The Talmud now tries to show that Rava does not have any doubt about this question, by citing his opinion in a different law about divorce. The husband places the get in the hand of his wife’s slave. If the slave is sleeping and she is watching over him, then he is fully controlled by her and she is divorced. But if he is awake, then the divorce is not valid, because he is like a courtyard that she is not watching.
Now if we consider the na’arah to be like her father’s courtyard, then even if the husband gives her the get, she should not be divorced, because like the slave, she is a courtyard that is guarded without his awareness.
Thus Rava must hold that the na’arah is like her father—just as he can appoint an agent, so can she.
The question is far simpler—even if she is like her father’s hand, can she appoint an agent? The answer is she cannot. We would do well to remember—this is referring to a 12 year old girl. The rabbis simply did not believe that she had this great legal power.
The Talmud continues to discuss whether a na’arah can appoint an agent to accept her get.
A mishnah from Gittin teaches that a minor girl cannot appoint an agent to receive her get. By deduction, a na’arah, a girl slightly older than a minor, can appoint an agent.
The Talmud resolves the difficulty—we are dealing here with a girl who has no father. Since she is of age and has no father with authority over her, she can appoint an agent. But a na’arah with a father cannot.
The second clause refers to the girl’s father. If he appoints an agent, then the divorce is valid as soon as the agent receives the get, since he clearly has the right to appoint an agent. Therefore, it seems that the first clause also refers to a ketanah (minor) that has a father.
The Talmud now adds words into the mishnah such that it accords with Rava. A minor can never appoint an agent to receive her get. A na’arah can, but only if she has no father. When Rava said that she cannot, he was referring to a minor whose father was still alive.
Theoretically a minor girl cannot accept her own betrothal, only her father can makes such an arrangement. Today’s sugya begins a discussion about what happens if she does accept her own betrothal without his knowledge. To leave this marriage does she require a full divorce?
Shmuel says that this girl requires a get, a regular divorce document. She also must perform “mi’un” which means refusal and is the way of annulling a marriage whose validity is only rabbinic and not biblical. Mi’un usually refers to a case where a girl without a father was married off by her mother or brother. From the Torah only the father has the right to marry her off. The rabbis gave the mother or brother such a power, but added that when the girl becomes of majority age, she can refuse the marriage.
Karna (not the Great Karnak, but close) points out that Shmuel contradicts himself. If the marriage was valid, than she should need a get, not mi’un. And if the marriage is valid only rabbinically, then why should she need a get.
The rabbis for some reason reverse the opinions and send the discussion to Rav. Rav rules like Shmuel did originally, and then notes that he could not believe that Shmuel would say like Karna. Rav too thinks she need a get and mi’un.
R. Abba son of R. Ika explains why she needs both. If the father consented to the marriage, then it would be valid and to leave the marriage she would need a divorce.
If the father does not consent, then really the marriage is not valid. But since she received a get, we would think that she is a divorcee and therefore this man cannot marry her sister (a man may not marry his divorcees sister). To signify that the marriage was not necessarily valid, and therefore if he tries to marry her sister the kiddushin are valid, we also force them to perform mi’un. If he betroths the sister and then wishes to terminate the marriage, he would have to divorce her as well.
Shmuel’s rule is valid only if they already arranged the match (a shidukh). In such a case, we can assume that the father would have wanted the marriage. But if there was no such arrangement we do not need to assume that he would have been okay with the marriage.
Ulla totally disagrees with Shmuel—such a girl does not even need mi’un. All the more so, she does not require a get.
But, the Talmud notes, this is true only if there were no prior arrangements. If there were, then she would need a get and mi’un.
According to this version, even if there were arrangements, she still does not require mi’un.
R. Kahana cites a mishnah from Yevamot. A man is married to two women and dies and both become liable for yibbum (levirate marriage) with the yavam. If the yavam is prohibited from marrying one of them (for instance she is his daughter), then the rival wife is also exempt (this is the subject of the first chapter of Yevamot). However, if the marriage with the forbidden wife was terminated, then the rival wife can perform yibbum.
One of the ways of terminating this marriage is mi’un, refusal. Who, the Talmud asks, gets to leave a marriage with refusal—it must be a minor who was married without the consent of her father.
R. Kahana resolves the difficulty by saying it refers only to a case where the girl was treated like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. He married her off as a minor and then she was divorced or widowed. Her father no longer has any authority over her. If she now, while still a minor, accepts marriage without her father’s consent, she can leave that marriage without a get and with only mi’un. But if she was married without his consent for her first marriage, the marriage, according to Ulla, has no validity.
We continue with last week’s discussion about the case where a minor betrothed herself without her father’s awareness. Ulla had said that there is no validity to this marriage whatsoever. R. Hamnuna will raise a difficulty on him.
The baraita refers to the rights of a father to sell his daughter (Exodus 21). The issue is that the Torah refers to this girl as eventually marrying her master or her master’s son. The first opinion holds that he may not sell her to an owner that cannot fulfill this aspect of the verse. R. Elazar holds that he can.
But both agree that if the prohibition is not first degree relative, but just one of the priestly prohibitions, he can sell her. A widow may not marry a high priest, but if she does, the marriage is valid. The same is true for a divorcee or a halutzah to an ordinary priest.