מאי לאו בשעמד בדין לא בשלא עמד בדין
What, is it not referring to a case where he has stood trial, and yet Rabbi Shimon does not render him liable for the oath as the payment was originally a fine? Rabba refutes this argument: No, that baraita is referring to a situation where he has not stood trial.
והא מדרישא בשעמד בדין סיפא נמי בשעמד בדין דקתני רישא אין לי אלא דברים שמשלמין עליהם את הקרן תשלומי כפל תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה והאונס והמפתה ומוציא שם רע מנין ת"ל (ויקרא ה, כא) ומעלה מעל ריבה
Abaye persists: But from the fact that the first clause of the baraita deals with one who has stood trial, it follows that the latter clause also deals with one who has stood trial. As the baraita teaches in its first clause: I have derived the halakha only for matters for which one pays the principal. With regard to the payments that are double the principal, and payments that are four and five times the principal, and those of the rapist, and the seducer, and the defamer, from where is it derived that all these are included in the liability to bring an offering for falsely taking an oath on a deposit? The verse states: “If anyone sin and commit a trespass [ma’ala ma’al]” (Leviticus 5:21). The doubled usage of the word trespass serves to amplify and include any false oath taken in denial of monetary liability.
היכי דמי אי דלא עמד בדין כפילא מי איכא אלא פשיטא בשעמד בדין ומדרישא בשעמד בדין סיפא נמי בשעמד בדין
Abaye analyzes this statement: What are the circumstances? If this is referring to a situation when he has not stood trial, is there double payment in that case? Everyone agrees that one who admits his guilt is exempt from the double payment, and yet this obligation is mentioned in the baraita. Rather, it is obvious that the baraita is referring to a case where it is claimed that he has already stood trial and was declared liable to pay the double payment, and the accused individual denies this claim. Abaye summarizes his question: And from the fact that the first clause of this baraita deals with one who has stood trial, the latter clause also deals with one who has stood trial, and even so Rabbi Shimon does not deem him liable to bring an offering for his oath.
א"ל יכילנא לשנויי לך רישא בשעמד בדין וסיפא בשלא עמד בדין וכולה ר"ש היא ושינויי דחיקי לא משנינן לך דא"כ אמרת לי ליתני רישא ר"ש אומר או ליתני סיפא דברי ר"ש
Rabba said to him: I could answer you that the first clause deals with one who is accused of already having stood trial and been deemed liable, and the latter clause deals with one who has not stood trial, and this entire baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. According to this answer, Rabbi Shimon concedes that after one has been deemed liable in court, the double payment attains the status of a regular monetary obligation rather than a fine, and therefore in the first case in the baraita he is liable to bring an offering and a payment for his admission. But I will not answer you a far-fetched answer, for if it is so, that the entire baraita represents the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, you could say to me: Let the tanna of the baraita either teach explicitly in the first clause: Rabbi Shimon says, or let him teach in the latter clause: This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.
אלא כולה בשעמד בדין ורישא רבנן וסיפא ר"ש
Rabba continued: Rather, I will say that the entire baraita is referring to one who has stood trial, and as for the difference in halakha, the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who deem one liable to bring the offering of an oath in a case where the plaintiff says that the defendant stood trial, was found liable, and swore falsely. And the latter clause represents the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who exempts one who confesses from bringing the offering of an oath.
ומודינא לך לענין קרבן שבועה דרחמנא פטריה מוכחש
And I concede to you, Abaye, with regard to the liability to bring an offering for falsely taking an oath on a deposit, that the Merciful One exempts him from this offering here, based upon the verse “And deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of a deposit,” (Leviticus 5:21), which indicates that one is liable to bring an offering only if he lied about a claim that was originally a monetary obligation.
וכי קאמינא ממון הוי להורישו לבניו
And when I say that Rabbi Shimon maintains that after one is declared liable in court his obligation to pay is considered a regular monetary payment rather than a fine, that is not to say that he is liable to bring an offering for falsely denying a monetary claim, but rather to say that the recipient of the payment bequeaths it to his sons. Unlike a fine, which does not pass by inheritance to one’s heirs, this is classified as a regular monetary payment. Consequently, if the perpetrator was deemed liable in court and ordered to pay the father of the girl he raped or seduced, and the father died before receiving payment, his sons inherit the right to that payment.
איתיביה ר"ש אומר אם לא הספיקה לגבות עד שמת האב הרי הן של עצמה ואי אמרת ממון הוי להורישו לבניו לעצמה אמאי דאחין בעי מיהוי
Abaye raised an objection to this last point from the mishna. Rabbi Shimon says: If the daughter did not manage to collect the payments before the father died, they belong to her. And if you say that this fine is a monetary payment to the extent that one can bequeath it to his sons after the trial, why does the money belongs to her? Since the trial has taken place, it should be the property of the brothers by inheritance from their father, as it is already considered a regular monetary obligation that is owed to the father.
אמר רבא האי מילתא קשאי בה רבה ורב יוסף עשרין ותרתין שנין ולא איפרק עד דיתיב רב יוסף ברישא ופירקה שאני התם דאמר קרא (דברים כב, כט) ונתן האיש השוכב עמה לאבי הנערה חמשים כסף לא זיכתה תורה לאב אלא משעת נתינה
Rava said: This matter was difficult for Rabba and Rav Yosef for twenty-two years without resolution, until Rav Yosef sat at the head of the academy and resolved it in the following manner: There, in the case of a rape, it is different, as the verse states: “And the man who laid with her shall give the young woman’s father fifty shekels of silver” (Deuteronomy 22:29), from which it is inferred: The Torah entitled the father to this money only from the time of giving. Consequently, if the father dies before receiving the money, he does not bequeath his right to the money to his sons. Instead, the daughter is considered to take her father’s place as the plaintiff, because she was the victim, and the money is paid to her.
וכי קאמר רבה ממונא הוי להורישו לבניו בשאר קנסות
And when Rabba said that the fine imposed by a court is considered a regular monetary obligation with regard to one’s ability to bequeath it to his sons, he was not referring to this particular case of a rapist or seducer, but only to other fines, which do have the status of regular monetary obligations after the court delivers its verdict.
אלא מעתה גבי עבד דכתיב (שמות כא, לב) כסף שלשים שקלים יתן לאדוניו הכי נמי לא זיכתה תורה לאדון אלא משעת נתינה יתן לחוד ונתן לחוד
The Gemara asks: However, if that is so, that the verb “give” is explained in this manner, with regard to an ox that killed a slave, where it is written: “He shall give to their master thirty shekels of silver” (Exodus 21:32), so too will you say that the Torah entitled the master only from the time of giving? The Gemara answers: “Shall give [yiten],” is distinct, and “shall give [venatan],” is distinct. The first expression, which is stated with regard to an ox that killed a slave, does not indicate that the recipient acquires the right to the money only from the moment it is given, whereas the formulation employed in the case of rape does indicate that this is the case.
אי הכי ת"ל וכחש ת"ל ונתן מיבעי ליה
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, that the main source for this halakha is the phrase “shall give [venatan],” when it was taught in the baraita that a man who rapes or seduces a woman is not liable to bring the offering for a false oath in denial of a monetary claim, rather than saying that this is derived from the fact that the verse states “and deal falsely,” he should have said that it is derived from the fact that the verse states “shall give,” as this is the phrase that teaches that the payment is considered a fine even after he has stood trial.
אמר רבא כי איצטריך וכחש כגון שעמדה בדין ובגרה ומתה דהתם כי קא ירית אביה מינה דידה קא ירית
In answer to this question, Rava said: When it was necessary to cite a proof from “and deal falsely,” it was with regard to a situation where the young woman’s case was brought to trial, and the court ruled in her favor, and she reached majority and subsequently died before the money was paid. The reason that “and deal falsely” is necessary in that case is because there, when the father inherits, it is from her that he inherits.
אי הכי יצאו אלו שהן קנס ממון הוא אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק יצאו אלו שעיקרן קנס
The Gemara raises another difficulty: If so, the language of the baraita: Excluding these, as they are a fine, is inaccurate, as it is a regular monetary payment, not a fine. In answer to this question, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that this phrase means: Excluding these, as they are originally a fine, and it is only once the court orders the man to pay that they are viewed as regular monetary payments.
איתיביה ר"ש פוטר שאינו משלם קנס על פי עצמו טעמא דלא עמד בדין הא עמד בדין דמשלם על פי עצמו קרבן שבועה נמי מיחייב
Abaye raised an objection to this explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, based upon the mishna in Shevuot cited above (42a), which states: Rabbi Shimon exempts him, as he does not pay a fine on his own admission. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is not liable to bring a guilt-offering is because he has not stood trial. However, if he has stood trial and been found guilty, in which case he pays on his own admission when he later admits that he was already convicted in court, he should also be liable to bring an offering if he denies that he was convicted in court and takes an oath to that effect. This contradicts the claim that, according to Rabbi Shimon, even after one is convicted in court, the payment is still considered a fine.
רבי שמעון לדבריהם דרבנן קאמר להו לדידי אע"ג דעמד בדין רחמנא פטריה מוכחש אלא לדידכו אודו לי מיהת היכא דלא עמד בדין דכי קא תבע קנסא קא תבע
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion to them in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis themselves, as follows: According to my opinion, although he has stood trial, the Merciful One exempts him from the offering, as derived from the verse: “And deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of a deposit” (Leviticus 5:21), which indicates that he is liable only for a claim that originally concerned regular a monetary payment. However, according to your opinion, you should at least concede to me in a case where he has not stood trial, that when one claims the money, he claims a fine and not a regular monetary payment.