Had the son appointed the father as an agent, the marriage would have been valid. But this is insolent behavior, and we do not assume that the son was so brazen as to do so.
Ravina does not agree with Rav and Shmuel who said that we are concerned lest the father consented to the betrothal of his daughter who was betrothed without his knowledge. Ravina holds that we are never concerned that someone might have consented. Without the father’s consent for his daughter to be betrothed or the son’s consent to betroth, there is no validity to the betrothal.
The Talmud continues with another story of betrothal. While it is hard to tell if these stories are accurate descriptions of kiddushin, they certainly are interesting tales.
In this case we can assume that the father would not have consented to the kiddushin because it was done in such a disgraceful manner.
Both aspects of this betrothal are disgraceful. The fact that it was done with vegetables and the fact that it was done in the shuk.
Now today’s story strikes me as being very realistic. They could make a movie out of this one!
Oy, the drama!
Both Abaye and Rava rule that the girl is not married to the father’s relative, for the father in the end told his wife she would be married to her relative. Abaye says that Jewish people should not be assumed as doing such a treacherous thing—throwing a party to marry the girl off to one man, but at the same time allowing her to marry another. Rava says that if the man wanted to marry her off to his relative, why would he have made the party?
If the father did not bother making a festive meal, Rava might assume that he did consent to the betrothal, whereas Abaye would still say that we do not assume the Jews will act this way.
In this case we do not know if the father wanted her to go overhead with the marriage because he was overseas. Eating terumah is the sine qua non sign that one is married, because eating terumah for someone not from a priestly family is strictly prohibited.
Rav says she may eat terumah, and if her father returns and protests, then she will have to stop.
R. Assi is concerned lest her father protest, and therefore he says she may not eat terumah.
Such a case actually occurred and despite his ruling, he was concerned about R. Assi’s opinion and did not allow her to eat terumah.
Finally, when it comes to inheritance, Rav says we follow a different principle—give the money to the last person we know owned it. In this case, that would be her father, for had she died before marriage, her father would have inherited her.
The first part of today’s sugya deals with a case where we do not know if the father consented to the marriage or not. He did consent to the betrothal.
The betrothal was done correctly, with the father’s knowledge. But the marriage was not done with his consent. Since a woman does not eat terumah (if married to a priest) until she enters the huppah, the question we need to ask is whether or not her entrance to the huppah, i.e. marriage, is legally acceptable in order to allow her to eat terumah.
Earlier Rav had said that if the father is overseas she may eat terumah. Rav said that she can eat terumah, because we can assume that since her father consented to the betrothal, he would also consent to the marriage. R. Huna says that in this case Rav would agree that she may eat not eat terumah. The father’s silence should be interpreted as anger.
R. Assi had said that if the father was overseas she does not eat terumah lest the father return and protest against the marriage. But R. Yirmiyah b. Abba argues that in this case, the father was here. The fact that he did not protest can be interpreted as a sign that he consents to the marriage.
In this case she was both betrothed and married without her father’s knowledge, but he was there and did not protest. R. Huna argues, in a very puzzling manner, that we assume that her father’s silence is a sign of consent. R. Yirmiyah b. Abba shifts his opinion and argues that since the father did not concede to the betrothal or the marriage, she may not eat terumah.
Ulla points out that R. Huna’s opinion seems absurd. If she does not eat terumah when the father consented to the betrothal, why should she eat terumah when her father did not consent? Hence, in this case we rule like R. Yirmiyah b. Abba who is a mere student in comparison with R. Huna, one of the great Babylonian amoraim.