אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מְהֵרָה דְּמָרֵי עָלְמָא תַּמְנֵי מְאָה וְחַמְשִׁין וְתַרְתֵּי הוּא Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Learn from this numerical value that soon [mehera] for the Master of the World is eight hundred and fifty-two years, as it is stated in the verse in Deuteronomy: “You will soon [maher] utterly perish.” Since the Jewish people dwelled in Eretz Yisrael for almost this amount of time, it is apparently considered soon.
מַתְנִי׳ גֵּט מְעוּשֶּׂה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל כָּשֵׁר וּבְגוֹיִם פָּסוּל וּבְגוֹיִם חוֹבְטִין אוֹתוֹ וְאוֹמְרִים לוֹ עֲשֵׂה מַה שֶּׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל אוֹמְרִים לָךְ (וְכָשֵׁר) MISHNA: With regard to a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled by the court to write and give his wife, if he was compelled by a Jewish court it is valid, but if he was compelled by gentiles it is invalid. But with regard to gentiles they may beat him at the request of the Jewish court and say to him: Do what the Jews are telling you, and it is a valid divorce.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל גֵּט הַמְעוּשֶּׂה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל כַּדִּין כָּשֵׁר שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין פָּסוּל וּפוֹסֵל GEMARA: Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: With regard to a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled by a Jewish court to give his wife, if they did so lawfully, as the halakha obligated the husband to divorce his wife, it is valid. This is referring to cases where sexual intercourse is forbidden or specific cases where the Sages instituted that the husband is obligated to divorce his wife. If they did so unlawfully, the bill of divorce is invalid, but it is not considered entirely invalid, as it disqualifies the wife from marrying a priest after her husband’s death.
וּבְגוֹיִם כַּדִּין פָּסוּל וּפוֹסֵל שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין אֲפִילּוּ רֵיחַ הַגֵּט אֵין בּוֹ And in a case where the husband was compelled by gentiles, if he was compelled lawfully, the bill of divorce is invalid, but it also disqualifies the wife from marrying a priest. But if he was compelled unlawfully it does not have even the trace of a bill of divorce, and the wife is not even disqualified from marrying a priest.
מָה נַפְשָׁךְ אִי גּוֹיִם בְּנֵי עַשּׂוֹיֵי נִינְהוּ אִיתַּכְשׁוֹרֵי נָמֵי לִיתַּכְשַׁר אִי לָאו בְּנֵי עַשּׂוֹיֵי נִינְהוּ מִיפְסָל לָא לִיפְסֹל The Gemara raises an objection: With regard to the statement that if the husband was compelled by gentiles the divorce is invalid but it also disqualifies the wife from marrying a priest, whichever way you look at it, the statement is difficult. If gentiles are legally capable of compulsion, it should be rendered valid with regard to the woman’s permission to remarry as well. If they are not legally capable of compulsion, it should not disqualify her either.
אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא דְּבַר תּוֹרָה גֵּט מְעוּשֶּׂה בַּגּוֹיִם כָּשֵׁר וּמָה טַעַם אָמְרוּ פָּסוּל שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת הוֹלֶכֶת וְתוֹלָה עַצְמָהּ בְּגוֹי ומַפְקַעַת עַצְמָהּ מִיַּד בַּעְלָהּ Rav Mesharshiyya says: By Torah law a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled by gentiles to write and give his wife is valid, and what is the reason the Sages said that it is invalid? It is so that each and every woman will not go and depend on a gentile to compel her husband to divorce her through temptation or bribery, and thereby she will release herself from her husband unlawfully.
אִי הָכִי שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין אֲפִילּוּ רֵיחַ הַגֵּט אֵין בּוֹ וְנֶהֱוֵי שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל וּמִפְסָל נָמֵי לִפְסוֹל The Gemara asks: If that is so, that where the husband was compelled by gentiles the bill of divorce is valid by Torah law, why did Shmuel rule that if he was compelled unlawfully it does not have even the trace of a bill of divorce? Let a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled unlawfully by gentiles to give his wife be compared to a case where he was compelled unlawfully by Jews, and disqualify the wife from marrying a priest as well.
אֶלָּא הָא דְּרַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא בְּדוּתָא הִיא Rather, that statement of Rav Mesharshiyya, that by Torah law a bill of divorce is valid even if the husband was compelled by gentiles to write it and give it to his wife, is a mistake. In principle it does not have even the trace of a bill of divorce, even if the husband is required by law to divorce his wife.
וְטַעְמָא מַאי כַּדִּין בְּכַדִּין דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל מִיחַלַּף שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין בְּכַדִּין [דְּ]יִשְׂרָאֵל לָא מִיחַלַּף And what is the reason that the wife is disqualified from marrying a priest in this case? It is because the case where the husband was compelled lawfully by gentiles can be confused with a case where he was compelled lawfully by Jews. If a bill of divorce that gentiles compelled the husband to write and give to his wife carries no weight, people might think that this is likewise the halakha with regard to a case where Jews compelled the husband to do so. Therefore, the Sages issued a decree that even if the husband was compelled by gentiles the wife is disqualified from marrying a priest. By contrast, the case where the husband was compelled unlawfully by gentiles cannot be confused with a case where he was compelled lawfully by Jews, as they are too dissimilar. Therefore, a bill of divorce that gentiles unlawfully compelled the husband to write and give his wife is entirely invalid.
אַבָּיֵי אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּיָתֵיב וְקָא מְעַשֵּׂה אַגִּיטֵּי אֲמַר לֵיהּ וְהָא אֲנַן הֶדְיוֹטוֹת אֲנַן וְתַנְיָא הָיָה רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאַתָּה מוֹצֵא אֲגוֹרִיאוֹת שֶׁל גּוֹיִם אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁדִּינֵיהֶם כְּדִינֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אִי אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לְהִיזָּקֵק לָהֶם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר וְאֵלֶּה הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים אֲשֶׁר תָּשִׂים לִפְנֵיהֶם לִפְנֵיהֶם וְלֹא לִפְנֵי גּוֹיִם דָּבָר אַחֵר לִפְנֵיהֶם וְלֹא לִפְנֵי הֶדְיוֹטוֹת § Abaye found Rav Yosef sitting in court as the judge and compelling husbands to give their wives bills of divorce. He said to him: But aren’t we ordinary people, not ordained judges? And it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Tarfon would say: With regard to any place where you find gentile courts [agoriot], even if their laws are like Jewish laws, you may not attend them, as it is stated: “Now these are the ordinances which you shall set before them” (Exodus 21:1). It is derived from here that one may go to court only before them, i.e., Jewish judges, and not before gentiles. Alternatively, it is derived that one may go to court before them, i.e., ordained judges, and not before ordinary people. Since we are not ordained judges, how can you perform a distinctly judicial act?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אֲנַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ קָא עָבְדִינַן מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַהוֹדָאוֹת וְהַלְוָאוֹת Rav Yosef said to him: We see ourselves as agents of the ordained judges in Eretz Yisrael, and we are performing our task as judges on the basis of their agency, just as is the case with regard to cases of admissions and loans, which we attend to on the same basis.
אִי הָכִי גְּזֵילוֹת וְחַבָּלוֹת נָמֵי כִּי עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ בְּמִילְּתָא דִשְׁכִיחָא בְּמִילְּתָא דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא לָא עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ The Gemara asks: If so, why is the halakha that judges living outside Eretz Yisrael do not judge in cases of robbery and personal injury? They should judge in these cases as well. The Gemara answers: When we perform our tasks as judges on the basis of their agency, it is with regard to common matters, e.g., cases that pertain to the halakhot of admissions and loans, which arise frequently between people. But with regard to uncommon matters, e.g., cases of robbery or personal injury, we do not perform our tasks as judges on the basis of their agency.
מַתְנִי׳ יָצָא שְׁמָהּ בָּעִיר מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא שָׁם אֲמַתְלָא MISHNA: If a rumor circulated in the city that an unmarried woman is betrothed, she is considered to be betrothed. Similarly, if a rumor circulated that a married woman is divorced, she is divorced, provided there is no valid alternative explanation [amatla] for the rumor.
אֵיזוֹ הִיא אֲמַתְלָא גֵּירַשׁ אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ עַל תְּנַאי זָרַק לָהּ קִידּוּשֶׁיהָ סָפֵק קָרוֹב לָהּ סָפֵק קָרוֹב לוֹ זוֹ הִיא אֲמַתְלָא What is considered a valid explanation? For example, it is a case where there is a rumor that so-and-so divorced his wife but that the bill of divorce was given to her conditionally. It is therefore possible that the condition was not fulfilled and she is not actually divorced. Similarly, if there is a rumor that a woman was betrothed but that the man threw her betrothal, i.e., the money or document of betrothal, to her, and it is uncertain whether it was closer to her and uncertain whether it was closer to him, and therefore the status of their betrothal is likewise uncertain, this is considered a valid explanation.
גְּמָ׳ וְאָסְרִינַן לַהּ אַגַּבְרָא וְהָא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי כֹּל קָלָא דְּבָתַר נִישּׂוּאִין לָא חָיְישִׁינַן לֵיהּ GEMARA: With regard to the statement that a woman who is rumored to be divorced is divorced, do we render her forbidden to her husband if she is married to a priest? But didn’t Rav Ashi say that we are not concerned about any rumor that circulates after marriage? Accordingly, a woman should not be compelled to leave her husband merely on the basis of a rumor.
הָכִי קָאָמַר יָצָא שְׁמָהּ בָּעִיר מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וּמְגוֹרֶשֶׁת The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna is saying: If a rumor circulated in the city that a woman is betrothed, she is betrothed, and she may not marry another man until she receives a bill of divorce from the man to whom she is rumored to be betrothed. If she is rumored to have been betrothed to a certain man and subsequently divorced from him,