קוֹרָה אַרְבָּעָה מַתִּיר בְּחוּרְבָּה, וְרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: קוֹרָה אַרְבָּעָה מַתִּיר בְּמַיִם, מַנִּי?
A cross beam four handbreadths wide renders carrying in a ruin that is breached into a public domain permitted, as the edge of the cross beam is considered to descend and seal the breach. And that which Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: A cross beam four handbreadths wide renders carrying in water permitted like a partition. In accordance with whose opinion were these rulings stated?
לְהַךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ בְּעֶשֶׂר לָא פְּלִיגִי: בְּעֶשֶׂר, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל. לְהַךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ בְּעֶשֶׂר פְּלִיגִי: כְּרַב.
The Gemara explains: According to this version that you stated, that Rav and Shmuel agree with regard to an opening no wider than ten cubits, here it is referring to a cross beam that is no longer than ten cubits, and everyone, both Rav and Shmuel, agrees with these rulings. According to that other version that you stated, that they disagree with regard to an opening no wider than ten cubits, these rulings are in accordance with the opinion of Rav alone.
לֵימָא אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּאִיתְּמַר: סִיכֵּךְ עַל גַּבֵּי אַכְסַדְרָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ פַּצִּימִין — כְּשֵׁירָה, אֵין לָהּ פַּצִּימִין, אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: כְּשֵׁירָה, וְרָבָא אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Abaye and Rava are disagreeing with regard to the point that was the subject of a dispute between Rav and Shmuel. As it was stated: If one placed roofing on top of a portico that has doorposts, i.e., pillars that form the beginnings of partitions, it is a valid sukka. If, however, he placed the roofing atop a portico that has no doorposts, there is a dispute. Abaye said: It is a valid sukka. And Rava said: It is invalid.
אַבָּיֵי אָמַר כְּשֵׁירָה, אָמַר פִּי תִקְרָה יוֹרֵד וְסוֹתֵם. וְרָבָא אָמַר פְּסוּלָה, לָא אָמַר פִּי תִקְרָה יוֹרֵד וְסוֹתֵם. לֵימָא אַבָּיֵי כְּרַב, וְרָבָא כִּשְׁמוּאֵל?
The Gemara elaborates: Abaye said: It is valid. As he said: The edge of a roof descends and seals. Since the portico is roofed, it is considered to have partitions as well. And Rava said: It is invalid, as he did not say: The edge of a roof descends and seals. Let us say that Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel?
אַלִּיבָּא דִשְׁמוּאֵל כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְלִיגִי. כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַלִּיבָּא דְרַב: אַבָּיֵי כְּרַב. וְרָבָא — עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַב הָתָם, אֶלָּא דְּהָנֵי מְחִיצוֹת לְאַכְסַדְרָה עֲבִידִי. אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּהָנֵי מְחִיצוֹת לָאו לְסוּכָּה עֲבִידִי — לָא.
The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Shmuel, everyone, including Abaye, agrees that this sukka is invalid. Where they disagree is according to the opinion of Rav. Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav in a straightforward manner. And Rava claims: Rav stated his opinion, that the edge of the portico descends and seals, only there, where those partitions formed by the roof were built for the portico, and they are therefore viewed as sealing it. However, here, where these partitions were not built for the mitzva of sukka, no, even Rav would agree that the partitions are not sufficiently significant to utilize for the purpose of this mitzva.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אִם מוּתָּרִין. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לֶאֱסוֹר, אוֹ לְהַתִּיר?
We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yosei says: If they are permitted to carry there on that Shabbat, they are likewise permitted to do so in the future, and if they are prohibited from carrying there in the future, they are also prohibited from carrying there on that Shabbat A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Did Rabbi Yosei intend to prohibit carrying even on that Shabbat, or to permit carrying even in the future?
אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: לֶאֱסוֹר. וְכֵן אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לֶאֱסוֹר. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֲסוּרִין לֶעָתִיד לָבֹא, כָּךְ אֲסוּרִין לְאוֹתוֹ שַׁבָּת.
Rav Sheshet said: His intention was to prohibit carrying even on that Shabbat. And similarly, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: His intention was to prohibit carrying even on that Shabbat. This opinion was also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei said: Just as they are prohibited from carrying in the future, so are they prohibited from carrying on that Shabbat.
אִיתְּמַר, רַב חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף אָמַר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
It was stated: Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, while Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
וּמִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל הָכִי?! וְהָתְנַן, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים, בְּעֵירוּבֵי תְחוּמִין. אֲבָל בְּעֵירוּבֵי חֲצֵירוֹת — מְעָרְבִין בֵּין לְדַעַת בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעַת, לְפִי שֶׁזָּכִין לְאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו, וְאֵין חָבִין שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו.
The Gemara expresses surprise: But did Shmuel really say this? Didn’t we learn in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda said: In what case are these matters, that an eiruv may be established for a person only with his knowledge, stated? It is with regard to a joining of Shabbat boundaries, but with regard to a joining of courtyards, one may establish an eiruv for another person both with his knowledge and without his knowledge, because one may act in a person’s interest even when not in his presence, but one may act to his disadvantage only in his presence. One may take unilateral action on another’s behalf when it is to that other person’s benefit. However, if it is to that person’s disadvantage, or when the action entails both benefits and disadvantages, he may act on the other person’s behalf only if he was explicitly appointed as his agent. A joining of courtyards is always to a person’s benefit, and therefore it can be established even without his knowledge. However, with regard to a joining of Shabbat boundaries, any distance that a person gains in one direction he forfeits in the opposite direction. Consequently, this type of eiruv may be established only with his knowledge.
וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וְלֹא עוֹד, אֶלָּא כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּעֵירוּבִין — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ.
And Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. And furthermore, anyplace where Rabbi Yehuda taught with regard to the halakhot of eiruv, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion.
וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב חָנָא בַּגְדָּתָאָה לְרַב יְהוּדָה: אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל אֲפִילּוּ בְּמָבוֹי שֶׁנִּיטַּל קוֹרָתוֹ אוֹ לְחָיָיו? וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּעֵירוּבִין אָמַרְתִּי לְךָ, וְלֹא בִּמְחִיצוֹת.
And Rav Ḥana of Baghdad said to Rav Yehuda: Did Shmuel state this ruling even with regard to an alleyway whose cross beam or side post was removed during Shabbat? And Rav Yehuda said to him: I spoke to you with regard to the acquisition of an eiruv, and not with regard to partitions. The Gemara asks: How, then, could Shmuel rule that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in this case, after explicitly stating that the halakha is not in accordance with his opinion in the case of fallen partitions?
אָמַר רַב עָנָן: לְדִידִי מִיפָּרְשָׁא לִי מִינֵּיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: כָּאן שֶׁנִּפְרְצָה לְכַרְמְלִית, כָּאן שֶׁנִּפְרְצָה לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים.
Rav Anan said: This matter was explained to me personally by Shmuel himself: Here, where Shmuel rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, it is in a case where the courtyard was breached into a karmelit. In that case the halakha is lenient, as there is no concern lest one transgress a Torah prohibition. There, where Shmuel states that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, it is in a case where the courtyard was breached into a public domain, and the halakha is therefore stringent, due to the concern lest one transgress a Torah prohibition.
מַתְנִי׳ הַבּוֹנֶה עֲלִיָּיה עַל גַּבֵּי שְׁנֵי בָתִּים, וְכֵן גְּשָׁרִים הַמְפוּלָּשִׁים — מְטַלְטְלִין תַּחְתֵּיהֶן בַּשַּׁבָּת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִין.
MISHNA: With regard to one who builds an upper story atop two houses on opposite sides of a public domain that passes beneath it, and likewise bridges with a thoroughfare beneath them that rest on walls on opposite sides of a public domain, one may carry beneath the upper story and beneath the bridge on Shabbat. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that these areas are considered private domains. And the Rabbis prohibit carrying in these areas.
וְעוֹד אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: מְעָרְבִין לְמָבוֹי הַמְפוּלָּשׁ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִין.
And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: One may establish an eiruv even for an alleyway that is open at both ends, with no need for any additional measures, and the Rabbis prohibit doing so.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבָּה: לָא תֵּימָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא סָבַר שְׁתֵּי מְחִיצוֹת דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּקָסָבַר: פִּי תִקְרָה יוֹרֵד וְסוֹתֵם.
GEMARA: Rabba said: Do not say this is Rabbi Yehuda’s reason; that he maintains that by Torah law two partitions constitute a private domain, i.e., the areas beneath the upper story and the bridge are considered private domains, as each has two partitions, one on each side of the public domain. Rather, the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is because he maintains that the edge of a roof descends and seals. The edges of the upper story and the bridge are considered to seal the areas beneath them.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: יָתֵר עַל כֵּן אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: מִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ שְׁנֵי בָתִּים מִשְּׁנֵי צִידֵּי רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, עוֹשֶׂה לֶחִי מִכָּאן וְלֶחִי מִכָּאן, אוֹ קוֹרָה מִכָּאן וְקוֹרָה מִכָּאן, וְנוֹשֵׂא וְנוֹתֵן בָּאֶמְצַע. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אֵין מְעָרְבִין רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים בְּכָךְ!
Abaye raised an objection to Rabba from a baraita: Furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: With regard to one who has two houses on two sides of a public domain and seeks to carry from one house to the other on Shabbat via the public domain, he places a side post from here, adjacent to one of the houses, and another side post from there, adjacent to the other house, or he places a cross beam from here and another cross beam from there, and he may subsequently carry objects and place them in the middle of the area, as he transformed it into a private domain. His colleagues said to him: One cannot establish an eiruv to transform a public domain into a private domain in this manner. Clearly, the rationale for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in that case is not that the edge of the roof descends and seals, as the area is not covered. Rather, he apparently holds that by Torah law, two walls suffice to form a private domain.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מֵהַהִיא — אִין, מֵהָא — לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rabba said to him: From that baraita, yes, it is indeed possible to arrive at this conclusion. But from this, the mishna, nothing can be learned from this source, as there could be a different reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא, מִדְּקָתָנֵי: וְעוֹד אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: מְעָרְבִין בְּמָבוֹי הַמְפוּלָּשׁ, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִין.
Rav Ashi said: The mishna is also precise in its wording, as it indicates that the rationale for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is that the edge of a roof descends and seals. As the mishna teaches: And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: One may establish an eiruv even for an alleyway that is open at both ends, and the Rabbis prohibit doing so.
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא סָבַר פִּי תִקְרָה יוֹרֵד וְסוֹתֵם — הַיְינוּ דְּקָתָנֵי ״וְעוֹד״.
Granted, if you say that the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s leniency with regard to carrying beneath an upper story and a bridge is that he maintains that the edge of a roof descends and seals, that is why the mishna states: And furthermore, to introduce the ruling for an alleyway. In other words, the tanna of our mishna is saying that the ruling applies not only to a roofed area, but also to an unroofed alleyway, despite the fact that the reason there is that two partitions suffice to create a private domain by Torah law.
אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא סָבַר שְׁתֵּי מְחִיצוֹת דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — מַאי ״וְעוֹד״?! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
However, if you say that Rabbi Yehuda permitted the first case as well because he maintains that by Torah law two partitions suffice to create a private domain, what is the need for the introduction: And furthermore? The rationale for the second ruling is no different from the rationale for the first. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from here that this is correct.
הַדְרָן עֲלָךְ כׇּל גַּגּוֹת
מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוֹצֵא תְּפִילִּין — מַכְנִיסָן זוּג זוּג. רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: שְׁנַיִם שְׁנַיִם. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בִּישָׁנוֹת, אֲבָל בַּחֲדָשׁוֹת — פָּטוּר.
MISHNA: One who finds phylacteries outside the city on Shabbat, where they are in danger of becoming lost or damaged, brings them in to his house pair by pair by donning them in the manner in which they are typically donned for the mitzva. Rabban Gamliel says: He brings them in two pairs by two pairs. In what case is this statement that one is permitted to carry phylacteries inside said? It is with regard to old phylacteries, which have already been used and are designated for the mitzva. However, with regard to new ones, as it is unclear whether they are phylacteries or merely amulets in the form of phylacteries, he is exempt from performing the task.
מְצָאָן צְבָתִים אוֹ כְרִיכוֹת — מַחְשִׁיךְ עֲלֵיהֶן וּמְבִיאָן.
If one finds phylacteries tied in bundles or in wrapped piles, in which case he is unable to carry them in pairs, he sits there and waits with them until dark, guarding them until the conclusion of Shabbat, and then brings them in to his house.