Chullin 82aחולין פ״ב א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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82aפ״ב א

ואמר ר"ש בן לקיש אומר היה ר"ש פרה נפדית על גבי מערכתה אמר רב שמן בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן פרת חטאת אינה משנה

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says in explanation of Rabbi Shimon’s statement: Rabbi Shimon would say that the red heifer can be redeemed with money even once it has been slaughtered and placed upon its pyre in preparation for being burned. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon states that there could be a time when the heifer was fit for consumption, i.e., if it was redeemed. Why, then, does he deem one who slaughters it exempt from liability for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring? Rav Shemen bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The statement with regard to the red heifer of purification is not considered part of the mishna, and Rabbi Shimon agrees that its slaughterer is liable for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.

ועגלה ערופה לאו שחיטה ראויה היא והתנן נמצא ההורג עד שלא תערף העגלה תצא ותרעה בעדר אמר ר"ש בן לקיש משום רבי ינאי עגלה ערופה אינה משנה

The Gemara asks: And is the slaughter of the heifer whose neck was to have been broken not considered an act of slaughter that is fit? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Sota 47a): If a heifer was set aside to have its neck broken to atone for the murder of an individual whose murderer was not known, and then the murderer was found before the heifer’s neck was broken, the heifer shall go out and graze among the flock, as it is not consecrated. Evidently, before its neck is broken, deriving benefit from it is not prohibited, and its slaughter would be one that is fit. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck was to have been broken is not considered part of the mishna, and Rabbi Shimon agrees that its slaughterer is liable for violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.

ומי אמר רבי ינאי הכי והאמר רבי ינאי גבול שמעתי בה ושכחתי ונסבין חבריא לומר ירידתה לנחל איתן אוסרתה

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yannai actually say so? But doesn’t Rabbi Yannai say: I heard the boundary, i.e., stage, beyond which the heifer is forbidden, but I have forgotten what it is; but the group of scholars were inclined to say that the heifer’s descent to a hard valley, where its neck is broken, is the action that renders it forbidden?

ואם איתא לישני כאן קודם ירידה כאן לאחר ירידה

And if it is so, let him resolve the contradiction by saying: Here, where deriving benefit from the heifer is permitted, and its slaughterer is liable for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it is referring to an act of slaughtering that is fit and is performed before the heifer’s descent, while there, in the mishna, where Rabbi Shimon holds that there is no liability for transgressing: Itself and its offspring, it is referring to slaughtering performed after its descent. At that time, deriving benefit from the heifer is already prohibited, and the slaughter is therefore not considered fit.

א"ר פנחס בריה דרב אמי אנן משמיה דרשב"ל מתנינן לה עגלה ערופה אינה משנה א"ר אשי כי הוינן בי רב פפי קשיא לן מי אמר רשב"ל הכי

Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami, said: We taught the statement in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish himself, not as a quote from Rabbi Yannai: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken is not considered part of the mishna. Rav Ashi said: When we were studying in the study hall of Rav Pappi, that statement was difficult for us: Did Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish actually say that it is not considered part of the mishna?

והא איתמר צפורי מצורע מאימתי נאסרין רבי יוחנן אמר משעת שחיטה ורשב"ל אמר משעת לקיחה ואמרינן מ"ט דרבי שמעון בן לקיש

But it was stated that amora’im engaged in a dispute concerning the following issue: From when is one prohibited from deriving benefit from the leper’s birds? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One is prohibited from the moment of their slaughter; and Reish Lakish says: One is prohibited from the moment they are taken and designated to be a leper’s birds. And we say: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish?

גמר קיחה קיחה מעגלה ערופה

His reasoning is that he derives it via verbal analogy from the terms: “Taking [kiḥa]” (Leviticus 14:4), with regard to the birds, and: “Taking [kiḥa]” (Deuteronomy 21:3), with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken. Consequently, just as deriving benefit from the heifer whose neck is broken is prohibited from the time of its selection, so too must deriving benefit from these birds be prohibited from the time of their selection. Clearly, then, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that deriving benefit from the heifer whose neck is broken is prohibited while it is still alive. Therefore, its slaughter is one that does not render the animal fit for consumption. Accordingly, Rabbi Shimon would exempt its slaughterer from the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, as is taught in the mishna.

אלא אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן עגלה ערופה אינה משנה:

Rather, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken is not considered part of the mishna, and this resolution of the difficulty was articulated by Rabbi Yoḥanan rather than Reish Lakish.

מתני׳ שנים שלקחו פרה ובנה איזה שלקח ראשון ישחוט ראשון ואם קדם השני זכה:

MISHNA: With regard to two people who purchased a cow and its offspring, where each purchased one of the animals, whoever purchased his animal first shall slaughter it first, and the second one must wait until the next day to slaughter his animal, so as not to violate the prohibition of: It and its offspring. But if the second one preceded him and slaughtered his animal first, he benefitted, and the one who purchased the animal first may not slaughter it until the next day.

גמ׳ אמר רב יוסף לענין דינא תנן תנא אם קדם השני הרי זה זריז ונשכר זריז דלא עבד איסורא ונשכר דקאכיל בשרא:

GEMARA: Rav Yosef said: We learn in the mishna that the first purchaser is granted precedence only with regard to the matter of a court judgment, in case the two purchasers go to court each demanding to slaughter his animal first. But there is no prohibition against the second one slaughtering his animal first if no claim is brought to court. Likewise, a Sage taught in a baraita: If the second one preceded him and slaughtered his animal first, he is diligent and rewarded; he is diligent because he did not violate a prohibition, and he is rewarded because he eats meat already that day.

מתני׳ שחט פרה ואח"כ שני בניה סופג שמונים שחט שני בניה ואחר כך שחטה סופג את הארבעים שחטה ואת בתה ואת בת בתה סופג שמונים

MISHNA: If one slaughtered a cow and thereafter slaughtered its two offspring on the same day, he incurs eighty lashes for two separate actions violating the prohibition against slaughtering the mother and the offspring on the same day. If one slaughtered its two offspring and thereafter slaughtered the mother cow, he incurs the forty lashes, as he performed a single prohibited act. If one slaughtered the mother and its daughter, and, later that day, slaughtered its daughter’s daughter, he incurs eighty lashes, as he has performed the act of slaughtering a mother and its offspring twice.

שחטה ואת בת בתה ואחר כך שחט בתה סופג את הארבעים סומכוס אומר משום רבי מאיר סופג שמונים:

But if one slaughtered the mother and its daughter’s daughter and thereafter slaughtered its daughter, he incurs the forty lashes, as he performed a single prohibited act. Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: He incurs eighty lashes for slaughtering the daughter on the same day as its calf and its mother, as that act comprises two separate violations of the prohibition.

גמ׳ אמאי (ויקרא כב, כח) אותו ואת בנו אמר רחמנא ולא בנו ואותו לא ס"ד דתניא אותו ואת בנו אין לי אלא אותו ואת בנו אותו ואת אמו מנין

GEMARA: With regard to the statement in the mishna that if one slaughters two calves and thereafter slaughters their mother he incurs the forty lashes, the Gemara asks: Why does he receive lashes? After all, the phrase: “It and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28), is what the Merciful One states in the Torah, and not: Its offspring and it. The Gemara answers: That thought should not enter your mind, as it is taught in a baraita: From the phrase “it and its offspring” I have derived only that the prohibition includes slaughtering the animal itself first and its offspring afterward. From where do I derive that the prohibition also includes the case of slaughtering the offspring itself first and its mother afterward?

כשהוא אומר לא תשחטו הרי כאן שנים הא כיצד אחד השוחט את הפרה ואחד השוחט את אמה ואחד השוחט את בנה שנים האחרונים חייבין

It is derived in the following manner: When the verse states: “You shall not slaughter [tishḥatu] both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), this is referring to two people who are prohibited from slaughtering on the same day, as the word “slaughter” is phrased in the plural. How so? If, during the course of a single day, there is one person who slaughters the cow and then another who slaughters that cow’s mother, and then there is another person who slaughters that cow’s offspring, the two latter people are liable, the first of them for slaughtering the mother after its offspring was slaughtered, and the second person for slaughtering the offspring after its mother was slaughtered.