In this case, a man makes a betrothal statement to a woman at a point at which the statement cannot be fulfilled—one of them is not Jewish, one of them is not free, she is married, he is married to her sister, or she is subject to yibbum. In all of these cases, R. Meir says she will be betrothed when the event occurs. This is like a case of transferring title for something not yet in the world, because at this point she is not permitted to him.
R. Judah Hanasi theoretically allows such a statement to be effective, but says that the rabbis did not allow it because this would create enmity. Imagine how this would play out in family dynamics if he’s married to her sister and he says “Behold you are betrothed to me after your sister dies.” Might make a good TV show.
Rabbi was already counted due to the previous source. Since Rabbi and R. Judah Hanasi are the same person, Abaye did not need to count him twice.
In this mishnah from Ketubot, a woman takes a vow that anything she produces, meaning the profit of her work, should be forbidden to her husband. Such a statement is against the marriage contract, in which she is obliged to turn over her handiwork to him. Thus, the first opinion rules that the husband need not annul the vow. The vow has no validity to begin with. But R. Akiva allows the vow to stand, lest she produce for him more than she is obligated to do. This is a case of a person dedicating (“konam” is a dedication statement) something that does not yet exist—her handiwork has not yet been made. So why didn’t Abaye include R. Akiva on the list.
R. Huna said on this mishnah that the woman did not dedicate her future earnings. A person cannot, in his opinion, dedicate something not yet in the world. Rather, she dedicated her hands, which are in the world. Anything they make will be forbidden to her husband (should this vow stand). Thus R. Akiva is not on Abaye’s list.
This mishnah teaches that a man may stipulate that his betrothal to a woman is contingent upon his performing for her a certain favor.
The question which the Talmud will ask is whether he must also give her money for the betrothal to be effective. Or is the favor he does for her sufficient to count as the money for kiddushin.
[Speaking to the government on her behalf sounds a bit like something out of the Trump or Netanyahu regime].
According to Resh Lakish, the man must also give her kiddushin money. The fact that he will perform a favor for her is not sufficient.
The two baraitot cited here prove that a man can betroth a woman by performing work or some sort of favor for her as long as that work has not yet been done and it is worth the value of a perutah. So this is a refutation of Resh Lakish.
Resh Lakish could resolve those baraitot by connecting them to a tannaitic dispute as to how to reckon wages. When one performs work for another, does that person become liable to pay the worker all at one time or incrementally? If incrementally, then at no point is he giving her the value of a perutah, because we could divide the moments up into units worth less than a perutah. This is the opinion of our mishnah—wages cannot be used for betrothal because there is no point at which they are worth a perutah. The other baraitot hold that the obligation is incurred only at the end of the labor, when they are worth a perutah.
Rava explains why Resh Lakish had to explain that our mishnah holds that wages are incurred from beginning to end and that therefore he also gave her an additional perutah. In the baraita, the man stated “in payment for.” Clearly the work was the betrothal money. Our mishnah teaches “on condition.” This teaches that “on condition” is an external stipulation; it is not the mechanism through which betrothal is contracted. Therefore, he must also give her an additional perutah.
The first part of this mishnah is straightforward. Slightly more complicated is the second part. If the father dies, he cannot consent to the betrothal. Nevertheless, the mishnah rules that she is betrothed. The assumption is that when the man said “on condition that my father consents” he really meant to say, “on condition that my father does not disapprove.” Since after his death the father cannot disapprove, the betrothal is valid. If the son dies, the mishnah finds a convenient way for the woman to avoid the need for yibbum (levirate marriage to her husband’s brother). The court would instruct the father to state that he did not approve of the marriage and he would thereby annul the betrothal. If the betrothal was annulled, the woman would not be liable for yibbum.
This is the problem with the mishnah—what does it mean when he says “on condition that my father consents.” The first clause seems to mean that the father says yes. If he is silent, she is not betrothed.
The second clause implies that “consent” means the father did not protest. Silence is acquiescence.
The last clause implies that to undo the kiddushin, the father must actively protest. His earlier silence is not sufficient. Thus the three clauses of the mishnah do not all seem to agree one with the other.