Gittin 74bגיטין ע״ד ב
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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74bע״ד ב

והתניא מהיום ולאחר מיתה גט ואינו גט דברי חכמים רבי אומר כזה גט

And it is taught in a baraita: If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, then this is both a valid bill of divorce and not a valid bill of divorce. This is the statement of the Rabbis. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagrees and says: A case like this is a valid bill of divorce without any uncertainty. This teaches that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree only in this case, but everyone agrees that when he employed the language: On the condition, it is as though he stipulated: From now.

ולרב יהודה דאמר בעל מנת פליגי אדמיפלגי במהיום ולאחר מיתה ליפלגי בעל מנת להודיעך כחו דרבי

The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Yehuda, who said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree about one who employs the language: On the condition, rather than disagreeing with regard to the case where the husband said: From today and after my death, let them disagree with regard to the case where the husband said: On the condition. The Gemara answers that the baraita uses this case to inform you about the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who is certain that the bill of divorce is valid.

וליפלגו בעל מנת ולהודיעך כחן דרבנן כח דהיתירא עדיף ליה:

The Gemara challenges: And let them disagree about: On the condition, to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, who do not hold that the phrase: On the condition, is considered to be like the phrase: From now, as this ruling is a more general matter. The Gemara answers: It is preferable to emphasize the power of leniency, and therefore it is preferable to teach the degree to which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is lenient.

על מנת שתתני לי מכאן ועד שלשים יום וכו': פשיטא מהו דתימא קפידיה לאו קפידא ולזרזה קאתי קא משמע לן:

§ The mishna teaches: If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me money from now until the conclusion of thirty days, if she gives the money to him within thirty days she is divorced, and if not she is not divorced. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious, since everything depends on whether or not the condition was fulfilled? The Gemara answers: No, the halakha that the divorce does not take effect unless she gives the money by that time needs to be said, lest you say that the concern of the husband that his wife will give him the money within a specific time frame is not a real concern, and he comes only to galvanize her. Although he wishes to receive this money as soon as possible, in truth he does not care if he receives it later. Therefore, it teaches us that his statement is a valid condition, and if she does not fulfill it then it is not a valid bill of divorce.

אמר רבן שמעון בן גמליאל מעשה בצידן כו: מאי תנא דקתני מעשה

§ The mishna teaches that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: There was an incident in the city of Tzaidan involving one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat, and she lost his coat. And the Rabbis said that she should give him the value of that coat, and by doing so she fulfills the condition and is divorced. The Gemara asks: What did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel teach before, such that he now teaches and cites an incident which is similar to it? This incident does not seem to be referring to what was stated immediately before in the mishna.

חסורי מיחסרא והכי קתני אם אמר לה ע"מ שתתני לי איצטליתי ואבדה איצטליתו איצטליתי דוקא קאמר לה רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר תתן לו את דמיה ואמר רבן שמעון בן גמליאל מעשה נמי בצידן באחד שאמר לאשתו הרי זה גיטך על מנת שתתני לי אצטליתי ואבדה אצטליתו ואמרו חכמים תתן לו את דמיה

The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: If the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat, and she lost his coat, then since he specifically stated to her: Give me my coat, she cannot give him its value instead. And since she has lost the coat, the bill of divorce is not valid; this is the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In such a case she can give him its value. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said in support of his statement: There was an incident also in the city of Tzaidan involving one who said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me my coat, and she lost his coat. And the Rabbis said that she should give him its value.

בעא מיניה רבי אסי מרבי יוחנן הרי זה גיטך על מנת שתתני לי מאתים זוז וחזר ואמר לה מחולים לך מהו

Rabbi Asi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and afterward he returned and said to her: It is waived for you, then what is the halakha?

תיבעי לרבנן תיבעי לרשב"ג

He explained his question in detail: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis, and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

תיבעי לרבנן עד כאן לא קאמרי רבנן התם אלא דלא אחלה גבה אבל הכא הא קאמר לה מחולים לך או דלמא אפילו רשב"ג לא קאמר אלא דקא מפייסה ליה בדמי אבל לגמרי לא אמר ליה אינה מגורשת

Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis: One can say that only there do the Rabbis state their opinion that she is not divorced if the condition is not fulfilled and she gives him his coat, because he did not waive his claim to it; but here he says to her: It is waived for you, so they are divorced. Or perhaps one can say that even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that she can be divorced even if he does not receive the coat only there, as she appeases him by giving him money, i.e., the condition is considered to be fulfilled due to the fact that he received the value of the coat; but in a case where he waives the condition entirely, no, because he does not receive anything from her. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him in response: She is not divorced, because the condition has not been fulfilled.

איתיביה האומר לחבירו קונם שאתה נהנה לי אם אי אתה נותן לבני כור אחד של חטין ושתי חביות של יין ר"מ אומר אסור עד שיתן וחכמים אומרים אף זה יכול להתיר את נדרו שלא ע"פ חכם ואומר הריני כאילו התקבלתי

He raised an objection to his opinion from a mishna (Nedarim 63b): In the case of one who says to another: Benefiting from me is konam for you, meaning it is prohibited for you to derive benefit from me, if you do not give my son one kor of wheat and two barrels of wine as a wedding gift, Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited for this other person to benefit from the person who took the vow until he gives his son the gift. And the Rabbis say: Even this individual who took the vow can dissolve his vow without the consent of a halakhic authority, and he does this by saying: I hereby consider it as though I have received the gift from you. Based on this mishna, it would seem that if the husband forgives his wife the money that she owes him, it should be considered as if he received it, and the bill of divorce should be valid.

הכי השתא התם לצעורה קא מכוין ולא ציערה הכא משום הרווחה הוא והא לא איצטריך

The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of a bill of divorce, he intends to vex her, and until she pays him he did not vex her. If he forgives this condition, his initial intention has not been fulfilled. Here, in the case of the vow, the reason the father took the vow is for the sake of profit; he wants his son to receive a valuable gift, but subsequently the one who took the vow decides that it was not necessary. Therefore, he can waive his claim.

ההוא גברא דאמר ליה לאריסיה כולי עלמא דלו תלת דלוותא ואכלי ריבעא את דלי ארבעה ואכול תילתא לסוף אתא מיטרא

The Gemara relates an incident of a certain man who said to his sharecropper: Everyone waters the field three times during the season, and they consume, i.e., receive as payment, one quarter of the crops from the field. Will you water four times and consume as your payment one-third of the produce? Ultimately, rain came when the sharecropper would have needed to water a fourth time, and so he did not need to water the field a fourth time. The question was presented to the Sages: Is the sharecropper still entitled to receive one-third of the produce since he was prepared to water the field four times, although ultimately it was not necessary to do so?

אמר רב יוסף הא לא דלה רבה אמר הא לא איצטריכא

Rav Yosef said: But he did not water the field a fourth time, so the condition was not fulfilled. Consequently, he deserves the same as the other sharecroppers, and receives only one quarter of the produce. Rabba said: But it was not necessary to water the field the fourth time because the rain fell to the benefit of the sharecropper, and therefore he should receive one-third of the produce.

לימא רב יוסף דאמר כרבנן ורבה דאמר כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rav Yosef said his ruling in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who require that the condition of the bill of divorce be fulfilled, and that Rabba said his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that it is not the fulfillment of the specifics of the condition that matter but the fulfillment of the intent of the condition?

ותיסברא והא קיימא לן הילכתא כוותיה דרבה ובהא אין הלכה כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל

The Gemara asks: And how can you understand it in this way? But don’t we maintain that in all of their disputes the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba when he disagrees with Rav Yosef? And with regard to this halakha we maintain that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. If so, this presents a contradiction between one halakha and another.

אלא לעולם כרבנן רב יוסף כרבנן ורבה אמר לך אנא דאמרי אפילו לרבנן עד כאן לא קאמרי רבנן התם אלא דלצעורה קא מיכוין אבל הכא משום הרווחה הוא והא לא איצטריך

Rather, according to both opinions, this dispute is actually in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rav Yosef clearly rules in accordance with the Rabbis. And Rabba could have said to you: I was saying my statement even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, as the Rabbis are saying there that she is not divorced if she does not return the coat itself only when the husband intends to vex her, and if she does not need to give the coat itself she will not be vexed, as it is not difficult for her to give him its value. But here, in the case of watering the field, the reason the owner is making the condition is only for the sake of increasing his profit, and it was not necessary to actually water the field.

תנן התם בראשונה היה נטמן יום שנים עשר חדש כדי שיהא חלוט לו התקין הלל הזקן שיהא חולש את מעותיו ללשכה ויהא שובר את הדלת ונכנס ואימתי שירצה הלה יבוא ויטול את מעותיו

§ With regard to the redemption of houses in walled cities, we learned elsewhere in a mishna (Arakhin 31b) that if a house was sold and not redeemed by its owners within twelve months it remains permanently in the possession of the purchaser. The Gemara describes this: At first the purchaser would hide for all of the final day of the twelfth month so that the house would be confirmed as his (see Leviticus 25:29–30). Because the purchaser was in hiding, the seller would be unable to redeem the house from him. Hillel the Elder instituted an ordinance whereby the seller may deposit [ḥolesh] his redemption money in the Temple treasury chamber, and then he may break the door of his house and enter and take possession. And when that purchaser wishes, he should come and take his money from the Temple treasury.

ואמר רבא מתקנתו של הלל נשמע הרי זה גיטך על מנת שתתני לי מאתים זוז ונתנה לו מדעתו מגורשת על כורחו אינה מגורשת

And Rava says: From the ordinance of Hillel we learn that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and she gave him the money with his consent, then she is divorced. If she gave it to him against his will then she is not divorced.

מדאיצטריך ליה להלל לתקוני נתינה בעל כורחיה דהויא לה נתינה

How does Rava prove this? From the fact that it was necessary for Hillel to institute a unique ordinance in the case of houses in walled cities whereby giving against the will of the receiver is considered giving.