Rava explains why R. Huna allows her to eat terumah. Since her father allowed her to be betrothed and married without saying a word, means that he was treating her like an orphan, by not paying attention to what she was doing. Thus he is in a sense, no longer her father. Her marriage is valid if she consents to it herself. This is an excellent example of how Rava and other late amoraim will defend all opinions, even those that seem to make little sense to them.
Today’s sugya discusses a girl who is betrothed without her father’s consent. All agree that if her father wants to prevent the marriage he can. Since she is a minor, he needs to consent to her actions. The question is whether she can prevent the marriage. In other words, if her father is okay with the match, can she change her mind?
Rav argues that either her father or she can prevent the marriage. Essentially, since her father did not agree, the betrothal is simply not valid. But R. Assi would argue that only her father can undo the marriage, not she.
The verse from Exodus refers to a case where a man had sex with a young virgin without her father’s permission (the rabbis call this a case of seduction). The Torah says that the father can refuse the marriage. The rabbis add that the girl can as well. This is analogous to a case where a girl was betrothed without her father’s consent. Even if she originally consented, she may revoke it at a later period.
Rav resolves the difficulty raised on R. Assi. The baraita could refer to a case where the man seduced her not for the sake of marriage, but just for sex. In this case, there never was a betrothal, so of course she can refuse the marriage.
Obviously, if he seduced her without the intent of marriage, then she is not married. The rabbis do not believe that premarital sex causes a marital bond. So then why would we even need this verse? R. Nahman b. Yitzchak argues that the verse is necessary to teach that he pays the fine, even though she refused to subsequently get married and her father consented to the marriage. Without this verse we might have thought that he pays the fine only if the father refuses the marriage, not she.
If the previous baraita referred to a case where he seduced her without the intent to marry her, then we learn the same thing in another baraita. This baraita requires that the seducer betroth her before marrying her. But if he seduced her with the intent to betroth her, then why does she need another betrothal. She is already betrothed! Thus the Torah refers to a situation where he did not seduce her for the sake of marriage.
Abaye argues with R. Joseph. Even if the man seduced her with the intent of betrothal, she still needs kiddushin with her father’s knowledge. Thus this latter baraita could refer to a case where the seducer had the intent of betrothal and would not be a support for Rav’s interpretation of the first baraita.
In this case a man gives a woman several dates (palm dates) in an attempt to use the dates as betrothal money. Here he says the words “Be betrothed to me” as he gives each date. The fact that he repeats the formula each time means that each act is a separate act of betrothal. Since they were separate acts, in order for the betrothal to be effective at least one of the dates must be worth a perutah. If each individual date is worth less than a perutah, we do not add the dates up so that together they make a perutah.
In this case, since he made one betrothal statement, we can add up the dates. If together they are worth a perutah then she is betrothed.
This section continues the scenario of the previous section. In this case, while he is giving her the dates she starts to eat them one at a time (dates are quite delicious, and I guess she just couldn’t resist!) Unless one of them is worth a perutah she cannot be betrothed by the combined value of them all because they are never all in her hand at the same time.
R. Shimon is the tanna who holds that separate phrases make the act separate acts. If one uses the word “oath” to each person to whom he owes an oath, and it turns out each was false, then he is liable for each oath. But if he makes one collective oath, he is only liable once.
The Talmud continues with interpreting the next line of the mishnah.
The last clause of the mishnah describes her eating the dates one at a time. She is not betrothed unless one of them is worth a perutah. To what does this clause refer? It cannot refer to the first clause where he said, “Be betrothed to me with this one, be betrothed to me with this one,” because she is not eating the dates. She could even put them down and as long as one of the dates is worth a perutah, she is betrothed.
Where he said “with this one and with this one and with this one.” If she is eating them one at a time, one of them alone must be worth a perutah.
If the first date is worth a perutah, and he keeps giving her dates, the betrothal is not complete until he gives her the last date. The rabbis view the first dates as a loan, because were he to retract his offer, she would have to give the date back. By the time she is betrothed, this date is gone and he is saying to her—if you become betrothed to me, you do not need to give me the loan back. But then this is betrothal through forgiving a loan, and this is not a valid form of kiddushin. R. Yohanan is indeed puzzled by the conundrum and offers a colorful statement to express it.
Rav and Shmuel return to saying that the last clause refers to the first clause of the mishnah, where he says “Be betrothed to me with this one, be betrothed to me with this one.” If she puts the dates down it is obvious that she is not betrothed unless one is worth a perutah because she has not yet derived any benefit from them. But if she is eating them, and deriving immediate benefit, I might have thought that even if no date is worth a perutah, she has agreed to be taken in marriage. Therefore, the mishnah teaches that this is not so. A woman never agrees to be betrothed for less than a perutah.
R. Ammi says that it can refer to the last clause of the mishnah as long as we read it as saying that the last date he gives her has to be worth a perutah. This last date is not a loan, it is the date on which she must agree to be betrothed. This date, and not the earlier dates, must be worth a perutah.
Rava derives three halakhic lessons from R. Ammi’s statement. First of all, kiddushin cannot be performed by forgiving a debt, as was stated above. Second, if one forgives a debt and at the same time gives the woman a perutah, she is thinking about the perutah and is betrothed. This is what happened in this situation. The first dates were a loan which he is now forgiving. And the last date is worth a perutah. Third, if she in the end does not want to be betrothed, she must return the money, which here refers to the first dates.