קַלְתָּהּ שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי דָּת יְהוּדִית אֲפִילּוּ קַלְתָּהּ נָמֵי אָסוּר if she covers her head with her basket [kilta], it seems well and is sufficient. But by precepts of Jewish women, i.e., custom, even if her head is covered by her basket this is also prohibited; she requires a substantial head covering.
אָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן קַלְתָּהּ אֵין בָּהּ מִשּׁוּם פְּרוּעַ רֹאשׁ הָוֵי בַּהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא הֵיכָא אִילֵּימָא בְּשׁוּק דָּת יְהוּדִית הִיא וְאֶלָּא בֶּחָצֵר אִם כֵּן לֹא הִנַּחְתָּ בַּת לְאַבְרָהָם אָבִינוּ שֶׁיּוֹשֶׁבֶת תַּחַת בַּעְלָהּ אָמַר אַבָּיֵי וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב כָּהֲנָא מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר וְדֶרֶךְ מָבוֹי Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If she covers her head with her basket, there is no violation of the prohibition against having an uncovered head. Rabbi Zeira discussed it: Where is the woman that Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to? If we say he means that she appears this way in the marketplace, this is a violation of precepts of Jewish women, as explained previously. And if you say rather that he means she appears this way in her own courtyard, if so, you have not allowed any daughter of our father Abraham to remain with her husband, since most women are not careful to cover their heads completely inside their own courtyards. Abaye said, and some say that Rav Kahana said: Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to when she walks from one courtyard to another courtyard or via an alleyway. Although these places are not considered public areas, strangers may still be present in them.
וְטוֹוֶה בַּשּׁוֹק אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל בְּמַרְאָה זְרוֹעוֹתֶיהָ לִבְנֵי אָדָם רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר אֲבִימִי בְּטוֹוֶה וְרַד כְּנֶגֶד פָּנֶיהָ וּמְדַבֶּרֶת עִם כׇּל אָדָם אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל בִּמְשַׂחֶקֶת עִם בַּחוּרִים § And the mishna stated that a woman violates Jewish custom if she spins wool in the marketplace. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This means that she reveals her arms to people by raising her sleeves as she spins. Rav Ḥisda said that Avimi said: It is referring to when she spins with a red [vered] thread opposite her face to highlight her beauty, which entails an element of promiscuity. The mishna also stated another violation of Jewish custom: Or she speaks with every man she encounters. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This means that she flirts with young men.
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה זִימְנָא חֲדָא הֲוָה קָאָזֵילְנָא בָּתְרֵיהּ דְּרַב עוּקְבָא חֲזִיתֵיהּ לְהַהִיא עַרְבָיָא דַּהֲוָה יָתְבָה קָא שָׁדְיָא פִּילְכַּהּ וְטוֹוֶה וְרַד כְּנֶגֶד פָּנֶיהָ כֵּיוָן דַּחֲזֵיתִינַן פְּסַיקְתֵּיהּ לְפִילְכַּהּ שְׁדֵיתֵיהּ אֲמַרָה לִי עוּלָם הַב לִי פֶּלֶךְ אָמַר בַּהּ רַב עוּקְבָא מִילְּתָא מַאי אָמַר בָּהּ רָבִינָא אָמַר טוֹוָה בַּשּׁוּק אָמַר בַּהּ רַבָּנַן אָמְרִי מְדַבֶּרֶת עִם כׇּל אָדָם אָמַר בָּהּ Rabba bar bar Ḥanna said: One time I was walking behind Rav Ukva. I saw an Arab woman who was sitting, casting her spindle, and spinning a red thread opposite her face. Once she saw us, she tore the spindle from the thread and threw it down. She said to me: Young man, give me the spindle. Rav Ukva made a comment about her, noting that she provided an example of one of the types of promiscuity mentioned in the mishna. The Gemara asks: What did he say about her? Which one of the cases in the mishna did he mention? Ravina said: He said about her that she was an example of a woman who licentiously spins in the marketplace. The Rabbis said: He said about her that she was an example of a woman who licentiously speaks with every man.
אַבָּא שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר אַף הַמְקַלֶּלֶת יוֹלְדָיו בְּפָנָיו אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל בִּמְקַלֶּלֶת יוֹלְידָיו בִּפְנֵי מוֹלָידָיו וְסִימָנָיךְ אֶפְרַיִם וּמְנַשֶּׁה כִּרְאוּבֵן וְשִׁמְעוֹן יִהְיוּ לִי אָמַר רַבָּה דְּאָמְרָה לֵיהּ נֵיכְלֵיהּ אַרְיָא לְסָבָא בְּאַפֵּי בְּרֵיהּ § The mishna stated: Abba Shaul says: Also a woman who curses her husband’s parents in his presence violates the precepts of Jewish women. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Even when she curses his parents in the presence of his children and not in his presence she is considered one who violates Jewish custom. And your mnemonic is “Ephraim and Manasseh will be to me like Reuben and Simeon” (Genesis 48:5), which teaches that grandchildren have the status of children. Cursing one’s husband’s parents in front of his children is tantamount to doing so in front of the husband himself. Rabba said: An example is that she said in the presence of her husband’s son: May a lion devour your grandfather.
רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר אַף הַקּוֹלָנִית מַאי קוֹלָנִית אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל בְּמַשְׁמַעַת קוֹלָהּ עַל עִסְקֵי תַּשְׁמִישׁ בְּמַתְנִיתָא תָּנָא בִּמְשַׁמֶּשֶׁת בְּחָצֵר זוֹ וְנִשְׁמַע קוֹלָהּ בְּחָצֵר אַחֶרֶת § The mishna stated: Rabbi Tarfon says: Also a loud woman. The Gemara asks: What is the definition of a loud woman? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: She is considered loud when she raises her voice about matters relating to intercourse, i.e., she quarrels and fights with her husband about it loudly enough that the neighbors overhear, causing him embarrassment. It was taught in a baraita: When she engages in intercourse in this courtyard and she screams from pain, and therefore her voice is heard in another courtyard.
וְנִיתְנְיַיהּ גַּבֵּי מוּמִין בְּמַתְנִיתִין אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִּדְשַׁנִּין מֵעִיקָּרָא The Gemara asks: But if so, then this should be taught together with the blemishes in the mishna at the end of the chapter, where it lists cases of women who may be divorced without payment of their marriage contract due to a physical blemish, as opposed to the mishna here, which discusses immodest conduct. Rather, it is clear as we initially answered, that a loud woman is so defined due to immodest behavior.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמִּקְדָּשׁ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין עָלֶיהָ נְדָרִים וְנִמְצְאוּ עָלֶיהָ נְדָרִים אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת כְּנָסָהּ סְתָם וְנִמְצְאוּ עָלֶיהָ נְדָרִים תֵּצֵא שֶׁלֹּא בִּכְתוּבָּה MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her, and it was subsequently discovered that there are vows incumbent upon her, she is not betrothed. This is because if the condition is not fulfilled, the betrothal is nullified. If he married her without specification and it was subsequently discovered that vows were incumbent upon her, she may be divorced without payment of her marriage contract, since he discovered a deficiency about which she had not initially informed him. However, this does not invalidate the betrothal, since he did not make any explicit condition.
עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ מוּמִין וְנִמְצְאוּ בָּהּ מוּמִין אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת כְּנָסָהּ סְתָם וְנִמְצְאוּ בָּהּ מוּמִין תֵּצֵא שֶׁלֹּא בִּכְתוּבָּה כֹּל הַמּוּמִין הַפּוֹסְלִין בַּכֹּהֲנִים פּוֹסְלִין בְּנָשִׁים If he betrothed her on condition that she has no blemishes, and it was subsequently discovered that she did have blemishes, she is not betrothed. But if he married her without specification, and it was subsequently discovered that she had blemishes, she may be divorced without payment of her marriage contract. The mishna clarifies what qualifies as a blemish: All of the blemishes that are listed in tractate Bekhorot involving significant physical deformities that disqualify priests from service similarly disqualify betrothal of women, as a mistaken transaction.
גְּמָ׳ וּתְנַן נָמֵי גַּבֵּי קִדּוּשִׁין כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא הָכָא כְּתוּבּוֹת אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ תַּנָּא קִדּוּשִׁין אַטּוּ כְּתוּבּוֹת הָתָם קִדּוּשִׁין אִצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ תְּנָא כְּתוּבּוֹת אַטּוּ קִדּוּשִׁין GEMARA: The Gemara comments: And we learned a mishna (Kiddushin 50a) also concerning betrothal just like this case. The mishna there is essentially identical to the mishna here, so why must it be repeated? The Gemara explains: Here, it was necessary for the tanna to mention these halakhot in the context of marriage contracts, which is the topic of this tractate. Therefore, he taught the halakha of betrothal due to the halakha of marriage contracts. There, in Kiddushin, it was necessary for him to mention the halakha of betrothal, so he taught about marriage contracts due to betrothal.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוֹצָדָק בְּאֵלּוּ נְדָרִים אָמְרוּ שֶׁלֹּא תֹּאכַל בָּשָׂר וְשֶׁלֹּא תִּשְׁתֶּה יַיִן וְשֶׁלֹּא תִּתְקַשֵּׁט בְּבִגְדֵי צִבְעוֹנִים תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי בְּאֵלּוּ נְדָרִים אָמְרוּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן עִינּוּי נֶפֶשׁ שֶׁלֹּא תֹּאכַל בָּשָׂר וְשֶׁלֹּא תִּשְׁתֶּה יַיִן וְשֶׁלֹּא תִּתְקַשֵּׁט בְּבִגְדֵי צִבְעוֹנִין Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: These are the vows they spoke about in the mishna that are considered grounds for divorce without payment of the marriage contract: A vow that she will not eat meat or that she will not drink wine or that she will not adorn herself with colored garments. That opinion is also taught in a baraita: These are the vows they spoke about: Matters that involve affliction, such as that she will not eat meat, or that she will not drink wine, or that she will not adorn herself with colored garments.
הָוֵי בַּהּ רַב פָּפָּא אַהֵיָיא אִילֵּימָא אַרֵישָׁא כֵּיוָן דְּקָא קָפֵיד אֲפִילּוּ כֹּל מִילֵּי נָמֵי אֶלָּא אַסֵּיפָא Rav Pappa discussed it: To which statement in the mishna is this referring? If we say it is referring to the first clause of the mishna, where one betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her, then since he demonstrated that he is particular about vows, even vows concerning any other matters, including insignificant ones, should also be included. Since he stipulated a condition and it was not fulfilled, the betrothal is invalid. Rather, one must conclude that it is referring to the latter clause of the mishna, about one who marries a woman without stipulation and then discovers that vows were incumbent upon her. In such a case the mishna says she may be divorced without payment of her marriage contract. However, it does not say this for all vows, but only for vows concerning matters of significant affliction.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר לְעוֹלָם אַרֵישָׁא וּמִידִּי דְּקָפְדִי בַּהּ אִינָשֵׁי הֲוָה קְפִידֵיהּ קְפִידָא מִידֵּי דְּלָא קָפְדִי בַּהּ אִינָשֵׁי לָא הָוֵי קְפִידֵיהּ קְפִידָא Rav Ashi said: Actually, one can explain that it is referring to the first clause of the mishna, where he stipulates that the marriage is conditional on the assumption that she has no vows incumbent upon her, and that the point is that for a vow concerning a matter about which people are ordinarily particular, his insistence is considered legitimate insistence, and is effective to invalidate the betrothal. But with regard to a vow concerning a matter about which people are generally not particular, his insistence is not considered insistence, and such a vow is not considered a violation of the condition. Consequently, the betrothal is valid.
אִיתְּמַר קִידְּשָׁה עַל תְּנַאי וּכְנָסָהּ סְתָם רַב אָמַר צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט אָמַר אַבָּיֵי § It was stated that the Sages had a dispute concerning the following question: If he betrothed her conditionally, such as that she had no vows incumbent upon her, and he subsequently married her without specification, and then it was discovered that the condition had not been fulfilled, Rav said: Although he may divorce her without payment of her marriage contract, the betrothal is not nullified, and therefore she requires a bill of divorce from him. And Shmuel said: The betrothal was invalid from the outset, and therefore she does not require a bill of divorce from him. Abaye said: