Gittin 21aגיטין כ״א א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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21aכ״א א

זקן שאני דידע לאקנויי

a knowledgeable old man is different, as he understands the need to transfer the documents, and this may not be true in the case of a woman and the bill of divorce.

אלא אמר רבא מהכא ערב היוצא לאחר חיתום שטרות גובה מנכסים בני חורין

Rather, Rava said: A proof may be brought from here: If there was a guarantor whose commitment emerged after the promissory note was signed, then the creditor may collect only from the guarantor’s unsold property. However, he does not have a lien on the guarantor’s property with which he could collect from property sold after he signed on as a guarantor. Rava’s proof is that it must be that ownership of the promissory note was transferred to the guarantor before he signed it, in order for his commitment to take effect. It may therefore be seen from this baraita that the participants understand the need to transfer ownership of the document.

אמר רב אשי מאי קושיא דלמא גברא שאני דידע לאקנויי אלא אמר רב אשי מהכא אשה כותבת את גיטה והאיש כותב את שוברו שאין קיום הגט אלא בחותמיו

Rav Ashi said: What is the difficulty raised by this baraita? Perhaps a man is different, in that he understands the need to transfer the document, and the question of the Gemara pertains to a woman, who may not be as well versed in the minutiae of monetary law. Rather, Rav Ashi said: There is a proof from what was taught here (22b): A woman may write her bill of divorce on her own or allow a scribe to write it on her behalf, and then give it to her husband, so that he will give it to her. Similarly, a man may write his receipt that he will receive from the woman after paying her marriage contract, as the ratification of a bill of divorce is only through its signatories, i.e., the witnesses who sign it, and the mere writing of the document or its receipt has no legal ramifications and may be done by anyone. In any case, it is clear from here that a woman understands the need to transfer the bill of divorce that will be given to her by her husband in the future.

אמר רבא כתב לה גט ונתנו ביד עבדו וכתב לה שטר מתנה עליו קנאתהו ומתגרשת בו

§ Rava says: If he wrote her a bill of divorce and placed it in the hand of his slave, and he wrote her a deed of gift with regard to the slave, then she acquired the slave due to the document, and she is divorced immediately by the bill of divorce that is in his hand. The slave is considered to be like her property, and it is as though the husband had placed the bill of divorce in her domain at the time that he transferred the slave to her, and she acquires the bill of divorce as though it were in her courtyard.

ואמאי חצר מהלכת היא וחצר מהלכת לא קנה וכי תימא בעומד והאמר רבא כל שאילו מהלך לא קנה עומד ויושב לא קנה והלכתא בכפות

The Gemara asks: And why does she acquire the bill of divorce? The slave is considered a mobile courtyard, and a mobile courtyard does not acquire property. One’s courtyard can acquire items for him only when the courtyard is fixed in its location. Since a slave is considered to be like land with regard to other areas of halakha, he should also be defined as a mobile courtyard, as he can move from place to place. And if you would say that Rava was referring to a slave who happens to be standing, who is not mobile, but didn’t Rava say: Anything that does not acquire when moving also does not acquire when it is standing or sitting. The fact that the slave could move gives him the status of a moving courtyard, regardless if he is currently moving or not. The Gemara answers: And the halakha taught by Rava could apply in a case where the slave was bound and unable to move, as in that case he is not even able to move, and is not considered to be a mobile courtyard.

ואמר רבא כתב לה גט ונתנו בחצרו וכתב לה שטר מתנה עליו קנאתהו ומתגרשת בו

And Rava also says: If he wrote her a bill of divorce and placed it in his courtyard, and he wrote a deed of gift with regard to the courtyard, then she has acquired the courtyard and is divorced immediately by the bill of divorce in the courtyard.

וצריכא דאי אשמעינן עבד הוה אמינא דוקא עבד אבל חצר ליגזר משום חצרה הבאה לאחר מכאן

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for Rava to teach his halakha both with regard to a slave and with regard to a courtyard. One could not have been learned from the other, as had he taught us only about a slave, I would say that the husband may transfer the bill of divorce to his wife specifically through a slave, but in the case of a courtyard the Sages may decide to enact a decree that this should not be a valid bill of divorce, due to the case of her courtyard that comes afterward. People may not differentiate between this case and a similar case, where the husband places the bill of divorce in the courtyard of a third party, and that courtyard is subsequently acquired by her. In that case, the couple is not divorced, as the bill of divorce was not given by the husband to the wife. Therefore, Rava has to teach that the Sages did not make this decree, and in this case, where the husband gave the courtyard together with the bill of divorce, it is valid.

ואי אשמעינן חצר ה"א דוקא חצר אבל עבד ליגזר כפות אטו שאינו כפות קמ"ל

And had Rava taught us only about a courtyard, then I would say that a woman is divorced specifically if her husband placed the bill of divorce in a courtyard, but in the case of a slave the Sages may decide to decree with regard to a bound slave that the divorce will not take effect, due to the similarity to an unbound slave, where the divorce would not take effect, as explained above. Therefore, Rava teaches us that it is a valid bill of divorce in both cases.

אמר אביי מכדי חצר מהיכא איתרבי מידה

Abaye said as a challenge to Rava: Now, from where was a courtyard included? What is the source for the halakha that a man can divorce a woman by placing a bill of divorce in her courtyard? This can be derived from the phrase: “And gives it in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and the Sages derived that this is not limited to her actual hand but also includes anything that is an extension of her hand, such as her courtyard.

מה ידה דאיתא בין מדעתה ובין בעל כורחה אף חצרה דאיתא בין מדעתה ובין בעל כורחה והא מתנה מדעתה איתא בעל כורחה ליתא

Consequently, the following reasoning should apply: Just as with regard to her hand, that it acquires property for her whether with her consent or against her will, so too, with regard to her courtyard, it should be that it acquires property for her whether with her consent or against her will. And with regard to a gift, it is so that she acquires it with her consent, but it is not so that she acquires it against her will. Therefore, a courtyard that a husband transfers to his wife as a gift along with a bill of divorce is not the same as a bill of divorce that he gives into her hand. As a courtyard is different from her hand in this sense, it should not be able to be used as a means of transferring a bill of divorce.

מתקיף לה רב שימי בר אשי והא שליחות לקבלה דמדעתה איתא בעל כורחה ליתא וקא הוי שליח לקבלה

Rav Shimi bar Ashi objects to the reasoning of Abaye: But what of agency for receipt of the bill of divorce, where the woman appoints an agent to receive a bill of divorce on her behalf, concerning which the agent can act with her consent, but not against her will. No one other than the wife can appoint an agent to receive the bill of divorce, and despite this he is an agent for receipt. Yet a woman is able to appoint an agent for receipt. Evidently, the comparison of other methods of acquisition to acquisition by placing the bill of divorce in her hand is not absolute.

ואביי אטו שליחו' מידה איתרבי מושלח (דברים כד, א) ושלחה איתרבי

And Abaye would respond: Is that to say that the halakha of agency is included from the words “her hand”? It is not learned from there; rather, it is included based on the additional wording of the verse, as the verse does not state: And he sent [veshillaḥ]. Rather, it states: “And sends her out [veshilleḥa]” (Deuteronomy 24:1). The expanded term teaches that a woman can also appoint an agent to receive a bill of divorce on her behalf. Since agency has a different source in the Torah, it is not impacted by the limitations of her hand. The halakha that a bill of divorce can be given to her by placing it in her courtyard is an extension of the halakha that it can be placed in her hand and does carry the limitations of her hand. Therefore, it must be able to work whether with her consent or against her will.

ואב"א שליחות לקבלה נמי אשכחן בעל כורחה שכן אב מקבל גט לבתו קטנה בעל כורחה:

And if you wish, say a different answer: We also have found that agency for receipt can be effective against her will. How so? As the halakha is that a father can receive a bill of divorce for his minor daughter against her will. The halakhot of agency are therefore consistent with the halakhot with regard to her hand, and Abaye’s objection stands.

על העלה של זית וכו'. בשלמא יד דעבד

§ The mishna taught that a bill of divorce may be written on an olive leaf, on the horn of a cow, or on the hand of a slave, provided that the husband then gives her the slave or the cow. The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to the hand of a slave,