קטן ואנפיליא פסולות ואין פוסלות
However, if the yavam was a minor, or if the yevama performed ḥalitza while he was wearing a soft shoe made of cloth [anpileya] and not the shoe used for ḥalitza, then these acts of ḥalitza are invalid, and in these cases they do not disqualify her from entering into levirate marriage.
זעירי אמר כולן אין פוסלין חוץ מן האחרון
The Gemara quotes another opinion with regard to the question of which of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna would disqualify the woman from marrying a priest. Ze’eiri says: Reception of any of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna does not disqualify the woman from marrying a priest except in the final case, where the husband instructed the scribe to write a bill of divorce for one of his wives and explained that he would later decide which wife would be given the bill of divorce.
וכן אמר רב אסי כולן אין פוסלין חוץ מן האחרון ור' יוחנן אמר אף אחרון נמי אינו פוסל
And similarly, Rav Asi says: Reception of any of the bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna does not disqualify the woman from marrying a priest except in the final case. But Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even in the final case, that bill of divorce does not disqualify her from marrying a priest as well, as even that bill of divorce is not a bill of divorce at all. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, there is no concern that retroactive clarification will determine that the bill of divorce was written for the sake of the woman who received it, while the amora’im who hold that the woman is disqualified from marrying a priest in the final case of the mishna regard the efficacy of retroactive clarification to be uncertain.
ואזדא רבי יוחנן לטעמיה דא"ר אסי א"ר יוחנן האחין שחלקו לקוחות הן ומחזירין זה לזה ביובל
The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his own line of reasoning. As Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Brothers who divided property they received as an inheritance are considered purchasers from each other, and as purchasers of land they must return the portions to each other in the Jubilee Year. In the Jubilee Year, all land that had been purchased since the previous Jubilee Year reverts to the possession of the original owner. In this case, the land the brothers inherited from their father reverts to their joint ownership. Evidently, when they divided the land, this is not viewed as if it is retroactively clarified who inherited which portion from their father.
וצריכא דאי איתמר בהא בהא קאמר רבי יוחנן דאין ברירה משום דבעינן לה לשמה אבל התם מכר הוא דאמר רחמנא ליהדר ביובל אבל ירושה ומתנה לא
And it is necessary for Rabbi Yoḥanan to state that there is no retroactive clarification both with regard to inheritance and with regard to a bill of divorce, as, if it were stated only with regard to this case, that of a bill of divorce, then one could say that with regard to this Rabbi Yoḥanan said that there is no retroactive clarification because we require that the bill of divorce be written in accordance with the verse: “He writes for her” (Deuteronomy 24:3), i.e., for her sake; but there, in the case of inheritance, one could say: It is only in the case of a sale that the Merciful One states that it will be returned in the Jubilee Year, but an inheritance and a gift will not be returned.
ואי אשמעינן שדה משום דלחומרא אי נמי כתחילה אבל הכא אימא לא צריכא:
And if he had taught us that there is no retroactive clarification only with regard to the inheritance of a field, then one could say that this is due to the fact that he holds that they must redistribute the property only as a stringency, but he would hold that in this case one must also be stringent and be concerned that it is a divorce. Alternatively, perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling was not because there is no retroactive clarification but because the halakha of the Jubilee Year requires that all land be returned to its state as it was initially, when the land had been divided among the tribes; but here, with regard to a bill of divorce, say that this consideration is not relevant, and there is retroactive clarification. Therefore, it is necessary for Rabbi Yoḥanan to rule that there is no retroactive clarification in each case separately.
בעא מיניה רב הושעיא מרב יהודה אמר ללבלר כתוב לאיזו שתצא בפתח תחילה מהו אמר ליה תניתוה יתר מיכן אמר ללבלר כתוב לאיזו שארצה אגרש פסול לגרש בו אלמא אין ברירה
§ The Gemara continues its discussion of the final case of the mishna. Rav Hoshaya asked of Rav Yehuda: If a husband said to a scribe: Write a bill of divorce for whichever of my wives emerges from the entrance first, what is the halakha? Rav Yehuda said to him: You learned it already in the mishna: Moreover, even if he said to the scribe: Write a bill of divorce for whichever one of them that I will want and I will divorce her with it, it is unfit for him to divorce either wife with it. Apparently, there is no retroactive clarification.
איתיביה האומר לבניו הריני שוחט את הפסח על מי שיעלה מכם ראשון לירושלים כיון שנכנס ראשון ראשו ורובו זכה בחלקו ומזכה את אחיו עמו
Rav Hoshaya raised an objection to Rav Yehuda’s answer based on a mishna (Pesaḥim 89a): In the case of one who says to his children: I am slaughtering the Paschal offering on behalf of whichever of you goes up first to Jerusalem, once the first of the children has entered with his head and the majority of his body into Jerusalem, he has acquired his portion and acquires the portions of his brothers together with him on their behalf. This mishna indicates that there is retroactive clarification, as it becomes clear retroactively that the father slaughtered the Paschal offering on behalf of this son.
אמר ליה הושעיא ברי מה ענין פסחים אצל גיטין הא אתמר עלה א"ר יוחנן כדי לזרזן במצות
Rav Yehuda said to him: Hoshaya, my son, what do Paschal offerings have to do with bills of divorce? Wasn’t it stated concerning this mishna that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The mishna is not based on retroactive clarification; rather, the father included all his children in his Paschal offering from the outset. He created this competition only in order to galvanize them, so that they would be expeditious in their fulfillment of mitzvot.
דיקא נמי דקתני כיון שנכנס ראשון ראשו ורובו זכה בחלקו ומזכה את אחיו עמו אי אמרת בשלמא דאמנינהו מעיקרא שפיר אלא אי אמרת דלא אמנינהו לאחר שחיטה מי קמיתמנו והתנן נמנין ומושכין ידיהן ממנו עד שישחט
The Gemara comments that according to the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan, the language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Once the first of the children has entered with his head and the majority of his body into Jerusalem, he has acquired his portion and acquires the portions of his brothers together with him on their behalf. Granted, if you say that the father registered them initially, before slaughtering the Paschal offering, the ruling is well understood. But if you say that he did not register them initially, can they then be registered after the slaughter of the Paschal offering? Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pesaḥim 89a): People may be registered and withdraw themselves from being registered for a Paschal offering until it is slaughtered, but not after? Clearly, then, the children must have already been registered before the father said his statement.
תניא נמי הכי מעשה וקדמו בנות לבנים ונמצאו בנות זריזות ובנים שפלים
That the competition was meant only to galvanize his children to be expeditious in their fulfillment of mitzvot is also taught in a baraita that records this type of competition: There was an incident such as this, and the daughters preceded the sons. And the daughters were found to have demonstrated that they were enthusiastic, whereas the sons were found to have demonstrated that they were lazy. The baraita is critical of the sons but does not say that they did not partake of the Paschal offering. Evidently the father slaughtered the offering for them as well.
אמר אביי קא בעי מיניה תולה בדעת אחרים וקא פשיט ליה תולה בדעת עצמו והדר מותיב ליה תולה בדעת אחרים
Questioning Rav Yehuda’s original answer to Rav Hoshaya, Abaye said: He asks him about a case where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others, but he resolves it based on a case where the husband makes the clarification dependent on his own decision. Rav Hoshaya asked about a bill of divorce written for whichever wife exits first, which depends on someone other than the husband, and Rav Yehuda resolved the question based on the mishna where the husband reserved the right to decide which wife he will divorce with the bill of divorce, which depends on his own decision. And then Rav Hoshaya raised an objection to him based on the mishna concerning the Paschal offering, where one makes the clarification dependent on the decision of others.
אמר רבא מאי קושיא דלמא דמאן דאית ליה ברירה לא שנא תולה בדעת עצמו ולא שנא תולה בדעת אחרים אית ליה ברירה ומאן דלית ליה ברירה לא שנא תולה בדעת עצמו ולא שנא תולה בדעת אחרים לית ליה ברירה
Rava said: What is the difficulty here? Perhaps it is so that for the one who accepts the principle of retroactive clarification, it is no different if one makes it dependent on his own decision, and it is no different if one makes it dependent on the decision of others. In either case, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification. And according to the one who does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, it is no different if one makes it dependent on his own decision, and it is no different if one makes it dependent on the decision of others. In either case, he does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification.
א"ל רב משרשיא לרבא והא רבי יהודה דתולה בדעת עצמו לית ליה ברירה ותולה בדעת אחרים אית ליה ברירה
Rav Mesharshiyya said to Rava: The issue of retroactive clarification is contingent upon the question of on whom the outcome is dependent. But isn’t there the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who in a case where one makes it dependent on his own decision, he does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, but when one makes it dependent on the decision of others, he accepts the principle of retroactive clarification?
תולה בדעת עצמו לית ליה ברירה דתניא הלוקח יין מבין הכותים אומר שני לוגין שאני עתיד להפריש הרי הן תרומה עשרה מעשר ראשון תשעה מעשר שני
The Gemara elaborates: When one makes it dependent on his own decision, Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle of retroactive clarification, as it is taught in the Tosefta (Demai 8:7): In the case of one who purchases wine from among the Samaritans, about whom it is assumed that they did not separate teruma and tithes, and he is not in a position to now separate teruma, he acts as follows: If there are, for example, one hundred log of wine in the barrels, he says: Two log that I will separate in the future are teruma, as the mandated average measure of teruma is one-fiftieth; ten log are first tithe; and one-tenth of the remainder, which is approximately nine log, are second tithe.