רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר שְׁאֵרָהּ כְּסוּתָהּ לְפוּם שְׁאֵרָהּ תֵּן כְּסוּתָהּ שֶׁלֹּא יִתֵּן לָהּ לֹא שֶׁל יַלְדָּה לִזְקֵינָהּ וְלֹא שֶׁל זְקֵינָה לְיַלְדָּה כְּסוּתָהּ וְעוֹנָתָהּ לְפוּם עוֹנָתָהּ תֵּן כְּסוּתָהּ שֶׁלֹּא יִתֵּן חֲדָשִׁים בִּימוֹת הַחַמָּה וְלֹא שְׁחָקִים בִּימוֹת הַגְּשָׁמִים Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says that she’era and kesuta should be interpreted as follows: In accordance with her flesh [she’era], i.e., her age, give her clothing [kesuta]. This means that he should not give the garments of a young girl to an elderly woman, nor those of an elderly woman to a young girl. Similarly, kesuta and onata are linked: In accordance with the time of year [onata], give her clothing [kesuta], meaning that he should not give new, heavy clothes in the summer, nor worn-out garments in the rainy season, i.e., the winter, when she requires heavier, warmer clothes. The entire phrase, therefore, refers only to a husband’s obligation to provide clothing for his wife.
תָּנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף שְׁאֵרָהּ זוֹ קֵרוּב בָּשָׂר שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהַג בָּהּ מִנְהַג פָּרְסִיִּים שֶׁמְּשַׁמְּשִׁין מִטּוֹתֵיהֶן בִּלְבוּשֵׁיהֶן מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַב הוּנָא דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא הָאוֹמֵר אִי אֶפְשִׁי אֶלָּא אֲנִי בְּבִגְדִּי וְהִיא בְּבִגְדָּהּ יוֹצִיא וְנוֹתֵן כְּתוּבָּה Rav Yosef taught the following baraita: “She’era,” this is referring to closeness of flesh during intercourse, which teaches that he should not treat her in the manner of Persians, who have conjugal relations in their clothes. The Gemara comments: This baraita supports the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: With regard to one who says: I do not want to have intercourse with my wife unless I am in my clothes and she is in her clothes, he must divorce his wife and give her the payment for her marriage contract. This is in keeping with the opinion of the tanna of the baraita that the Torah mandates the intimacy of flesh during sexual relations.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר אֲפִילּוּ עָנִי שֶׁבְּיִשְׂרָאֵל וְכוּ׳ מִכְּלָל דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר הָנֵי לָא הֵיכִי דָמֵי אִי דְּאוֹרְחַהּ מַאי טַעְמָא דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא דְּאָמַר לָא וְאִי דְּלָאו אוֹרְחַהּ מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the poorest man of the Jewish people may not provide fewer than two flutes and a lamenting woman for his wife’s funeral. The Gemara infers: This proves by inference that the first, anonymous tanna cited in the mishna holds that these are not part of a husband’s obligations. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If this is the common custom in her family at funerals, what is the reason for the opinion of the first tanna who said that he does not have to do so? If he neglected to provide these items he would be treating her with disrespect. And if this is not the common custom in her family, what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda?
לָא צְרִיכָא כְּגוֹן דְּאוֹרְחֵיהּ דִּידֵיהּ וְלָאו אוֹרְחַהּ דִּידַהּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר כִּי אָמְרִינַן עוֹלָה עִמּוֹ וְאֵינָהּ יוֹרֶדֶת עִמּוֹ הָנֵי מִילֵּי מֵחַיִּים אֲבָל לְאַחַר מִיתָה לֹא The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state their dispute in a case where it is the common custom for his family according to its social status, but it is not common for her family according to its social status. The first tanna holds: When we say that a woman who marries a man ascends with him, i.e., she must be treated as equal in status to her husband if his social status is higher than hers, and does not descend with him if he is from a lower social status, this applies only when they are alive, but after death the Sages did not enforce this rule.
וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר אֲפִילּוּ לְאַחַר מִיתָה אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר מָר עוּקְבָא הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה And Rabbi Yehuda maintains: Even after death she must be treated in accordance with his status, which means that if those in his family are mourned with flutes and lamenting women, he must provide the same for her funeral. Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
וְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר מָר עוּקְבָא מִי שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּטָּה בֵּית דִּין יוֹרְדִין לִנְכָסָיו וְזָנִין וּמְפַרְנְסִין אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבָנָיו וּבְנוֹתָיו וְדָבָר אַחֵר אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי מַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָא דְּתַנְיָא מִי שֶׁהָלַךְ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם וְאִשְׁתּוֹ תּוֹבַעַת מְזוֹנוֹת בֵּית דִּין יוֹרְדִין לִנְכָסָיו וְזָנִין וּמְפַרְנְסִין אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ אֲבָל לֹא בָּנָיו וּבְנוֹתָיו וְלֹא דָּבָר אַחֵר Apropos this ruling, the Gemara cites another statement that Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: With regard to one who became insane, the court enters his property and feeds and provides a livelihood for his wife, his sons, and his daughters, and it also gives something else, as will be explained. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In what way is this case different from that which is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who went overseas and his wife claims sustenance, the court descends to his property and feeds and provides a livelihood for his wife, but not for his sons and daughters and does not give something else. If a father is not obligated to sustain his children in his absence, what is different about a situation where he is mad?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ וְלָא שָׁאנֵי לָךְ בֵּין יוֹצֵא לְדַעַת לַיּוֹצֵא שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעַת Rav Ashi said to Ravina: Is there no difference for you between a man who leaves his responsibilities knowingly and one who leaves them unknowingly? A father who lost his sanity did not do so by his own choice, and therefore it can be assumed that he would want to provide for his children from his possessions, despite the fact that he is not obligated to do so. By contrast, if he went overseas he freely decided to depart, and one would think that he would leave enough for his sons and daughters. If he failed to do so, he has demonstrated that he does not want to provide for them.
מַאי דָּבָר אַחֵר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר זֶה תַּכְשִׁיט רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר צְדָקָה מַאן דְּאָמַר תַּכְשִׁיט כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן צְדָקָה מַאן דְּאָמַר צְדָקָה אֲבָל תַּכְשִׁיט יָהֲבִינַן לַהּ דְּלָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּתִינַּוַּול The Gemara asks: What is this something else mentioned in the baraita? Rav Ḥisda said: This is a wife’s ornaments, to which she is entitled in addition to her sustenance. Rav Yosef said: It is money for charity. The Gemara comments: According to the one who says that the court does not pay for a woman’s ornaments from her husband’s property if he has gone overseas, all the more so he maintains that the husband’s property is not taken for charity. Conversely, the one who says that the court does not give money for charity holds that this applies only to charity, but it does give her ornaments, as it is assumed that it is not satisfactory for him that his wife be demeaned by a lack of jewelry.
אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין אָמַר רַב הוּנָא מִי שֶׁהָלַךְ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם וּמֵתָה אִשְׁתּוֹ בֵּית דִּין יוֹרְדִין לִנְכָסָיו וְקוֹבְרִין אוֹתָהּ לְפִי כְבוֹדוֹ לְפִי כְבוֹדוֹ וְלֹא לְפִי כְבוֹדָהּ Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Rav Huna said: In the case of one who went overseas and his wife died, the court enters his property and buries her in accordance with his dignity. The Gemara asks: Does the court act in accordance with his dignity and not in accordance with her dignity? What if she came from a more dignified family than her husband?
אֵימָא אַף לְפִי כְבוֹדוֹ הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן עוֹלָה עִמּוֹ וְאֵינָהּ יוֹרֶדֶת עִמּוֹ וַאֲפִילּוּ לְאַחַר מִיתָה The Gemara answers: Say that Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin meant: Even in accordance with his dignity, i.e., if his family was more distinguished than hers, he must bury her in accordance with the dignity of his family. The Gemara adds: This comes to teach us that she ascends with him to his social status and does not descend with him, and this principle applies even after her death, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in the mishna.
אָמַר רַב מַתְנָה הָאוֹמֵר אִם מֵתָה לֹא תִּקְבְּרוּהָ מִנְּכָסָיו שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ מַאי שְׁנָא כִּי אָמַר דְּנָפְלִי נִכְסֵי קַמֵּי יַתְמֵי כִּי לָא אָמַר נָמֵי נִכְסֵי קַמֵּי יַתְמֵי רְמוּ Rav Mattana said: In the case of one who says that if his wife dies, they should not bury her using funds from his property, the court listens to him. The Gemara asks: What is different about the case when he says this command that induces the court to comply with his wishes? It is due to the fact that the property has come before the orphans as an inheritance, while the obligation to bury her is not incumbent upon them but is a duty of the inheritors of her marriage contract. However, even if he did not state the above preference, the property is cast before the orphans and it belongs to them. What does it matter whether or not the husband issued a command to this effect?
אֶלָּא הָאוֹמֵר אִם מֵת הוּא לֹא תִּקְבְּרוּהוּ מִנְּכָסָיו אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ לָאו כׇּל הֵימֶנּוּ שֶׁיַּעֲשִׁיר אֶת בָּנָיו וְיַפִּיל עַצְמוֹ עַל הַצִּיבּוּר Rather, the Gemara amends Rav Mattana’s statement: With regard to one who says that if he himself dies, they should not bury him using funds from his property, one does not listen to him, but the court spends his money without resorting to charity. The reason for this is that it is not in his power to enrich his sons by saving them this expense and to cast himself as a burden on the community.
מַתְנִי׳ לְעוֹלָם הִיא בִּרְשׁוּת הָאָב עַד שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס MISHNA: Even after she is betrothed, a daughter is always under her father’s authority until she enters