אֲבָל בִּגְדֵי עֲשִׁירִים לַעֲנִיִּים — לָא. But the clothing of the wealthy does not need to be three by three handbreadths in order to become ritually impure for the poor because even smaller pieces of cloth are significant for the poor. Therefore, the law with regard to the poor is not determined by the customary practice of the rich. So too, the law of eiruv pertaining to the rest of the world should not be determined by the customary practice of the Persians to eat roasted meat as a food in itself.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָכָא לְחוּמְרָא וְהָכָא לְחוּמְרָא, וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: מְעָרְבִין לְחוֹלֶה וּלְזָקֵן כְּדֵי מְזוֹנוֹ. וּלְרַעַבְתָן, בִּסְעוּדָה בֵּינוֹנִית שֶׁל כׇּל אָדָם. קַשְׁיָא. And if you say: Both here the ruling is stringent, and there the ruling is stringent, i.e., with regard to ritual impurity the halakha is stringent with respect to the poor and declares scraps of cloth that are only three by three fingerbreadths impure, but with regard to eiruv the halakha requires enough roasted meat to suffice for two meals as a food in its own right, in accordance with the practice of the Persians, then there is a difficulty: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One may establish an eiruv for an ill or elderly person with an amount of food that is enough for him for two meals, and if he eats less than the average person due to his sickness or age, a smaller amount of food is required in order to establish an eiruv on his behalf; however, for a glutton, we do not require food in an amount that would satisfy him but merely enough food for two meals measured according to an average meal for the typical person? This indicates that the halakha with respect to an eiruv is lenient and not stringent. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is difficult.
וּמִי אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר הָכִי? וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: עוֹג מֶלֶךְ הַבָּשָׁן — פִּיתְחוֹ כִּמְלוֹאוֹ! The Gemara raises a difficulty with the aforementioned baraita: Did Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar really say this? Wasn’t it taught in another baraita pertaining to the laws of ritual impurity that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Og, king of the Bashan, or any similar giant, requires an opening as big as his full size? If a person dies in a house and it is not clear how his corpse will be removed, all of the openings in the house are considered ritually impure, as the corpse might be carried out through any one of them. If the corpse can fit through some of the openings but not through others, only the larger openings are ritually impure. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that in the case of a giant the size of Og, king of the Bashan, one opening can only prevent the others from contracting impurity if it is large enough for Og’s corpse to fit through. This indicates that the law is determined by the measure of each particular person and not by some general measure.
וְאַבָּיֵי: הָתָם הֵיכִי לֶיעְבֵּיד, הַדּוֹמֵי נְהַדְּמֵיהּ [וְנַפְּקֵיהּ]?! The Gemara asks: And what does Abaye say? How does he reconcile his position with regard to an eiruv, which maintains that we follow the customary practice of most of the world and not that of particular locales, with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s ruling with regard to the corpse of a giant? The Gemara answers: There, in the case of a giant, what should we do? Should we cut the corpse into pieces and carry it out? We have no choice but to carry it out through an opening large enough for the corpse to pass through. However, in the case of the food for the two meals of an eiruv, there is no such logistical constraint, and the law should be determined in accordance with the usual practice.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר, אוֹ לָא? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עוֹג מֶלֶךְ הַבָּשָׁן פִּיתְחוֹ בְּאַרְבָּעָה. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, or not? Come and hear a proof from that which Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Og, king of the Bashan, requires an opening of four handbreadths in order to save the other openings in the house from becoming ritually impure. This indicates that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.
הָתָם דְּאִיכָּא פְּתָחִים קְטַנִּים טוּבָא, וְאִיכָּא חַד דְּהָוֵי אַרְבָּעָה, דְּוַדַּאי כִּי קָא מְרַוַּח — בְּהָהוּא קָא מְרַוַּח. The Gemara rejects this proof: There, we are dealing with a case where there are many small openings, and there is only one that is four handbreadths wide. Therefore, it may be assumed with certainty that when one widens one of the openings in order to remove the corpse from the house, he will widen that opening. Consequently, that opening is ritually impure while the others are not. However, if all the openings in the house are equal in size, they are all ritually impure, as we cannot know through which opening the corpse will be carried out.
אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר רַב: מְעָרְבִין בְּבָשָׂר חַי. אָמַר רַב שִׁימִי בַּר חִיָּיא: מְעָרְבִין בְּבֵיצִים חַיּוֹת. וְכַמָּה? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: אַחַת. סִינַי אָמַר: שְׁתַּיִם. Returning to the laws of eiruv, Rav Ḥiyya bar Rav Ashi said that Rav said: One may establish an eiruv with raw meat because it can be eaten when necessary, even though it is not ordinarily regarded as food. Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya said: One may also establish an eiruv with raw eggs. The Gemara asks: How many eggs are required for an eiruv? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: One. Sinai, a nickname of Rav Yosef, said: Two.
הַנּוֹדֵר מִן הַמָּזוֹן, מוּתָּר בַּמַּיִם כּוּ׳. מֶלַח וּמַיִם הוּא דְּלָא אִיקְּרִי מָזוֹן, הָא כׇּל מִילֵּי אִיקְּרִי מָזוֹן. לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל. דְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: אֵין מְבָרְכִין ״בּוֹרֵא מִינֵי מְזוֹנוֹת״ אֶלָּא עַל חֲמֵשֶׁת הַמִּינִין בִּלְבַד. We learned in the mishna: One who vows that nourishment is prohibited to him is permitted to eat water and salt. The Gemara infers from this: It is only salt and water that are not considered nourishment, but all other food items are considered nourishment. Let us say that this is a refutation of the position of Rav and Shmuel. As it was Rav and Shmuel who both said: One only recites the blessing: Who creates the various kinds of nourishment, over the five species of grain alone, but not over other types of food.
וְלָא אוֹתְבִינֵּיהּ חֲדָא זִימְנָא? לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתַּיְיהוּ נָמֵי מֵהָא! The Gemara asks a question: Did we not already refute their position on one occasion from a different source? The Gemara answers: Indeed, we already refuted their view, but let us say that there is a refutation of their position from here as well.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: בְּאוֹמֵר ״כׇּל הַזָּן עָלַי״. מַיִם וּמֶלַח הוּא דְּלָא זָיְינִי, הָא כׇּל מִילֵּי זָיְינִי. Rav Huna said: We can resolve the difficulty from the mishna by saying that it is referring to someone who vows and says: Anything that nourishes is prohibited to me. In that case, it is water and salt that are permitted to him, as they do not nourish, but all other food items are prohibited, as they do nourish. This inclusive formulation includes anything that provides even a small degree of nourishment; but the particular term mazon, nourishment or sustenance, used in the blessing over food, is reserved only for the five species of grain.
וְהָאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה: כִּי הֲוָה אָזֵילְנָא בָּתְרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְמֵיכַל פֵּירֵי דְּגִינּוֹסַר, כִּי הֲוֵינַן בֵּי מְאָה — הֲוָה מְנַקְּטִינַן לְכׇל חַד וְחַד עַשְׂרָה עַשְׂרָה. כִּי הֲוֵינַן בֵּי עַשְׂרָה — הֲוָה מְנַקְּטִינַן לְכׇל חַד וְחַד מְאָה מְאָה. וְכׇל מְאָה מִינַּיְיהוּ (לָא) הֲוֵי מַחֲזִיק לְהוּ צַנָּא בַּת תְּלָתָא סָאוֵי, וַהֲוָה אָכֵיל לְהוּ לְכוּלְּהוֹן, וְאָמַר: שְׁבוּעָתָא דְּלָא טְעִים לִי זִיּוּנָא! אֵימָא: ״מְזוֹנָא״. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say: When we were following Rabbi Yoḥanan to eat of the fruits of Genosar, very sweet fruits that grow in the region of the Sea of Galilee, when we were a group of a hundred people, each and every person would take ten fruits; and when we were a group of ten, each and every person would take a hundred fruits for him. And each hundred of these fruits could not fit into a three-se’a basket. And Rabbi Yoḥanan would eat them all and then say: I swear that I have not yet tasted something that nourishes. Didn’t we say that only water and salt are excluded from the category of things that nourish? The Gemara corrects the rendition of the story: Say that he said as follows: I have not tasted sustaining food, but fruit is certainly considered something that nourishes.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ״ — מְעָרְבִין לוֹ בָּהּ. ״כִּכָּר זוֹ עָלַי״ — אֵין מְעָרְבִין לוֹ בָּהּ. Rav Huna said that Rav said: If one said: I swear that I shall not eat this loaf, one may nonetheless establish an eiruv for him with it because the food used for an eiruv does not have to be edible for the particular individual the eiruv services. However, if one said: This loaf shall be forbidden to me, one may not establish an eiruv for him with it, as this formulation indicates that he is prohibiting himself to use or benefit from the loaf in any manner.
מֵיתִיבִי: הַנּוֹדֵר מִן הַכִּכָּר — מְעָרְבִין לוֹ בָּהּ. מַאי לָאו, דְּאָמַר ״עָלַי״? לָא, דְּאָמַר ״זוֹ״. The Gemara raises an objection based upon the following baraita: With regard to one who vows not to benefit from a loaf, one may nonetheless establish an eiruv for him with it. What, is it not referring to one who said: This loaf shall be forbidden to me? The Gemara answers: No, the baraita is only is referring to a case where he said: I swear that I shall not eat this loaf.
הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אֵימָתַי, בִּזְמַן שֶׁאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶטְעָמֶנָּה״. The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to understand the baraita in this fashion, as it was taught in the latter clause: When do we apply this halakha? Only when one said: I swear that I shall not taste it.
אֲבָל אָמַר ״עָלַי״, מַאי? הָכִי נָמֵי דְּאֵין מְעָרְבִין לוֹ בָּהּ? אִי הָכִי, אַדְּתָנֵי ״כִּכָּר זוֹ הֶקְדֵּשׁ״ אֵין מְעָרְבִין לוֹ בָּהּ, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין מְעָרְבִין בַּהֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת — לִיפְלוֹג וְלִיתְנֵי בְּדִידַהּ: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים, דְּאָמַר ״זוֹ״, אֲבָל אָמַר ״עָלַי״ — אֵין מְעָרְבִין לוֹ בָּהּ! The Gemara asks: But if he said: This loaf shall be forbidden to me, what is the halakha? So too, one may not establish an eiruv for him with it. But if so, there is a difficulty. Instead of teaching in the continuation of the baraita that if one said: This loaf is consecrated property, one may not establish an eiruv for him with it, as one may not establish an eiruv with consecrated objects, let him make an internal distinction in the case of a non-sacred loaf itself and state: In what case is this statement said? Only where one said: I swear that I shall not eat this loaf. But if one said: This loaf shall be forbidden to me, one may not establish an eiruv for him with it. This indicates that Rav Huna’s understanding of the baraita is incorrect.
אָמַר לְךָ רַב הוּנָא: אֶלָּא מַאי, כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאָמַר ״עָלַי״ מְעָרְבִין? קַשְׁיָא רֵישָׁא? Rav Huna could have said to you: Rather, what would you say, that wherever one said: This loaf shall be forbidden to me, one may establish an eiruv for him with it? If so, there is a difficulty from the first clause of the baraita, which states: When do we say this? Only when one said: I swear that I shall not taste it. That indicates that if one said: This loaf shall be forbidden to me, one may not establish an eiruv for him with it.
חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא, וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: הַנּוֹדֵר מִן הַכִּכָּר מְעָרְבִין לוֹ בָּהּ, וַאֲפִילּוּ אָמַר ״עָלַי״ — נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר: שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶטְעָמֶנָּה. The Gemara answers that the baraita is incomplete, and it teaches the following: With regard to one who vows not to benefit from a loaf, one may nonetheless establish an eiruv for him with it. And even if one said: This loaf shall be forbidden to me, it is as though he said: I swear that I shall not taste it. Therefore, the loaf itself is only forbidden to him as food, but he can use it for the purpose of an eiruv.
מִכׇּל מָקוֹם קַשְׁיָא לְרַב הוּנָא! הוּא דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל כִּכָּר זוֹ״ — מְעָרְבִין לוֹ בָּהּ. ״כִּכָּר זוֹ עָלַי״ — אֵין מְעָרְבִין לוֹ בָּהּ. The Gemara comments: Nevertheless, the difficulty remains according to the opinion of Rav Huna. The Gemara answers: He stated his view in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer; as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If one said: I swear that I shall not eat this loaf, one may establish an eiruv for him with it; but if he said: This loaf shall be forbidden to me, one may not establish an eiruv for him with it.
וּמִי אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָכִי? וְהָתַנְיָא, זֶה הַכְּלָל: אָדָם אוֹסֵר עַצְמוֹ בְּאוֹכֶל — מְעָרְבִין לוֹ בָּהּ. אוֹכֶל הַנֶּאְסָר לוֹ לְאָדָם — אֵין מְעָרְבִין לוֹ בָּהּ. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: ״כִּכָּר זוֹ עָלַי״ — מְעָרְבִין לוֹ בָּהּ. ״כִּכָּר זוֹ הֶקְדֵּשׁ״ — אֵין מְעָרְבִין לוֹ בָּהּ, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין מְעָרְבִין לוֹ בַּהֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת! The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Eliezer really say this? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: This is the principle: With regard to a person who prohibits himself from eating a particular food, e.g., if one said: I swear that I shall not eat this loaf, one may establish an eiruv for him with that loaf. However, if the food was prohibited to a person, e.g., if he said: This loaf shall be forbidden to me, one may not establish an eiruv for him with it. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he said: This loaf shall be forbidden to me, one may establish an eiruv for him with it. However, if he said: This loaf is consecrated property, one may not establish an eiruv for him with it, as one may not establish an eiruv for him with consecrated objects. Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer does not distinguish between the two differently worded types of vows, but between a vow and consecration.
תְּרֵי תַנָּאֵי וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. The Gemara answers: It must be explained that these are two tanna’im who both held according to Rabbi Eliezer. Two later tanna’im disagreed with each other in reporting Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion.
מְעָרְבִין לַנָּזִיר בְּיַיִן כּוּ׳. מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי. דְּתַנְיָא, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין מְעָרְבִין לַנָּזִיר בְּיַיִן וּלְיִשְׂרָאֵל בִּתְרוּמָה, בֵּית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: מְעָרְבִין לַנָּזִיר בְּיַיִן וּלְיִשְׂרָאֵל בִּתְרוּמָה. אָמְרוּ לָהֶן בֵּית הִלֵּל לְבֵית שַׁמַּאי: אִי אַתֶּם מוֹדִים We learned in the mishna: One may establish an eiruv for a nazirite with wine and for an Israelite with teruma, even though they themselves may not partake of these foods. The Gemara comments: The mishna was not taught in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, as it was taught in a baraita that Beit Shammai say: One may not establish an eiruv for a nazirite with wine and for an Israelite with teruma. Beit Hillel disagree and say: One may establish an eiruv for a nazirite with wine and for an Israelite with teruma. Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: Do you not concede