Gittin 82bגיטין פ״ב ב
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82bפ״ב ב

שר"א מתיר לכל אדם חוץ מאותו האיש וחכמים אוסרים

as in this case Rabbi Eliezer permits her to marry any man except for that man about whom the condition was made, and the Rabbis prohibit her from remarrying, as in their opinion this divorce is not valid.

מאי טעמא דר"א מידי דהוה אכל תנאי דעלמא ורבנן כל תנאי דעלמא לא שייר ליה בגט הכא שייר לה בגט

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning behind Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion as cited in the baraita? The Gemara answers: The ruling here is just as it is with regard to any typical condition. The husband has the right to attach conditions to the divorce. And how would the Rabbis respond to this reasoning? They would reason that by attaching any typical condition the husband did not leave out part of the bill of divorce, as it does not diminish the essential act of severance. By contrast, here he left out part of the bill of divorce, as she is not permitted to marry any man she wishes. Therefore, the divorce is invalid.

ומתני' דאוקימנא בחוץ מאי טעמא דר"א

The Gemara asks: And according to the mishna, which we established as referring to a case of exception, what is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion that the divorce takes effect, despite its lack of complete severance?

א"ר ינאי משום זקן אחד אמר קרא (דברים כד, ב) ויצאה מביתו והלכה והיתה לאיש אחר אפילו לא התירה אלא לאיש אחר הרי זו מגורשת ורבנן (אמרי טעמא דר"א) האי איש לכל איש ואיש

Rabbi Yannai said in the name of one elder that the verse states with regard to divorce: “And she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2), indicating that even if he divorced her in a manner that only permitted her to marry one other man, she is divorced, i.e., this partial severance takes effect. And the Rabbis would say in response to Rabbi Eliezer’s explanation that this phrase: Another man, which appears in the verse refers not to a specific man but to any man, i.e., it must be permitted for her to marry any man for the divorce to take effect.

ורבי יוחנן אמר טעמא דר"א מהכא (ויקרא כא, ז) ואשה גרושה מאישה לא יקחו אפילו לא נתגרשה אלא מאישה נפסלה מן הכהונה אלמא הוי גיטא

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is from the verse here, where it is stated with regard to priests: “Neither may they take a woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7). This verse indicates that even if she was divorced only from her husband, and was not permitted to marry others, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood as a divorcée, i.e., she may not marry a priest even after her husband’s death. Apparently, all the more so, divorce that excludes certain men from the wife’s right to remarry is considered a valid bill of divorce. This is certainly the case when the divorce permits her to marry all men with the exception of one.

ורבנן איסור כהונה שאני

And the Rabbis would respond that the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is different, as even a divorce that is otherwise invalid disqualifies a woman from marrying a priest.

בעי רבי אבא בקידושין היאך תיבעי לר"א תיבעי לרבנן

§ Rabbi Abba raises a dilemma: If this kind of exception is made in a case of betrothal, i.e., the man says to the woman that she is hereby forbidden to all men except for so-and-so, how is this betrothal treated? The Gemara elaborates: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis.

תיבעי לר"א עד כאן לא קאמר רבי אליעזר הכא אלא משום דכתיבי קראי אבל התם קנין מעליא בעינן או דלמא ויצאה והיתה

Let the dilemma be raised according to Rabbi Eliezer: Is Rabbi Eliezer saying only here that the divorce is valid because verses are written that support this proposition, as delineated by Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yoḥanan; but there, in the case of betrothal, a proper acquisition is necessary, which is not the case when a certain man is excluded from the prohibition to engage in sexual intercourse with her? Or should it perhaps be derived from the juxtaposition between the clause: “And she departs out of his house,” and the clause: “And becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2), which serves as a basis for the comparison of the halakhot of divorce and betrothal, teaching that just as divorce takes effect in this manner, so does betrothal?

תיבעי לרבנן עד כאן לא קאמרי רבנן הכא אלא דבעינן כריתות וליכא אבל התם קנין כל דהו או דלמא ויצאה והיתה

Let the dilemma be raised according to the Rabbis: Are the Rabbis saying here that the divorce is invalid only because the severance of the bond between the husband and wife is necessary for the divorce to take effect, and there is no such severance as long as the woman may not marry any man she wishes; but there, in the case of betrothal, any form of acquisition is sufficient for it to take effect? Or should it perhaps be derived from the juxtaposition between the clause beginning: “And she departs,” and the clause beginning: “And becomes,” that what renders a divorce invalid renders a betrothal invalid as well?

לבתר דאיבעיא ליה הדר פשטה בין לרבי אליעזר בין לרבנן בעינן ויצאה והיתה

After Rabbi Abba raised the dilemma he then resolved it in the following manner: Both according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and according to the opinion of the Rabbis it is necessary to compare the halakha in the case of betrothal to the ruling with regard to divorce, based on the juxtaposition between “And she departs” and: “And becomes.” Therefore, the dispute remains in this case as well.

אמר אביי אם תמצא לומר איתא לדרבי אבא

Abaye said: If you say that Rabbi Abba’s solution is so, i.e., if you say that Rabbi Eliezer holds that making an exception in a betrothal is valid, the issue of levirate marriage in such cases must be addressed.

בא ראובן וקידשה חוץ משמעון ובא שמעון וקידשה חוץ מראובן ומתו שניהם מתיבמת ללוי ואין אני קורא בה אשת שני מתים

If Reuven came to a woman and betrothed her saying that she is forbidden to all men except for his brother Shimon, and Shimon then came and betrothed her saying that she is forbidden to all men except for Reuven, and they both died without children, in this case she performs levirate marriage with their brother Levi, and I do not call her the wife of two dead men. It is stated in tractate Yevamot (31b) that if a woman has a levirate bond with a man due to her two late husbands who were his brothers, she may not perform levirate marriage with him, as it is derived from the verse: “The wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family” (Deuteronomy 25:5), that the wife of only one dead man performs levirate marriage, not the wife of two. Abaye stated that in the case under discussion the woman may perform levirate marriage with Levi.

מאי טעמא קידושי דראובן אהנו קידושי דשמעון לא אהנו

What is the reason that she is not considered to be the wife of two dead men? It is that although her betrothal to Reuven was effective, i.e., it took effect, her betrothal to Shimon was not effective, as it did not render her forbidden to any man to whom she was not already forbidden due to her betrothal to Reuven. Therefore, she is considered only Reuven’s wife.

ואלא אשת שני מתים היכי משכחת לה כגון שבא ראובן וקידשה חוץ משמעון. ובא שמעון וקידשה סתם דקידושי ראובן אהנו למיסרא אעלמא וקידושי דשמעון אהנו למיסרא אראובן

Rather, under what circumstances is the case of a wife of two dead men found in this context? It is found in a case where Reuven came and betrothed her, saying that she is hereby forbidden to all men except for Shimon, and Shimon then came and betrothed her without specifying any qualifications. Since Reuven’s betrothal was effective in rendering her forbidden to everyone except for Shimon, and Shimon’s betrothal was effective in rendering her forbidden to Reuven, the betrothal of both brothers took effect. And if both of them die she may not perform levirate marriage with Levi, as she is the wife of two dead men.

בעי אביי אמר לה הרי את מותרת לכל אדם חוץ מראובן ושמעון וחזר ואמר לה לראובן ושמעון מהו

Abaye raises a dilemma: If a man said to his wife while handing her a bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for Reuven and Shimon, and he then said to her: You are permitted to marry Reuven and Shimon, what is the halakha?

מי אמרינן מאי דאסר שרא או דלמא מאי דאסר שרא ומאי דשרא אסר אם תמצא לומר

Do we say that what he forbade initially he then permitted, enabling her to marry anyone, including Reuven and Shimon, in which case the severance is complete? Or perhaps what he forbade initially he then permitted, permitting her to marry Reuven and Shimon, and what he permitted initially he then forbade, i.e., he permitted her only to Reuven and Shimon, excluding all other men? If you say