46bמ״ו ב

ורב פפא אמר איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא הני מילי בעירובי חצירות אבל בעירובי תחומין אימא לא צריכא

Rav Pappa said a different explanation for the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi made both statements: It was necessary for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi to inform us that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, because had he said only that the halakha follows the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv, it could have entered your mind to say that this statement applies only with regard to the laws governing the eiruv of courtyards, which are entirely rabbinic in origin. But with regard to the more stringent laws governing the eiruv of Shabbat limits, you would have said that we should not rule leniently, and therefore it was necessary to make both statements.

ומנא תימרא דשני לן בין עירובי חצירות לעירובי תחומין דתנן אמר רבי יהודה במה דברים אמורים בעירובי תחומין אבל בעירובי חצירות מערבין בין לדעת ובין שלא לדעת שזכין לאדם שלא בפניו ואין חבין לאדם אלא בפניו

The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that we distinguish between an eiruv of courtyards and an eiruv of Shabbat limits? As we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda said: In what case is this statement said, that an eiruv may be established for another person only with his knowledge? It was said with regard to an eiruv of Shabbat limits, but with regard to an eiruv of courtyards, an eiruv may be established for another person whether with his knowledge or without his knowledge, as one may act in a person’s interest in his absence; however, one may not act to a person’s disadvantage in his absence. One may act unilaterally on someone else’s behalf when the action is to that other person’s benefit; however, when it is to the other person’s detriment, or when there are both advantages and disadvantages to him, one may act on the other person’s behalf only if one has been explicitly appointed as an agent. Since an eiruv of courtyards is always to a person’s benefit, it can be established even without his knowledge. However, with regard to an eiruv of Shabbat limits, while it enables one to walk in one direction, it disallows him from walking in the opposite direction. Therefore, it can be established only with his knowledge.

רב אשי אמר איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא הני מילי בשיורי עירוב אבל בתחילת עירוב אימא לא

Rav Ashi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s need to issue two rulings can be explained in another manner: It is necessary for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi to inform us that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, as if he had said only that the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv, it could have entered your mind to say that this statement applies only with regard to the remnants of an eiruv, i.e., an eiruv that had been properly established, where the concern is that it might subsequently have become invalid. But with regard to an initial eiruv, i.e., an eiruv that is just being established and has not yet taken effect, you might have said that we should not rule leniently, and therefore it was necessary to issue both rulings.

ומנא תימרא דשני לן בין שיורי עירוב לתחילת עירוב דתנן אמר רבי יוסי במה דברים אמורים בתחילת עירוב אבל בשיורי עירוב אפילו כל שהוא

The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that we distinguish between the remnants of an eiruv and an initial eiruv? As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Yosei said: In what case is this statement said, that the Sages stipulated that a fixed quantity of food is necessary for establishing an eiruv? It is said with regard to an initial eiruv, i.e., when setting up an eiruv for the first time; however, with regard to the remnants of an eiruv, i.e., on a subsequent Shabbat when the measure may have become diminished, even a minimal amount suffices.

ולא אמרו לערב חצירות אלא כדי שלא לשכח תורת עירוב מן התינוקות

And they said to establish an eiruv for courtyards only after all the inhabitants of the city merge their alleyways and become like the inhabitants of a single courtyard, so that the law of eiruv should not be forgotten by the children, who may not be aware of the arrangement that has been made with regard to the alleyways.

רבי יעקב ורבי זריקא אמרו הלכה כרבי עקיבא מחבירו וכרבי יוסי מחבריו וכרבי מחבירו

Since the Gemara discussed the principles cited with regard to halakhic decision-making, it cites additional principles. Rabbi Ya’akov and Rabbi Zerika said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in disputes with any individual Sage, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei even in disputes with other Sages, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in disputes with any individual Sage.

למאי הלכתא רבי אסי אמר הלכה ורבי חייא בר אבא אמר מטין ורבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר נראין

The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha do these principles apply, meaning, to what degree are they binding? Rabbi Asi said: This is considered binding halakha. And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said: One is inclined toward such a ruling in cases where an individual asks, but does not issue it as a public ruling in all cases. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: It appears that one should rule this way, but it is not an established halakha that is considered binding with regard to issuing rulings.

כלשון הזה אמר רבי יעקב בר אידי אמר רבי יוחנן רבי מאיר ורבי יהודה הלכה כרבי יהודה רבי יהודה ורבי יוסי הלכה כרבי יוסי ואין צריך לומר רבי מאיר ורבי יוסי הלכה כרבי יוסי השתא במקום רבי יהודה ליתא במקום רבי יוסי מיבעיא

Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In the case of a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; in the case of a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei; and, needless to say, in the case of a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. As now, if in disputes with Rabbi Yehuda, the opinion of Rabbi Meir is not accepted as law, need it be stated that in disputes with Rabbi Yosei, Rabbi Meir’s opinion is rejected? Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is not accepted in disputes with Rabbi Yosei.

אמר רב אסי אף אני לומד רבי יוסי ורבי שמעון הלכה כרבי יוסי דאמר רבי אבא אמר רבי יוחנן רבי יהודה ורבי שמעון הלכה כרבי יהודה השתא במקום רבי יהודה ליתא במקום רבי יוסי מיבעיא

Rav Asi said: I also learn based on the same principle that in a dispute between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. As Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In cases of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Now, if where it is opposed by Rabbi Yehuda the opinion of Rabbi Shimon is not accepted as law, where it is opposed by the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, with whom the halakha is in accordance against Rabbi Yehuda, is it necessary to say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei?

איבעיא להו רבי מאיר ורבי שמעון מאי תיקו

The Gemara raises a dilemma: In a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon, what is the halakha? No sources were found to resolve this dilemma, and it stands unresolved.

אמר רב משרשיא ליתנהו להני כללי מנא ליה לרב משרשיא הא

Rav Mesharshiya said: These principles of halakhic decision-making are not to be relied upon. The Gemara asks: From where does Rav Mesharshiya derive this statement?

אילימא מהא דתנן רבי שמעון אומר למה הדבר דומה לשלש חצירות הפתוחות זו לזו ופתוחות לרשות הרבים עירבו שתים החיצונות עם האמצעית היא מותרת עמהן והן מותרות עמה ושתים החיצונות אסורות זו עם זו

If you say that he derived it from that which we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this comparable? It is like three courtyards that open into one another, and also open into a public domain. If the two outer courtyards established an eiruv with the middle one, the residents of the middle one are permitted to carry to the two outer ones, and they are permitted to carry to it, but the residents of the two outer courtyards are prohibited to carry from one to the other, as they did not establish an eiruv with one another.

ואמר רב חמא בר גוריא אמר רב הלכה כרבי שמעון ומאן פליג עליה רבי יהודה והא אמרת רבי יהודה ורבי שמעון הלכה כרבי יהודה אלא לאו שמע מינה ליתנהו

And Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon; and who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon on this matter? It is Rabbi Yehuda. Didn’t you say: In disputes between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Rather, can we not conclude from this mishna that these principles should not be relied upon?

ומאי קושיא דילמא היכא דאיתמר איתמר היכא דלא איתמר לא איתמר

The Gemara rejects this argument: What is the difficulty posed by this ruling? Perhaps where it is stated explicitly to the contrary, it is stated, but where it is not stated explicitly to the contrary, it is not stated, and these principles apply.

אלא מהא דתנן עיר של יחיד ונעשית של רבים מערבין את כולה של רבים ונעשית של יחיד אין מערבין את כולה אלא אם כן עושה חוצה לה כעיר חדשה שביהודה שיש בה חמשים דיורין דברי רבי יהודה

Rather, the proof is from that which we learned elsewhere in a mishna: If a city that belongs to a single individual subsequently becomes one that belongs to many people, one may establish an eiruv of courtyards for all of it. But if the city belongs to many people, and it falls into the possession of a single individual, one may not establish an eiruv for all of it, unless he excludes from the eiruv an area the size of the town of Ḥadasha in Judea, which contains fifty residents; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

רבי שמעון אומר

Rabbi Shimon says: