משנה: מִי שְׁהָיָה מוּשְׁלָךְ בַּבּוֹר וְאָמַר כָּל־הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ אֶת קוֹלִי יִכְתּוֹב גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ. הַבָּרִיא שֶׁאָמַר כִּתְבוּ גֵט לְאִשְׁתִּי רָצָה לְשַׂחֵק בָּהּ. מַעֲשֶׂה בְבָרִיא אֶחָד שֶׁאָמַר כִּתְבוּ גֵט לְאִשְׁתִּי וְעָלָה לְרֹאשׁ הַגַּג וְנָפַל וָמֵת. אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. אָֽמְרוּ חֲכָמִים אִם מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל הֲרֵי זֶה גֵט. אִם הָרוּחַ דְּחָאַתּוּ אֵינוֹ גֵט. MISHNAH: If somebody was thrown into a cistern119From here on, the text is from Peah 3:9 (פ), Note 155. and said, anybody hearing my voice should write a bill of divorce for my wife120Naturally, he has to declare his and his wife’s full names as well as their place of residence. The people hearing him do not have to ask for further identification., they should write and deliver121Even though he did not say that the bill should be delivered.. If a healthy person said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, he wants to make fun of her122Since he did not instruct anybody to deliver the bill, it is invalid.. It happened to a healthy person who had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, that he went on the roof123After the bill had been written and (erroneously) been delivered to the wife when he was still alive., fell down, and died. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, the Sages said that if he jumped, it is a bill of divorce124The bill of divorce of the suicide retroactively becomes an emergency bill and is valid.; if the wind pushed him, it is no bill of divorce.
הלכה: מִי שְׁהָיָה מוּשְׁלָךְ בַּבּוֹר כול׳. אָמַר רִבִּי חֲנִינָה. לִימְּדָנוּ רִבִּי יוֹנָתָן. וְהֵן שֶׁרָאוּ בּוּבְייָה שֶׁלְּאָדָם. תַּמָּן תַּנִינָן. מְעִידִין לְאוֹר הַנֵּר וּלְאוֹר הַלְּבָנָה וּמַשִּׂיאִין עַל פִּי בַת קוֹל. וָמַר רִבִּי יוֹנָתָן. וְהֵן שֶׁרָאוּ בּוּבְייָה שֶׁלְּאָדָם. רִבִּי אָחָא בַּר חֲנִינָה בְשֵׁם רִבִּי חֲנִינָה. הָדָה דְתֵימַר בַּשָּׂדֶה. אֲבָל בָּעִיר אֲפִילוּ לֹא רָאוּ בּוּבְייָה שֶׁלְּאָדָם. וְהָתַנִּינָן. מִי שֶׁהָיָה מוּשְׁלָךְ בַּבּוֹר. וְאָמַר רִבִּי יוֹנָתָן. וְהֵן שֶׁרָאוּ בּוּבְייָה שֶׁל אָדָם. אָמַר רִבִּי אָבִין. הַמַּזִּיקִין הָיוּ מְצוּיִין בַּבּוֹרוֹת כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁהֵן מְצוּיִין בַּשָּׂדוֹת. HALAKHAH: “If somebody was thrown into a cistern,” etc. 125This text essentially is from Yebamot 16:6, Notes 117–124. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jonathan taught us, only if they saw a man’s shadow. There we have stated: “One testifies by the light of a candle or by the light of the moon and one permits to remarry on the basis of a disembodied voice”, and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow. Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That means, in the fields, but in town even without a man’s shadow. But did we not state: “If somebody had been thrown into a cistern,” and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow? Rebbi Abin said, damaging spirits were126This disclaimer of the current existence of spirits is not in the Yebamot text (which is an insert of the corrector, not a text by the original scribe), nor in the text quoted by Rashba (Novellae to 66a) The Babli definitely believes in evil spirits. The sentence is quoted by Tosaphot (s.v. וליחוש, 66a) as מְצוּיִין הֵן בַּשָּׂדוֹת “they are found in the fields.” But that text is not usable as witness since it is thoroughly babylonized, using תימא for תימר, בבואה for בובייה. as frequent in cisterns as they are frequent on the fields.
סָפֵק מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל סָפֵק הָרוּחַ דָּחַתּוּ. נִישְׁמְעִינָהּ מִן הָדָא. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר. אִם עַל אָתָר נָפַל הֲרֵי זֶה גֵט. וְאִם לְאַחַר זְמָן נָפַל אֵינוֹ גֵט. וְהָהֵן עַל אָתָר וְלֹא סָפֵק הוּא. הָדָא אָֽמְרָה. סָפֵק מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל סָפֵק הָרוּחַ דָּחִייַתּוּ הְרֵי זֶה גֵט. If it was doubtful whether he jumped or the wind pushed him? Let us hear from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he fell down immediately, it is a bill of divorce; if he fell after some time it is no bill of divorce. But is “immediately” not a case of doubt whether he jumped or the wind pushed him? This implies that in case of doubt whether he jumped or the wind pushed him, it is a bill of divorce127The different versions of the Tosephta seem to disagree with the Yerushalmi (the topic is not treated in the Babli). Tosephta 4:7 (Lieberman) “If a healthy person said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, climbed on a roof, and fell down, one writes and delivers as long as he still is alive. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he jumped, it is a bill of divorce; if he fell down after some time, it is no bill of divorce since I may say that the wind pushed him.” Tosephta 6:9 (Zuckermandel): “If a healthy person said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, climbed on a roof, and fell down, one writes and delivers as long as he still is alive. If he fell down after some time, it is no bill of divorce since I may say that the wind pushed him.” Tosephta (quote of Rashba): “If a healthy person said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, climbed on a roof, and fell down, one writes but does not deliver since I may say that the wind pushed him.” A discussion of the different versions is in J. N. Epstein, 2מבוא לנוסח המשנה, p. 600–601..
שְׁחָטָהּ לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לָעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לָעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר. הַמַחֲשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר. אֵין הַמַחֲשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת. הָתִיב רִבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי קוֹמֵי רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. וְהָתַנִּינָן. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר. קַל וְחוֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים. מַה אִם בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁהַמַּחֲשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בַּמּוּקְדָּשִׁין וכו׳. וּפִיגּוּל וְנוֹתָר הַמַּחֲשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת. אָמַר לֵיהּ. פִּיגּוּל וְנוֹתָר אִין הַמַּחֲשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת. אֲבָל אִם שְׁחָטָהּ לִזְרוֹק אֶת דָּמָהּ לָעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְלִקְטוֹר חֶלְבָּהּ לָעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה אֵין הַמַחֲשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת. שְׁחָטָהּ וְזָרַק דָּמָהּ לָעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְהִקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לָעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. זֶה הָיָה מַעֲשֶׂה בְקַיְסָרִין וְלֹא אָֽמְרוּ לֹא לְאִיסּוּר וְלֹא לְהֵיתֵר. רִבִּי חֲנִינָה בְשֵׁם רַב חִסְדָּא. זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת לֹא חָשׁוּ. אִין תֵּימַר חָשׁוּ. הָיָה לָהֶם לְהוֹרוֹת אִיסּוּר. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בְשֵׁם רַב חִסְדָּא. זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת שֶׁחָשׁוּ. אִין תֵּימַר לֹא חָשׁוּ. לֹא הָיָה לָהֶן לְהוֹרוֹת. If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry128Any idolatrous sacrifice is forbidden for any use; Deut. 13:18., Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates129If the slaughter were for idolatry, everybody would agree that the meat is forbidden for consumption. But here the slaughter is not intended for idolatry, only that later part of the blood and fat would be used for idolatrous purposes, for instance, if the animal is a Gentile’s property; cf. Note 131., Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate130Only an action can trigger the prohibition. If the Gentile takes part of the animal for himself for idolatrous purposes after he had sold most of the meat to Jews, there is no reason why the meat should be forbidden to Jews.. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state131Mishnah Ḥulin 2:7: “If somebody slaughters for a Gentile, his slaughtering is valid, but Rebbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rebbi Eliezer said: Even if he slaughtered it only for the Gentile to eat the appendage of its liver, it is invalid since the Gentile’s thoughts are always for idolatry. Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, everything is determined by the person who officiates; in the case of profane food which cannot become invalidated by thought, it is only logical that everything depend on the slaughterer.”
It is forbidden to eat from a sacrifice after its appointed time (piggul) or outside the appropriate sacred precinct. If the slaughterer intends the sacrifice to be eaten at the wrong time or place, the entire sacrifice becomes invalid. But if the owners had the same idea, their intentions are irrelevant; they could invalidate the sacrifice only by actually using it at the wrong time and at the wrong place. R. Yose argues that profane slaughter cannot have rules more strict than sacrificial slaughter. If the owner’s intentions are irrelevant for sacrificial slaughter, they must be irrelevant also for profane slaughter.: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover132A sacrifice not eaten during its appointed time becomes forbidden as leftover even if it was not intended from the start to be eaten out of its time.. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate133He holds that only for Jewish sacrifices does the wrong thought at slaughter invalidate the act; for all others the wrong thought invalidates the act but is not transferable to others. If the slaughter was for idolatry, the entire meat is forbidden. If the slaughter was for using part of the blood or fat for idolatry, that blood or fat becomes forbidden by being used; it has no influence on the other parts. (Babli Ḥulin 39a/b).. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite134In the Babli (Ḥulin 39b): It was slaughtered and after that [the slaughterer] expressed an intention [of idolatry]., there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive135In the Babli, the reference is to the opinion of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel in the Mishnah, who holds that a later action indicates a prior thought. If suicide can validate a prior bill of divorce then idolatrous practice can invalidate a prior slaughter. Since this also explains the insertion of the paragraph here, it has to be accepted as explanation.. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case136A rabbi could have dismissed the case without bringing it to the attention of the full court. But what they really said was that the scrupulous should not eat from the meat; those who did eat did not sin..