receive the death penalty.

אלמה לא אפיקתה ממיתה ואוקימתה על עשה מידי דהוה אפסולי המוקדשים

The Gemara answers: And why is this suggestion not considered reasonable? One could argue that the death of the husband removed her from the class of people with whom one is punished with death for engaging in intercourse, and placed her in the class of people with whom one is prohibited to engage in intercourse due to a positive mitzva, just as it is with consecrated animals that have been disqualified. This is referring to animals that were designated as offerings but became invalid due to some blemish.

דמעיקרא אית בהו מעילה ואסירי בגיזה ועבודה פרקינהו מעילה לית בהו בגיזה ועבודה אסירי

The Gemara explains: The halakha with regard to such animals is that initially, when they are unblemished, they are subject to the halakhot of misuse, i.e., if one benefited from them he has misused consecrated items. And likewise shearing them and performing labor with them is prohibited. Once these animals have developed a blemish and one has redeemed them, the prohibition against misuse of consecrated items does not apply to them, but shearing them and performing labor with them remains prohibited. Based on this example, it is possible that the death of the husband does not render the woman entirely permitted. If so, one cannot derive from here that it is permitted for a wife whose husband has passed away to marry another man.

אלא מדאמר קרא (דברים כ, ז) פן ימות במלחמה ואיש אחר יקחנה מתקיף לה רב שישא בריה דרב אידי אימא מאן אחר יבם

Rather, the source that a widow may remarry is from that which the verse states: “Lest he die in battle and another man take her” (Deuteronomy 20:7). This indicates that a man may marry a widow. Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this: One can say: Who is this other man mentioned by the verse? It is a yavam.

א"ר אשי ב' תשובות בדבר חדא דיבם לא איקרי אחר ועוד כתיב (דברים כד, ג) ושנאה האיש האחרון וכתב לה ספר כריתות או כי ימות האיש האחרון ואיתקש מיתה לגירושין מה גירושין שריא וגומרת אף מיתה שריא וגומרת :

Rav Ashi said that there are two refutations of this statement: First, a yavam is not called “another,” as his relationship with her is not entirely separate from that of the first husband. And furthermore, it is written: “And the latter husband hates her, and writes her a scroll of severance and gives it in her hand and sends her out of his house, or if the latter husband dies” (Deuteronomy 24:3). In this manner the verse juxtaposes death to divorce: Just as divorce permits a woman to everyone and completes the severing of a husband from his wife, thereby allowing her to marry another man, so too, death permits her and completes the severing, allowing her to marry another man.

והיבמה נקנית בביאה כו' : בביאה מנלן אמר קרא

§ The mishna teaches: And a yevama can be acquired by the deceased husband’s brother, the yavam, only through intercourse. And she acquires herself through ḥalitza or through the death of the yavam. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that she can be acquired through intercourse? The verse states: