רבי מאיר היא דאמר מצוה לקיים דברי המת
It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says it is a mitzva to fulfill the instructions of the dead, as the mishna states that the third party must fulfill the instructions of the deceased, although the daughter is likely to do as she pleases after the third party fulfills his part. In this manner, Ilfa successfully answered the man’s challenge.
אמר רב חסדא אמר מר עוקבא הלכתא בין שאמר תנו ובין שאמר אל תתנו נותנין להם כל צורכם הא קיימא לן הלכה כרבי מאיר דאמר מצוה לקיים דברי המת ה"מ במילי אחרניתא אבל בהא מינח ניחא ליה והא דאמר הכי לזרוזינהו הוא דאתא
Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: The halakha is that whether he says: Give a shekel or whether he says: Do not give more than a shekel, the court gives the sons enough for all of their needs. The Gemara asks: But how could we disregard the father’s words and give more, when the father said to give only a shekel? We maintain that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that it is a mitzva to fulfill the statements of the dead. How, then, may the father’s instructions be ignored? The Gemara answers: This principle applies only in other matters, in which there is a mitzva to fulfill his wishes, but in this instance it is certainly preferable to him that his children be appropriately provided for. And the reason that he said this statement limiting the allowance is that he came to encourage them to adopt thrifty spending habits.
תנן התם הפעוטות מקחן מקח וממכרן מכר במטלטלים
We learned in a mishna there (Gittin 59a): With regard to children, their acquisitions are considered acquisitions and their sales are considered sales. This is the case with respect to movable properties, but not with respect to real estate.
אמר רפרם לא שנו אלא שאין שם אפוטרופוס אבל יש שם אפוטרופוס אין מקחן מקח ואין ממכרן מכר
Rafram said: They taught this only if there is no steward [apotropos] overseeing the children’s affairs. However, if there is a steward, the children’s acquisitions are not considered acquisitions and their sales are not considered sales, even for movable property.
ממאי מדקתני אין מעשה קטנה כלום ודלמא היכא דאיכא שליש שאני א"כ ליתני אבל בקטנה יעשה שליש מה שהושלש בידו מאי אין מעשה קטנה כלום שמע מינה אפילו בעלמא:
From where does he know this? From the fact that it teaches in the mishna here that even when there is a third party who functions as a steward, any action of a minor girl is nothing. The Gemara asks: And perhaps where there is a third party the halakha is different? It is possible that the act of a minor is discounted only when it clashes with the actions of an appointee who is past majority. The Gemara answers: If so, let it teach: But with regard to a minor girl, the third party should execute the agency that was entrusted in his power. What is the implication of the clause: Any action of a minor girl is nothing? Conclude from this that even generally, without a specific steward, a minor may not conduct transactions involving real estate.
הדרן עלך מציאת האשה
May we return to you chapter “the findings of a woman.”
מתני׳ המדיר את אשתו מליהנות לו עד ל' יום יעמיד פרנס יתר מיכן יוציא ויתן כתובה
MISHNA: With regard to one who vows and obligates his wife, prohibiting her from benefiting from him or his property, if his vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days, he must appoint a trustee [parnas] to support her. But if the vow will remain in effect for more than this amount of time, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.
רבי יהודה אומר בישראל חדש אחד יקיים ושנים יוציא ויתן כתובה בכהן שנים יקיים ושלשה יוציא ויתן כתובה
Rabbi Yehuda says: If the husband is an Israelite, then if his vow will remain in effect for up to one month, he may maintain her as his wife; and if it will be two months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. But if he is a priest, then he is given extra time: If the vow will remain in effect for up to two months, he may maintain her, and if it will be three months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. The reason for this is that it is prohibited for a priest to marry a divorcée, including his own ex-wife, and therefore if he divorces her and later regrets his decision he will not be able to take her back.
המדיר את אשתו שלא תטעום אחד מכל הפירות יוציא ויתן כתובה ר' יהודה אומר בישראל יום אחד יקיים שנים יוציא ויתן כתובה ובכהן שנים יקיים שלשה יוציא ויתן כתובה
One who vows and obligates his wife, requiring her not to taste a particular type of produce, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he is an Israelite, then if the vow will remain in effect for one day he may maintain her as his wife, but if it will be two days he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. And if he is a priest, then if the vow will be in effect for two days he may maintain her; for three days he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.
המדיר את אשתו שלא תתקשט באחד מכל המינין יוציא ויתן כתובה ר' יוסי אומר בעניות שלא נתן קצבה ובעשירות שלשים יום:
One who vows and obligates his wife, requiring her not to adorn herself with a particular type of perfume, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Yosei says that one must distinguish between different types of women: For poor women, this applies only when he did not establish a set amount of time for the vow, and for wealthy women, who are accustomed to adorning themselves more elaborately, if she is prohibited from doing so for thirty days, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.
גמ׳ וכיון דמשועבד לה היכי מצי מדיר לה כל כמיניה דמפקע לה לשיעבודה
GEMARA: The Gemara questions the efficacy of a vow taken by the husband prohibiting his wife from deriving benefit from him: And since he is under a prior obligation to provide her support in accordance with what is written in the marriage contract, how can he vow prohibiting her from benefiting from him? Is it in his power to remove his obligation to her?
והתנן קונם שאיני עושה לפיך אינו צריך להפר אלמא כיון דמשעבדא ליה לאו כל כמינה דמפקע ליה לשיעבודיה הכא נמי כיון דמשועבד לה לאו כל כמיניה דמפקע לה לשיעבודה
But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 85a): If his wife said: It is forbidden like an offering [konam] that I will therefore not perform any work for the benefit of your mouth, he does not need to nullify her vow, since this vow does not take effect at all. Apparently, since she is under a prior obligation by power of the Sages’ ordinance to perform work for him, it is not in her power to remove her obligation to him. Here too, since he is under a prior obligation to provide support for her, it is not in his power to remove his obligation to her.
אלא מתוך שיכול לומר לה צאי מעשה ידיך במזונותיך
Rather, one must say the following: Since he is able to say to her at any time: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself, meaning that he has the right to instruct her to support herself from her own earnings instead of supporting her himself,