פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי הַדַּיָּינִין שֶׁבְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי so-and-so and so-and-so the judges, in such and such a place, in order that I will collect any debt that I am owed by so-and-so whenever I wish. Despite the fact that the prosbol mentions only two people, it nevertheless refers to them as judges, in accordance with the statement of Rav Naḥman.
וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת אַטּוּ תַּנָּא כִּי רוֹכְלָא לִיחְשֹׁיב וְלֵיזִיל And Rav Sheshet would respond to this: Is that to say that the tanna should have continued counting judges like a peddler? The tanna twice used the expression so-and-so because he wished to note that one should mention the judges’ names; he did not intend to teach anything about the number of judges.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ דִּתְנַן הַדַּיָּינִים חוֹתְמִין לְמַטָּה אוֹ הָעֵדִים מַאי לָאו דַּיָּינִים דֻּומְיָא דְּעֵדִים מָה עֵדִים שְׁנַיִם אַף דַּיָּינִים נָמֵי שְׁנַיִם וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת מִידֵּי אִירְיָא הָא כִּדְאִיתָא וְהָא כִּדְאִיתָא Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say that two judges are also considered a court? As we learned in a mishna with regard to a prosbol (Shevi’it 10:4): The judges sign below the text of the prosbol, or the witnesses do so. What, is it not possible to deduce: The mishna means that judges are similar to witnesses? Just as there are two witnesses, so too, there are also two judges. And Rav Sheshet would respond to this: Are the cases comparable? This case of the judges is as it is, and that case of the witnesses is as it is, each one with its respective requirement of three or two members.
לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנֵא דַּיָּינִים לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנֵא עֵדִים הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּלָא שְׁנָא כָּתוּב בִּלְשׁוֹן דַּיָּינִים וְחָתְמִי עֵדִים וְלָא שְׁנָא כָּתוּב בִּלְשׁוֹן עֵדִים וְחָתְמִי דַּיָּינִים The Gemara asks with regard to the mishna in Shevi’it: Why do I need the tanna to teach that it can be signed by judges, and why do I need him to teach that it can be signed by witnesses as well? Why is it necessary to mention both? The Gemara answers: This teaches us that there is no difference if the prosbol is written in the terminology of judges and witnesses sign it, and there is no difference if it is written in the terminology of witnesses and judges sign it. What is important is that the prosbol was written and then signed by the court, and the precise wording is not important.
מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם מַאי מִפְּנֵי תִּיקּוּן הָעוֹלָם רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר מִפְּנֵי תַּקָּנַת מַמְזֵרִים רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר מִפְּנֵי תַּקָּנַת עֲגוּנוֹת § The mishna taught that Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one may not render a bill of divorce void in a court elsewhere for the betterment of the world. The Gemara asks: What problem did Rabban Gamliel ameliorate that this is considered to be for the betterment of the world? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is for the benefit of potential children born from an adulterous relationship [mamzerim], as the husband might render a bill of divorce void unbeknownst to his wife. She might remarry after having received the void bill of divorce, when in fact she is still married to her first husband, and children born from the second marriage will be mamzerim. To prevent this, Rabban Gamliel instituted that one may not render the bill of divorce void when not in the location of his wife. Reish Lakish says: For the betterment of deserted wives, lest women who received their bill of divorce by means of the husband’s agent refrain from remarrying out of the concern that perhaps their husband rendered the bill of divorce void.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר מִפְּנֵי תַּקָּנַת מַמְזֵרִים סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַב נַחְמָן דְּאָמַר בִּפְנֵי שְׁנַיִם וּבֵי תְרֵי לֵית לְהוּ קָלָא וְהִיא לָא שָׁמְעָה וְלָא יָדְעָה וְאָזְלָה וּמִינַּסְבָא וְאִיכָּא מַמְזֵרִים The Gemara explains the two opinions: Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says the reason for this ordinance is for the betterment of potential mamzerim, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman, who says that the husband can render void the bill of divorce even in the presence of two people. And since matters that occur in the presence of two people do not generate publicity, it is possible that she does not hear that the bill of divorce was rendered void. And since she does not know that her husband rendered the bill of divorce void, she will go and marry, and there are mamzerim as a result of second marriages like these.
וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר מִפְּנֵי תַּקָּנַת עֲגוּנוֹת סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת דְּאָמַר בִּפְנֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה וּבֵי תְלָתָא אִית לְהוּ קָלָא וְשָׁמְעָה וְיָדְעָה וְלָא מִינַּסְבָא וְתַקָּנַת עֲגוּנוֹת הוּא דְּאִיכָּא And Reish Lakish, who says that the reason is for the betterment of deserted wives, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet, who says: One can render void a bill of divorce only in the presence of three people. And since matters that occur in the presence of three people do generate publicity, she does hear and know that her husband rendered void the bill of divorce, and she would not marry again. Therefore, there is no concern that this will result in mamzerim, but there is a need to institute this ordinance for the betterment of deserted wives, as explained above.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן בִּטְּלוֹ מְבוּטָּל דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לֹא לְבַטְּלוֹ וְלֹא לְהוֹסִיף עַל תְּנָאוֹ שֶׁאִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה § The Sages taught: Even after Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that a husband cannot render void a bill of divorce when not in the presence of the wife or the agent, if he nevertheless rendered it void, the bill of divorce is rendered void; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He is unable to render it void, and he also cannot add on to his condition if the bill of divorce contained some condition, as if so, i.e., if he can render it void, what advantage does the court have, if an ordinance of the court of Rabban Gamliel can be ignored?
וּמִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּמִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא בָּטֵל גִּיטָּא וּמִשּׁוּם מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה שָׁרֵינַן אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ לְעָלְמָא אִין כׇּל דִּמְקַדֵּשׁ אַדַּעְתָּא דְּרַבָּנַן מְקַדֵּשׁ וְאַפְקְעִינְהוּ רַבָּנַן לְקִידּוּשִׁין מִינֵּיהּ The Gemara asks: And is there anything that by Torah law renders the bill of divorce void and the wife remains married, and due to the reasoning of: What advantage does the court have, we do not recognize that the bill of divorce is void and permit a married woman to marry anyone? The Gemara answers: Yes, anyone who betroths a woman betroths her contingent upon the will of the Sages, and when one fails to conform to their will in matters of marriage and divorce the Sages expropriated his betrothal from him retroactively.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי תִּינַח דְּקַדֵּישׁ בְּכַסְפָּא קַדֵּישׁ בְּבִיאָה מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר שַׁוְּיוּהָ רַבָּנַן לִבְעִילָתוֹ בְּעִילַת זְנוּת Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This works out well in a case where he betrothed his wife with money, as it is possible to say that the Sages expropriated the money used for the betrothal from the possession of its owner, resulting in a retroactive cancellation of the betrothal. But if he betrothed her by means of sexual intercourse then what is there to say? The Gemara answers: The Sages declared his sexual intercourse to be licentious sexual intercourse, which does not create a bond of betrothal.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן אָמַר לַעֲשָׂרָה כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל זֶה שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי זֶה דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל אֶלָּא זֶה בִּפְנֵי זֶה § The Sages taught: If a husband said to ten people: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, in which case any one of them may write the bill of divorce and two others will serve as witnesses, he can render his instructions void before this one, i.e., any one of them, by stating: Do not write the bill of divorce, even though it is not before that one, i.e., any other one of them; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He can render his instructions void only when this one is before that one of them, meaning that all ten people must be present.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי בְּעֵדוּת שֶׁבָּטְלָה מִקְצָתָהּ בָּטְלָה כּוּלָּהּ קָמִיפַּלְגִי רַבִּי סָבַר עֵדוּת שֶׁבָּטְלָה מִקְצָתָהּ The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree with regard to whether testimony that was partially invalidated is entirely invalidated. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds: Testimony that was partially invalidated