Ketubot 35aכתובות ל״ה א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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35aל״ה א

מאי לאו אסון ממש לא דין אסון איכא דאמרי איתיביה רבי יוחנן לר"ל (שמות כא, כב) ולא יהיה אסון ענוש יענש מאי לאו דין אסון לא אסון ממש

Is this not referring to actual harm, i.e., the woman’s death? And the verse states that he pays only if she did not die, but if she died is he exempt, even if he was not forewarned? The Gemara answers: No, the verse can be explained to mean: If there is no sentence of harm. If the court does not actually sentence him to death, he pays the damages for the miscarried fetus. He is exempt from payment only if he is actually executed. Some say a different version of this exchange: Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish: “And yet no harm follow, he shall be punished” (Exodus 21:22); is this not referring to a sentence of harm? The Gemara answers: No, the verse can be explained to mean: If there is no actual harm.

אמר רבא ומי איכא למ"ד חייבי מיתות שוגגין חייבים והא תנא דבי חזקיה מכה אדם ומכה בהמה

Rava said: Is there anyone who said that those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty are obligated to pay? But didn’t the Sage of the school of Ḥizkiyya teach: The verse speaks of one who smites a person, and the verse speaks of one who smites an animal. The two cases are juxtaposed in the verse “And one who smites an animal shall pay for it, and one who smites a person shall die” (Leviticus 24:21).

מה מכה בהמה לא חילקת בו בין בשוגג בין במזיד בין מתכוין לשאין מתכוין בין דרך ירידה לדרך עלייה לפוטרו ממון אלא לחייבו ממון אף מכה אדם לא תחלוק בו בין בשוגג בין במזיד בין מתכוין לשאין מתכוין בין דרך ירידה לדרך עלייה לחייבו ממון אלא לפוטרו ממון

Just as in the case of one who smites an animal, you did not distinguish between one who did so unwittingly and one who did so intentionally, between one who acted with intent and one who acted with no intent, between one who smites in the course of a downward motion and one who smites in the course of an upward motion, and in all those cases it is not to exempt him from paying money but rather to obligate him to pay money; so too, in the case of one who smites a person, do not distinguish between one who did so unwittingly and one who did so intentionally, between one who acted with intent and one who acted with no intent, between one who smites in the course of a downward motion and one who smites in the course of an upward motion. In all those cases as well it is not to obligate him to pay money but rather to exempt him from paying money. The halakha in both cases is unconditional; when he smites an animal he is always liable to pay and when he smites a person he is always exempt from payment, regardless of whether or not he is actually executed.

אלא כי אתא רבין אמר חייבי מיתות שוגגין כולי עלמא לא פליגי דפטורין כי פליגי בחייבי מלקות שוגגין ודבר אחר רבי יוחנן אמר חייב חייבי מיתות איתקוש חייבי מלקיות לא איתקוש ריש לקיש אמר פטור בפירוש ריבתה תורה חייבי מלקיות כחייבי מיתות

Rather, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: With regard to those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty, everyone agrees that they are exempt, as per the derivation of the Sages of the school of Ḥizkiyya. When they disagree it is with regard to those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive lashes, and another matter, for which he is liable to pay money. Rabbi Yoḥanan said that he is obligated to pay, as those liable to receive the death penalty are juxtaposed to cases of monetary payment and are unconditionally exempt from payment. However, those liable to receive lashes are not juxtaposed. Therefore, in the case of one who is liable to receive lashes, unless one is actually flogged, he is obligated to pay for the damage he inflicted. Reish Lakish said: He is exempt, as the Torah explicitly included those liable to receive lashes, like those liable to receive the death penalty, and unconditionally exempted them from payment.

היכן ריבתה תורה אמר אביי אתיא (במדבר לה, לא) רשע (דברים כה, א) רשע רבא אמר אתיא מכה מכה אמר ליה רב פפא לרבא הי מכה אילימא (ויקרא כד, כא) ומכה בהמה ישלמנה ומכה אדם יומת האי בקטלא כתיב אלא האי מכה (ויקרא כד, יח) מכה נפש בהמה ישלמנה נפש תחת נפש וסמיך ליה ואיש כי יתן מום בעמיתו [כאשר עשה כן יעשה לו]

The Gemara asks: Where did the Torah include those liable to be flogged? Abaye said: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the term wicked in the verse “That he is wicked and liable to die” (Numbers 35:31), and the term wicked in the verse “That he is wicked and liable to be flogged” (Deuteronomy 25:2). Rava said: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the term smites in one verse and the term smites in another verse. Rava Pappa said to Rava: To which term smites are you referring? If we say that it is the verse “And one who smites an animal shall pay for it, and one who smites a person shall die” (Leviticus 24:21), clearly that is not so, as that is written with regard to death. Smiting a person in that verse is referring to murder. Rather, it is to this term smites that Rava is referring: “And he who smites an animal shall pay for it, a life for a life” (Leviticus 24:18), and juxtaposed to it, it is written: “And a man who places a blemish upon his counterpart, as he has done so shall be done to him” (Leviticus 24:19). The verses liken those liable to receive lashes to those obligated to pay money, from which it is derived that those liable to receive lashes are exempt from payment.

והאי לאו מכה היא אנן הכאה הכאה קאמרינן והא כי כתיב בחובל בחבירו הוא דכתיב וחובל בחבירו בר תשלומין הוא אם אינו ענין להכאה שיש בה שוה פרוטה תנהו ענין להכאה שאין בה שוה פרוטה

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But this term that appears in the latter verse is “places a blemish,” not smites. How, then, can one derive a verbal analogy? The Gemara answers: This is not a verbal analogy based on identical terms; rather, it is based on identical concepts. We are saying that it is a verbal analogy between smiting an animal in the first verse and smiting a person in the latter verse. The Gemara asks: However, when the second verse is written, it is written with regard to one who injures another, and one who injures another is subject to payment and not to lashes. This undermines the proof, as lashes are not mentioned in either verse. The Gemara answers: If it is not a matter of smiting that causes damage equivalent to the value of a peruta, in which case he would pay and would not be flogged, apply it to the matter of smiting that causes damage that is not equivalent to the value of a peruta. Since in that case there is no payment for the injury, one is flogged for striking that blow.