שָׁלֹשׁ חֲצֵירוֹת שֶׁל שְׁנֵי בָתִּים. וְאָמַר רַב חָמָא בַּר גּוּרְיָא אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. וּמַאן פְּלִיג עֲלֵיהּ — רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן — הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה!
The excluded area need not be so large; rather, three courtyards each containing two houses are sufficient for this purpose. And Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon; and who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon on this matter? It is Rabbi Yehuda. Didn’t you say: In a case where Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? This teaches that one should not rely on these principles.
ומַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִילְמָא הָכָא נָמֵי, הֵיכָא דְּאִיתְּמַר — אִיתְּמַר, הֵיכָא דְּלָא אִיתְּמַר — לָא אִיתְּמַר.
The Gemara rejects this argument as well: What is the difficulty here? Perhaps here, too, where it is stated explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, it is stated, but where it is not stated explicitly, it is not stated, and the principle that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda applies.
אֶלָּא, מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: הַמַּנִּיחַ אֶת בֵּיתוֹ וְהָלַךְ לִשְׁבּוֹת בְּעִיר אַחֶרֶת, אֶחָד נָכְרִי וְאֶחָד יִשְׂרָאֵל — אוֹסֵר לִבְנֵי חֲצֵירוֹת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
Rather, the proof is from that which we learned elsewhere in a mishna: With regard to one who left his house without making an eiruv of courtyards, and established residence for Shabbat in a different town, whether he was a gentile or a Jew, his lack of participation prohibits the other residents of the courtyards in which he has a share to carry objects from their houses to the courtyard, because he did not establish an eiruv with them, and failure to include a house in the eiruv imposes restrictions upon all the residents of the courtyard. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: נָכְרִי — אוֹסֵר, יִשְׂרָאֵל — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין דֶּרֶךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל לָבֹא בַּשַּׁבָּת. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ הִנִּיחַ אֶת בֵּיתוֹ וְהָלַךְ לִשְׁבּוֹת אֵצֶל בִּתּוֹ בְּאוֹתָהּ הָעִיר — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר, שֶׁכְּבָר הִסִּיחַ דַּעְתּוֹ.
Rabbi Yehuda says: His lack of participation does not prohibit the others to carry, since he is not present there. Rabbi Yosei says: Lack of participation in an eiruv by a gentile who is away prohibits the others to carry, because he might return on Shabbat; but lack of participation by a Jew who is not present does not prohibit the others to carry, as it is not the way of a Jew to return on Shabbat once he has already established his residence elsewhere. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he left his house and established residence for Shabbat with his daughter in the same town, his lack of participation does not prohibit the residents of his courtyard to carry, even though he is permitted to return home, because he has already removed it, i.e., returning, from his mind.
וְאָמַר רַב חָמָא בַּר גּוּרְיָא אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, וּמַאן פְּלִיג עֲלֵיהּ — רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה!
And Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And who disagrees with him? It is Rabbi Yehuda. Didn’t you say: When there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? This teaches that one cannot rely upon these principles.
וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא הָכָא נָמֵי, הֵיכָא דְּאִיתְּמַר — אִיתְּמַר, הֵיכָא דְּלָא אִיתְּמַר — לָא אִיתְּמַר.
The Gemara rejects this argument again: What is the difficulty here? Perhaps here, too, where it is explicitly stated that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, it is stated; but where such a ruling is not stated, it is not stated, and the principle that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda is relied upon.
אֶלָּא, מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: וְזֶהוּ שֶׁאָמְרוּ הֶעָנִי מְעָרֵב בְּרַגְלָיו. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אָנוּ אֵין לָנוּ אֶלָּא עָנִי.
Rather, the proof is from that which we learned in the mishna. And that is what the Sages meant when they said: A pauper can establish an eiruv with his feet; that is to say, he may walk to a place within his Shabbat limit and declare: Here shall be my place of residence, and then his Shabbat limit is measured from that spot. Rabbi Meir says: We apply this law only to a pauper, who does not have food for two meals; only such a person is permitted to establish his eiruv by walking to the spot that he wishes to acquire as his place of residence.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֶחָד עָנִי וְאֶחָד עָשִׁיר. לֹא אָמְרוּ מְעָרְבִין בְּפַת אֶלָּא לְהָקֵל עַל הֶעָשִׁיר, שֶׁלֹּא יֵצֵא וִיעָרֵב בְּרַגְלָיו.
Rabbi Yehuda says: This allowance applies both to a pauper and to a wealthy person. Indeed, they said that one can establish an eiruv with bread only in order to make placing an eiruv easier for a wealthy person, so that he need not trouble himself and go out and establish an eiruv with his feet, but the basic eiruv is established by walking to the spot one will acquire as his place of residence.
וּמַתְנֵי לֵיהּ רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָשֵׁי לְחִיָּיא בַּר רַב קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב: אֶחָד עָנִי וְאֶחָד עָשִׁיר. וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב, סַיֵּים בָּהּ נָמֵי: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
And Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi once taught this law to Ḥiyya bar Rav in the presence of Rav, saying: This allowance applies both to a pauper and to a wealthy person, and Rav said to him: When you teach this law, conclude also with this ruling: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
תַּרְתֵּי לְמָה לִי, וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ: רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה — הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה!
The Gemara asks: Why do I need a second ruling? Didn’t you already say: When there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? The fact that Rav needed to specify that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda on this matter indicates that he does not accept the general principle that when there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּילְמָא רַב לֵית לֵיהּ לְהָנֵי כְּלָלֵי?
The Gemara rejects this reasoning: What is the difficulty here? Perhaps Rav does not accept these principles, but the other Sages accept them.
אֶלָּא, מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: הַיְּבָמָה לֹא תַּחֲלוֹץ וְלֹא תִּתְיַיבֵּם עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ לָהּ שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים.
Rather, the Gemara brings a proof from that which we learned in another mishna with regard to a woman waiting for her brother-in-law, i.e., a woman whose husband died without children but who is survived by a brother. The brother-in-law is obligated by Torah law either to perform levirate marriage with his deceased brother’s widow, or to free her to marry others by participating in ḥalitza. The woman waiting for her brother-in-law may neither participate in ḥalitza nor undergo levirate marriage until three months have passed following her husband’s death, due to concern that she may be pregnant from him, in which case she is exempt from levirate marriage and ḥalitza. After the three-month waiting period it will become clear whether she is pregnant from her husband.
וְכֵן שְׁאָר כׇּל הַנָּשִׁים לֹא יִנָּשְׂאוּ וְלֹא יִתְאָרְסוּ עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ לָהֶן שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים, אֶחָד בְּתוּלוֹת וְאֶחָד בְּעוּלוֹת, אֶחָד אַלְמָנוֹת וְאֶחָד גְּרוּשׁוֹת, אֶחָד אֲרוּסוֹת וְאֶחָד נְשׂוּאוֹת.
And similarly, all other women may not be married or even betrothed until three months have passed following their divorce or the death of their husbands, whether they are virgins or non-virgins, whether they are widows or divorcees, and whether they became widowed or divorced when they were betrothed or married. In all cases, the woman may not marry for three months. Otherwise, if she is within the first three months of her pregnancy from her first husband, and she gives birth six months later, a doubt would arise as to the identity of the father. The Sages did not differentiate between cases where this concern is applicable and where it is not; rather, they fixed a principle that applies universally.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: נְשׂוּאוֹת — יִתְאָרְסוּ.
Rabbi Yehuda says: A woman who had been married when she became widowed or divorced may be betrothed immediately, as couples do not have relations during the period of their betrothal. However, she may not marry until three months have passed, in order to differentiate between any possible offspring from the first and second husband.
וַאֲרוּסוֹת — יִנָּשְׂאוּ, חוּץ מֵאֲרוּסָה שֶׁבִּיהוּדָה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלִּבּוֹ גַּס בָּהּ.
A woman who had only been betrothed when she became widowed or divorced may be married immediately, as it may be assumed that the couple did not have relations during the period of their betrothal. This is except for a betrothed woman in Judea, because there the bridegroom’s heart is bold, as it was customary for couples to be alone together during the period of betrothal, and consequently there is a suspicion that they might have had relations, in which case she might be carrying his child. However, no similar concern applies in other places.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הַנָּשִׁים יִתְאָרְסוּ, חוּץ מִן הָאַלְמָנָה — מִפְּנֵי הָאִיבּוּל.
Rabbi Yosei says: All the women listed above may be betrothed immediately, because the decree applies only with regard to marriage; this is except for a widow, who must wait for a different reason, because of the mourning for her deceased husband.
וְאָמְרִינַן: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לָא עָל לְבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא. אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ לְרַבִּי אַסִּי דַּהֲוָה קָאֵים. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי אֲמוּר בְּבֵי מִדְרְשָׁא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, הָכִי אֲמַר לֵיהּ יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי. מִכְּלָל דִּיחִידָאָה פְּלִיג עֲלֵיהּ?
And we said with regard to this: It once happened that Rabbi Eliezer did not come to the study hall. He met Rabbi Asi, who was standing, and said to him: What did they say today in the study hall? He said to him that Rabbi Yoḥanan said as follows: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Eliezer asked: By inference, can it be inferred from the fact that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion that only a single authority disagrees with him?
אִין, וְהָתַנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיְתָה רְדוּפָה לֵילֵךְ לְבֵית אָבִיהָ, אוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה לָהּ כַּעַס עִם בַּעְלָהּ, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה בַּעְלָהּ זָקֵן אוֹ חוֹלֶה, אוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה הִיא חוֹלָה, עֲקָרָה, זְקֵנָה, קְטַנָּה וְאַיְילוֹנִית, וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לֵילֵד, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה בַּעְלָהּ חָבוּשׁ בְּבֵית הָאֲסוּרִין, הַמַּפֶּלֶת לְאַחַר מִיתַת בַּעְלָהּ — כּוּלָּן צְרִיכִין לְהַמְתִּין שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי מַתִּיר לֵיאָרֵס וְלִינָּשֵׂא מִיָּד.
Rabbi Asi answered: Yes, and so it was taught in the following baraita: If a woman was eager to go to her father’s house and did not remain with her husband during his final days, or if she was angry with her husband and they separated, or if her husband was elderly or sick and could not father children, or if she was sick, or barren, or an elderly woman, or a minor, or a sexually underdeveloped woman who is incapable of bearing children, or a woman who was unfit to give birth for any other reason, or if her husband was imprisoned in jail, or if she had miscarried after the death of her husband, so that there is no longer any concern that she might be pregnant from him, all these women must wait three months before remarrying or even becoming betrothed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that this decree applies to all women, even when the particular situation renders it unnecessary. In all these cases Rabbi Yosei permits the woman to be betrothed and to marry immediately.
לְמָה לִי? וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי — הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי!
The Gemara resumes its question: Why do I need Rabbi Yoḥanan to state that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei? Didn’t you say: In a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and therefore the halakha should be in accordance with him here as well? This implies that the principle is not to be relied upon.
וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר בִּגְזֵירוֹתָיו.
The Gemara rejects this argument: What is the difficulty here? Perhaps this ruling comes to exclude what Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: Although there are many cases in which the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, nonetheless, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir with respect to his decrees, i.e., in those cases where he imposed a restriction in a particular case due to its similarity to another case. For this reason Rabbi Yoḥanan had to say that the halakha here is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, notwithstanding its opposition to Rabbi Meir’s decree.
אֶלָּא, מֵהָא דְּתַנְיָא: הוֹלְכִין לְיָרִיד שֶׁל נׇכְרִים וְלוֹקְחִים מֵהֶן בְּהֵמָה וַעֲבָדִים וּשְׁפָחוֹת, בָּתִּים שָׂדוֹת וּכְרָמִים, וְכוֹתֵב וּמַעֲלֶה בְּעַרְכָּאוֹת שֶׁלָּהֶן, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כְּמַצִּיל מִיָּדָן.
Rather, the proof that these principles do not apply is from that which was taught in the following baraita: One may go to a fair of idolatrous gentiles and buy animals, slaves, and maidservants from them, as the purchase raises them to a more sanctified state; and he may buy houses, fields, and vineyards from them, due to the mitzva to settle Eretz Yisrael; and he may write the necessary deeds and confirm them in their gentile courts with an official seal, even though this involves an acknowledgement of their authority, because it is as though he were rescuing his property from their hands, as the court’s confirmation and stamp of approval prevents the sellers from appealing the sale and retracting it.
וְאִם הָיָה כֹּהֵן — מִטַּמֵּא בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ לָדוּן וּלְעַרְעֵר עִמָּהֶן. וּכְשֵׁם שֶׁמִּטַּמֵּא בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ — כָּךְ מִטַּמֵּא בְּבֵית הַקְּבָרוֹת.
And if he is a priest, he may become ritually impure by going outside Eretz Yisrael, where the earth and air are impure, in order to litigate with them and to contest their claims. And just as a priest may become ritually impure by going outside Eretz Yisrael, so may he become ritually impure for this purpose by entering into a cemetery.
בֵּית הַקְּבָרוֹת סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ?! טוּמְאָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הִיא!
The Gemara interrupts its presentation of the baraita to express surprise at this last ruling: Can it enter your mind to say that a priest may enter a cemetery? This would make him ritually impure by Torah law. How could the Sages permit a priest to become ritually impure by Torah law?
אֶלָּא בְּבֵית הַפְּרָס, דְּרַבָּנַן.
Rather, the baraita is referring to an area where there is uncertainty with regard to the location of a grave or a corpse [beit haperas], owing to the fact that a grave had been unwittingly plowed over, and the bones may have become scattered throughout the field. Such a field imparts ritual impurity only by rabbinic law.
וּמִטַּמֵּא לִישָּׂא אִשָּׁה, וְלִלְמוֹד תּוֹרָה. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אֵימָתַי — בִּזְמַן שֶׁאֵין מוֹצֵא לִלְמוֹד, אֲבָל מוֹצֵא לִלְמוֹד — לֹא יִטַּמָּא.
The baraita continues: And a priest may likewise become ritually impure and leave Eretz Yisrael in order to marry a woman or to study Torah there. Rabbi Yehuda said: When does this allowance apply? When he cannot find a place to study in Eretz Yisrael. But if the priest can find a place to study in Eretz Yisrael, he may not become ritually impure by leaving the country.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אַף בִּזְמַן שֶׁמּוֹצֵא לִלְמוֹד — נָמֵי יִטַּמָּא, לְפִי
Rabbi Yosei says: Even when he can find a place to study Torah in Eretz Yisrael, he may also leave the country and become ritually impure, because