בשל סופרים חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו ורב ששת אמר אחד זה ואחד זה חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו
However, with regard to rabbinic laws, we do rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency. And Rav Sheshet disagreed and said: With regard to both this, Torah law, and that, rabbinic law, we rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency.
אמר רב ששת מנא אמינא לה דתנן משקרב העומר הותר החדש מיד
Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say this? As we learned in a mishna: Once the omer has been offered, the grain from the new crop is immediately permitted. The Torah prohibits eating from the new crop of grain until the omer sacrifice is offered on the second day of Passover (Leviticus 23:14); once the omer is offered, it is immediately permitted to partake of the new grain.
והרחוקים מותרים מחצות היום ואילך והא חדש דאורייתא הוא וקתני הרחוקים מותרין מחצות היום ואילך לאו משום חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו
And those far from Jerusalem, who do not know whether or not the omer has already been offered, are permitted to eat from the new crop from midday and on, as the omer must surely have been offered by this time. Isn’t the prohibition to eat from the new crop a Torah law? And nevertheless, it was taught: And those far from Jerusalem are permitted to eat from the new crop from midday and on. Is this not because we may rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency? The priests in the Temple serve as the agents of the entire Jewish people, and it may be assumed that they have performed the mission entrusted to them.
ורב נחמן התם כדקתני טעמא לפי שיודעין שאין בית דין מתעצלין בו
The Gemara asks: And how does Rav Naḥman, who holds that with respect to Torah laws we may not rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, refute this proof? He can respond as follows: There, the agents may be trusted for the reason that was explicitly taught: Because we know that the court will not be indolent in offering the omer sacrifice; however, the same cannot be said of ordinary agents.
ואיכא דאמרי אמר רב נחמן מנא אמינא לה דקתני טעמא לפי שיודעין שאין בית דין מתעצלין בו בית דין הוא דלא מתעצלין בו הא שליח מתעצל בו
And some say a different version of this response: Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say this principle? As it was taught that the reason is because we know that the court will not be indolent in offering the omer past midday. From this we may infer: It is the court that will not be indolent with regard to missions entrusted to it, but an ordinary agent may indeed be indolent with regard to his mission. Therefore, we cannot rely upon an ordinary agent.
ורב ששת אמר לך בית דין עד פלגיה דיומא שליח כולי יומא
And Rav Sheshet could have said to you that this is not the correct inference; rather, we should infer as follows: It is only the court that is presumed to have executed its mission by midday, even though the mitzva to bring the omer offering lasts all day. However, an ordinary agent, who is not as diligent, is only presumed to have completed his mission by the end of the entire day.
אמר רב ששת מנא אמינא לה דתניא האשה שיש עליה לידה או זיבה מביאה מעות ונותנת בשופר וטובלת ואוכלת בקדשים לערב מאי טעמא לאו משום דאמרינן חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו
Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say my opinion? As it was taught in a baraita: A woman who is responsible to offer sacrifices following childbirth or after experiencing ziva (Leviticus 12, 15) brings money and puts it in the appropriate collection box in the Temple, immerses in a ritual bath, and she may then eat sacrificial food at nightfall. What is the reason that she is permitted to eat immediately at nightfall? Is it not because we say that there is a presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, and the priests certainly purchased the appropriate sacrifices with her money and offered them during the day?
ורב נחמן התם כדרב שמעיה דאמר רב שמעיה חזקה אין בית דין של כהנים עומדים משם עד שיכלו כל מעות שבשופר
The Gemara asks: And how does Rav Naḥman counter this proof? There, in the case of a woman who put money in the box, the reason she may rely on agency is in accordance with the statement of Rav Shemaya, as Rav Shemaya said: There is a legal presumption that the court of priests would not leave the Temple until all the money in the collection box has been spent on the purchase of sacrifices. We may rely only on the special court appointed to carry out this task, as it can be trusted. However, no proof may be brought from here with regard to an ordinary agent.
אמר רב ששת מנא אמינא לה דתניא האומר לחבירו צא ולקט לך תאנים מתאנתי אוכל מהן עראי ומעשרן ודאי מלא לך כלכלה זה תאנים מתאנתי אוכל מהן עראי ומעשרן דמאי
Rav Sheshet said another proof: From where do I say this? As it was taught in a baraita: One who says to another person: Go and gather for yourself figs from my fig tree, if he does not specify the amount that he should take, the gatherer may eat casually from them even without separating tithes. However, if one wishes to eat the figs as a regular, set meal, he must first tithe them as fruit that is known with certainty not to previously be tithed. In this case, it may be assumed that the owner of the fig tree did not separate tithes to exempt these figs, as he did not know how many the gatherer would take. However, if the owner of the fig tree said to him: Fill this basket for yourself with figs from my fig tree, he may eat from them casually without tithing, and before eating them as a regular meal, he must tithe them as demai, produce with regard to which we are unsure if the appropriate tithes have been separated. Since the owner of the tree knows how many figs the gatherer will take, it is possible that he has already separated tithes for these figs.
במה דברים אמורים בעם הארץ אבל בחבר אוכל ואינו צריך לעשר דברי רבי רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר במה דברים אמורים בעם הארץ אבל בחבר אינו אוכל עד שיעשר לפי שלא נחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף
In what case is this statement said? Where the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz. But if he is a ḥaver, the gatherer may eat the figs, and he need not tithe them even as demai, as the owner certainly separated tithes for them from other produce; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. His father, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, says the opposite: In what case is this statement said? Where the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz. But if he is a ḥaver, the gatherer may not eat the fruit until he tithes them because ḥaverim, who are meticulous in their observance of halakha, are not suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt. Since the figs that have been picked are not adjacent to the owner’s other figs, he has certainly not separated teruma and tithes on their account.
אמר רבי נראין דברי מדברי אבא מוטב שיחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף ולא יאכילו לעמי הארץ טבלים
Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: My statement appears to be more correct than Father’s statement: It is better that ḥaverim should be suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt, and they should not feed amei ha’aretz produce that is tevel.
עד כאן לא פליגי אלא דמר סבר נחשדו ומר סבר לא נחשדו אבל כולי עלמא חזקה שליח עושה שליחותו
The Gemara infers: The tanna’im disagreed only with regard to the following point: That one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that ḥaverim are suspected of tithing with produce that is not adjacent to the produce it comes to exempt, and one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that they are not suspected of that. But all agree that we may rely on the presumption that an agent fulfills his agency, i.e., that the owner, who is regarded as an agent to tithe his produce so that no one will eat tevel on his account, can be relied upon to separate the tithes.
ורב נחמן התם כדרב חנינא חוזאה דאמר רב חנינא חוזאה חזקה הוא על חבר שאינו מוציא דבר שאינו מתוקן מתחת ידו
And Rav Naḥman can respond as follows: There, the owner can be trusted, in accordance with the statement of Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a, as Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a said: There is a legal presumption with regard to a ḥaver that he does not release anything that is not tithed from his possession. Therefore, we are not relying on a general presumption with regard to agents but on a presumption with regard to ḥaverim.
אמר מר במה דברים אמורים בעם הארץ אבל בחבר אוכל ואינו צריך לעשר דברי רבי
The previous baraita contained several puzzling elements. Now that the Gemara has completed its primary discussion, namely the presumption that an agent carries out his mission, it turns to a discussion of the baraita itself. The Master said: If one said to his fellow: Go and gather for yourself figs, in what case is this statement said? It is in a case where the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz. However, if he is a ḥaver, the gatherer may eat the figs, and he need not tithe them; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
האי עם הארץ דקאמר ליה למאן אילימא דקאמר לעם הארץ חבריה מעשרן דמאי מי ציית אלא בעם הארץ דקאמר ליה לחבר אימא סיפא נראין דברי מדברי אבא מוטב שיחשדו חברים לתרום שלא מן המוקף ואל יאכילו לעמי הארץ טבלין עמי הארץ מאי בעי התם
The Gemara asks: This am ha’aretz, who addressed his fellow man, to whom did he speak? If you say that he spoke to his fellow am ha’aretz, if so how are we to understand the statement that follows: He must tithe them as demai? Would an am ha’aretz comply with the admonition of the Sages to suspect that the produce of his fellow am ha’aretz may not have been tithed? Rather, this must be referring to an am ha’aretz who told a ḥaver to gather figs from his fig tree, and the ḥaver will certainly tithe them. However, say that the latter clause of this baraita: My statement appears to be more correct than Father’s statement, means the following: It is better that ḥaverim should be suspected of separating teruma and tithes from produce that is not adjacent to the produce they seek to exempt, and they should not feed amei ha’aretz produce that is tevel. What is the relevance of amei ha’aretz there? According to that explanation, the situation is the opposite. The person eating the figs is a ḥaver, and the owner of the fig tree is an am ha’aretz.
אמר רבינא רישא בעם הארץ שאמר לחבר סיפא בחבר שאמר לעם הארץ וחבר אחר שומעו רבי
Ravina said: The first clause is referring to an am ha’aretz who spoke to a ḥaver, while the latter clause is referring to a ḥaver who spoke to an am ha’aretz, and a different ḥaver heard him speak, and the discussion relates not to the one gathering the figs but to whether the second ḥaver may partake of the figs if they are offered to him. The Gemara explains the disagreement according to this understanding: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi