Keritot 19aכריתות י״ט א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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19aי״ט א
1 א

רבי שמעון פוטר בזו ר"ש בן יהודה פוטר בכולן משום רבי שמעון

The baraita continues by citing a dispute concerning Rabbi Shimon’s opinion. Rabbi Shimon exempts him from the obligation to bring an offering in this particular case. Since he became pure in between, at no point did he have definite knowledge that he was impure. For one to be liable to bring an offering for entering the Temple in a state of ritual impurity he must have knowledge of the impurity at the beginning and the end, and a lack of knowledge in the middle. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda deems him exempt from the obligation to bring an offering in all of those cases, and he reports this opinion in the name of Rabbi Shimon.

2 ב

ואפילו בקמייתא אמר רבא הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהלך בראשון ובשעת הילוכו בשני שכח שהלך בראשון ובהא פליגי ת"ק סבר מקצת ידיעה כידיעה דמיא ור"ש סבר מקצת ידיעה לאו כידיעה דמיא

Before explaining the contradictions between the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, the Gemara asks a question about Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda’s statement: Can it be that Rabbi Shimon holds that one is exempt even in the first case? Since he walked down both paths prior to entering the Temple, he had definite knowledge of his impure status. Rava said: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where he walked on the first path, and at the time of his walking on the second path he forgot that he had previously walked on the first path. Consequently, the knowledge that would render him liable to bring a sin offering is incomplete. And it is with regard to this point that they disagree: The first tanna holds that partial knowledge is considered like full knowledge, and Rabbi Shimon holds that partial knowledge is not considered like full knowledge.

3 ג

אמר מר הלך בראשון ונכנס והיזה וטבל והלך בשני ונכנס חייב אמאי חייב הא לא הוי ליה ידיעה

The Gemara returns to discuss the contradictions for which it cited this baraita. The Master said: If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple, and then he received the sprinkling of the ashes of the red heifer on the third and seventh days, and immersed, and subsequently walked on the second path and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin offering. The Gemara asks: Why is he liable? After all, he did not have definite knowledge of his ritual impurity each time he entered the Temple. Although it is certain that after walking on the second path he had contracted ritual impurity at some point, as he had been purified in between, there was no specific point at which he had knowledge of definite impurity.

4 ד

אמר ריש לקיש הא מני רבי ישמעאל היא דלא בעי ידיעה בתחלה רבי יוחנן אמר אפילו תימא רבנן כאן עשו ספק ידיעה כידיעה

Reish Lakish said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who does not require knowledge at the outset, before an unwitting transgression, in order to render one liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You may even say that it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that definite knowledge is necessary to render one liable to bring a sin offering, as here they rendered uncertain knowledge like full knowledge.

5 ה

סלקא דעתך כאן עשו והוא הדין לכל התורה כולה קשיא דרבי יוחנן אדרבי יוחנן

The Gemara explains the contradiction: It enters your mind to say that Rabbi Yoḥanan meant that here they rendered uncertain knowledge like full knowledge, and the same is true for the entire Torah. Therefore, it is difficult, as there is an apparent contradiction between the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan above and this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Here, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that uncertain knowledge is considered like full knowledge, whereas earlier he stated that uncertain knowledge, unlike full knowledge, does not divide separate unwitting transgressions to render one obligated to bring multiple sin offerings.

6 ו

קשיא דריש לקיש אדריש לקיש

And likewise it is difficult with regard to the apparent contradiction between the statement of Reish Lakish earlier and the statement of Reish Lakish here. Reish Lakish previously stated that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that uncertain knowledge divides unwitting transgressions to render one obligated to bring separate sin offerings, whereas here he explains that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, not Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

7 ז

בשלמא דר' יוחנן אדר"י לא קשיא כאן עשו אבל בכל התורה כולה לא

The Gemara comments: Granted, the apparent contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and the other statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is not difficult. One can answer that when he said: Here they rendered uncertain knowledge like full knowledge, he meant specifically here, but with regard to the entire Torah it is not considered like full knowledge.

8 ח

מאי טעמא הכא גבי טומאה כתיב (ויקרא ה, ב) ונעלם ממנו והוא טמא ידיעה דאית בה נמי ספק חייב קרא אבל בכל התורה כולה כתיב (ויקרא ד, כג) או הודע אליו חטאתו אי אית ליה ידיעה הוא דמחייב

The Gemara asks: What is the reason that this particular case is an exception? Here, with regard to ritual impurity, it is written: “Or if anyone touch any impure thing…and it was concealed from him that he is impure” (Leviticus 5:2). This indicates that even when one has knowledge that has an uncertainty to it, the verse renders him obligated to bring an offering. But with regard to the rest of the entire Torah it is written: “If his sin, which he has sinned, be known to him” (Leviticus 4:28). This teaches that it is only if he has full knowledge that he is obligated to bring an offering.

9 ט

אלא לר"ל קשיא אדמוקים לה כר' ישמעאל לוקמה כרבי הא קמ"ל דר' ישמעאל נמי לא בעי ידיעה בתחלה

But the contradiction between one statement of Reish Lakish and the other statement of Reish Lakish is difficult: Instead of interpreting the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, he should interpret it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara answers: This is what Reish Lakish is teaching us by establishing the baraita in accordance with Rabbi Yishmael: That Rabbi Yishmael also does not require knowledge at the outset, before an unwitting transgression, in order to render one liable to bring a sin offering.

10 י

הא מתניתין היא דתנן רבי ישמעאל אומר ונעלם ממנו שתי פעמים לחייב על העלם טומאה ועל העלם מקדש

The Gemara objects: But that is already taught explicitly in a mishna, as we learned (Shevuot 14b) that Rabbi Yishmael says: The verse states: “It was concealed from him” (Leviticus 5:2–3), twice. One mention of the phrase serves to render one obligated to bring a sin offering for a lapse of awareness of his state of ritual impurity when he entered the Temple, and the other mention of the phrase teaches that he is obligated to bring a sin offering for a lapse of awareness during which he forgot that the building he was entering while impure was the Temple. Since this is the same verse that is the source for the requirement of knowledge at the outset, evidently Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with this opinion, as he derives a different halakha from the verse.

11 יא

איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא מקרא לית ליה מגמרא אית ליה קמ"ל:

The Gemara explains: It was necessary for Reish Lakish to state that Rabbi Yishmael does not require knowledge at the outset, as it might enter your mind to say: Although Rabbi Yishmael has no verse from which he could derive this requirement, perhaps he has a tradition with regard to the requirement of prior knowledge. By establishing that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, Reish Lakish teaches us conclusively that Rabbi Yishmael does not require knowledge at the outset.

12 יב

מתני׳ חלב ונותר לפניו ואכל אחד מהן ואינו יודע איזה מהן אכל אשתו נדה ואחותו עמו בבית שגג באחת מהן ואינו יודע באיזה מהן שגג שבת ויום הכיפורים ועשה מלאכה בין השמשות ואינו יודע באיזה מהן עשה רבי אליעזר מחייב חטאת ורבי יהושע פוטר

MISHNA: If one has pieces of forbidden fat and notar before him and he ate one of them and he does not know which of them he ate; or if his menstruating wife and his sister were with him in the house and he unwittingly engaged in intercourse with one of them and he does not know with which of them he unwittingly engaged in intercourse; or if Shabbat and Yom Kippur occurred adjacent to one another and he performed prohibited labor during the intervening twilight period and he does not know on which of the days he performed the labor, in all of these cases, Rabbi Eliezer deems the transgressor liable to bring a sin offering, as he certainly sinned, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems the transgressor exempt, as he does not know the nature of his sin.

13 יג

א"ר יוסי לא נחלקו על העושה מלאכה בין השמשות שהוא פטור שאני אומר מקצת עשה היום ומקצת עשה למחר

Rabbi Yosei said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to one who performs prohibited labor during the intervening twilight period because they concur that he is exempt, as I say: He performed part of the labor today, and he performed part of the labor the following day.

14 יד

על מה נחלקו על העושה מלאכה בתוך היום ואינו יודע אם בשבת עשה אם ביוה"כ עשה או על העושה ואינו יודע מעין איזו מלאכה עשה שרבי אליעזר מחייב חטאת ורבי יהושע פוטר א"ר יהודה פוטרו היה רבי יהושע אף מאשם תלוי

With regard to what case did they disagree? With regard to the case of one who performs prohibited labor in the midst of the day, and he does not know whether it was on Shabbat that he performed the labor or whether it was on Yom Kippur that he performed the labor; or with regard to one who performs a prohibited labor and he does not know which labor he performed. As, in those cases Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt. Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Yehoshua would deem him exempt even from bringing a provisional guilt offering.

15 טו

ר' שמעון ור' שמעון שזורי אומרים לא נחלקו על דבר שהוא משם אחד שהוא חייב על מה נחלקו על דבר שהוא משום ב' שמות שרבי אליעזר מחייב חטאת ורבי יהושע פוטר

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from one category, e.g., he picked a grape from a vine on Shabbat and does not know which vine it was, as in that case they both agree that he is liable, since he knows the nature of his sin. With regard to what case did they disagree? With regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from two categories, e.g., he picked fruit from a tree on Shabbat and does not know whether it was from a vine or from a fig tree. As, in that case Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering, since he certainly sinned, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt, as he does not know the nature of his sin.

16 טז

א"ר יהודה אפילו נתכוון ללקוט תאנים וליקט ענבים ענבים וליקט תאנים שחורות וליקט לבנות לבנות וליקט שחורות ר"א מחייב חטאת ור' יהושע פוטר תמיהני אם פטר בה ר' יהושע א"כ למה נאמר (ויקרא ד, כג) אשר חטא בה פרט למתעסק:

Rabbi Yehuda said: Even if one intended to pick figs and he picked grapes, or to pick grapes and he picked figs, or to pick black figs and he picked white figs, or to pick white figs and he picked black figs, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt. Rabbi Yehuda added: I wonder if Rabbi Yehoshua deemed him exempt in that case, as even in his opinion the person intended to perform a prohibited labor. The mishna asks: If it is so, that he is not exempt according to Rabbi Yehuda, why is it stated: “If his sin, wherein he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:23), from which it is derived that one is liable only if the object of the sin was the one that he intended? The mishna answers: This serves to exclude one who acts unawares and does not intend to perform a prohibited action at all.

17 יז

גמ׳ תניא א"ר אליעזר מה נפשך אי חלב אכל חייב אי נותר אכל חייב אי אשתו נדה בעל חייב אי אחותו בעל חייב אי בשבת עשה מלאכה חייב אי ביה"כ עשה מלאכה חייב

GEMARA: With regard to the first clause of the mishna and the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: Whichever way you look at it he is liable to bring a sin offering. If it was forbidden fat that he ate, he is liable; and if it was notar that he ate, he is also liable. If it was with his menstruating wife that he engaged in intercourse, he is liable; and if it was with his sister that he engaged in intercourse, he is also liable. If it was on Shabbat that he performed the forbidden labor, he is liable; and if it was on Yom Kippur that he performed the labor, he is also liable. The result of any one of these scenarios is that he is liable to bring a sin offering.

18 יח

אמר לו רבי יהושע הרי הוא אומר אשר חטא בה עד שיודע לו במה חטא ורבי אליעזר האי בה מאי עביד ליה מיבעי ליה פרט למתעסק

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him in response: The verse states: “If his sin, which he has sinned, be known to him, he shall bring for his offering a goat, a male without blemish” (Leviticus 4:23). It is derived from the phrase: “Wherein he has sinned,” that he is not liable until it becomes known to him specifically with which item he sinned. The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Eliezer, what does he do with this phrase: “Which he has sinned”? The Gemara answers: He requires it for the halakha that only one who is aware of his action is liable, as this phrase excludes one who acts unawares and inadvertently commits a transgression.