Chullin 78bחולין ע״ח ב
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
Save "Chullin 78b"
Toggle Reader Menu Display Settings
78bע״ח ב

זה בנה אב כל מקום שנאמר שה אינו אלא להוציא את הכלאים אמר קרא או לרבות את הכלאים

concerning the verse: “These are the animals that you may eat: An ox, a seh of sheep, and a seh of goats” (Deuteronomy 14:4), that this verse establishes a paradigm for other cases: Wherever the word seh is stated in the Torah, it serves only to exclude an animal of diverse kinds. The Hebrew word seh denotes either a sheep or a goat. The offspring of diverse kinds, which is neither a sheep nor a goat, does not qualify as a seh. The Gemara answers that with regard to a mother and its offspring, the verse states: “Whether it be a bull or a sheep” (Leviticus 22:28), and the “or” is superfluous there and serves to include the offspring of diverse kinds.

האי או מיבעי ליה לחלק דס"ד אמינא עד דשחיט שור ובנו שה ובנו לא מיחייב קמ"ל לחלק מבנו נפקא

The Gemara challenges: This word “or” is necessary to separate the prohibitions, as it might enter your mind to say: One is not liable unless he slaughters both a bull and its offspring and a sheep and its offspring in a single day. Therefore, the word “or” teaches us that one is liable for slaughtering either type of animal with its offspring. The Gemara responds: Separating the prohibitions is derived from the use of the words “its offspring” instead of their offspring.

ואכתי מיבעי ליה לכדתניא אילו נאמר שור ושה ובנו הייתי אומר עד שישחוט שור ושה ובנו ת"ל (ויקרא כב, כח) שור או שה אותו ואת בנו מאי לאו מאו נפקא ליה לא מאותו

The Gemara challenges: But the word “or” is still necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: If it were stated: A bull, and a sheep, and its offspring you shall not slaughter in one day, I would say: One is not liable unless he slaughters a bull, and a sheep, and the offspring of one of them in a single day. Therefore, the verse states: “A bull or a sheep…it and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28), to teach that one is liable even for slaughtering either of them and its offspring. What, is it not from the word “or” that the baraita derives this halakha? The Gemara responds: No, it is derived from the word “it,” and the offspring of diverse kinds are included in the prohibition due to the word “or.”

הניחא לרבנן דמייתר להו אותו אלא לחנניה דלא מייתר ליה אותו לחלק מנא ליה לחלק לא צריך קרא דסבר לה כר' יונתן

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, cited further in the discussion, for whom the word “it” is superfluous and can be used for this derivation, leaving the word “or” available to include the offspring of diverse kinds; but according to the opinion of Ḥananya, for whom the word “it” is not superfluous, from where does he derive that one is to separate into two prohibitions slaughtering either a bull with its offspring or a sheep with its offspring? The Gemara answers that there is no need for a verse to separate them into two prohibitions, as Ḥananya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan.

דתניא (ויקרא כ, ט) איש אשר יקלל את אביו ואת אמו אין לי אלא אביו ואמו אביו שלא אמו ואמו שלא אביו מנין ת"ל (ויקרא כ, ט) אביו ואמו קלל אביו קלל אמו קלל דברי ר' יאשיה

As it is taught in a baraita: From the verse: “A man who curses his father and his mother shall die” (Leviticus 20:9), I have derived only that one is liable if he curses both his father and his mother. From where do I derive that if one curses his father but not his mother, or his mother but not his father, he is liable? The continuation of the verse states: “His father and his mother he has cursed, his blood is upon him.” In the first part of the verse, the word “curses” is in proximity to “his father,” and in the last part of the verse, “cursed” is in proximity to “his mother.” This teaches that the verse is referring to both a case where he cursed only his father and a case where he cursed only his mother; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yoshiya maintains that conjunctions are interpreted strictly unless the verse indicates otherwise.

ר' יונתן אומר משמע שניהם כאחד ומשמע אחד בפני עצמו עד שיפרוט לך הכתוב יחדו

Rabbi Yonatan says: There is no need for this derivation, because the phrase “his father and his mother” indicates that one is liable if he curses both of them together, and it also indicates that he is liable if he curses either one of them on their own, unless the verse specifies that one is liable only if he curses both together. An example of a verse where the Torah specifies that the halakha applies only to the two elements in conjunction is: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together” (Deuteronomy 22:10). According to Rabbi Yonatan, had the verse stated with regard to a mother and its offspring: A bull and a sheep, and not: A bull or a sheep, one would still be liable for slaughtering each with its own offspring independently. Therefore, the word “or” is superfluous, and is utilized by Ḥananya, who agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, to include the offspring of diverse kinds in this prohibition.

מאי חנניה ומאי רבנן דתניא אותו ואת בנו נוהג בנקבות ואינו נוהג בזכרים חנניה אומר נוהג בין בזכרים ובין בנקבות

The Gemara asks: What is the opinion of Ḥananya, and what is the opinion of the Rabbis that were mentioned earlier? Their opinions are elucidated as it is taught in a baraita: Despite the fact that the verse is written in the masculine form, the prohibition against slaughtering itself and its offspring in a single day applies to females, i.e., to a mother and its offspring, but it does not apply to males, i.e., a male animal and its offspring. Ḥananya says: It applies both to males and to females.

מ"ט דרבנן דתניא יכול יהא אותו ואת בנו נוהג בין בזכרים ובין בנקבות ודין הוא חייב כאן וחייב באם על הבנים מה כשחייב באם על הבנים בנקבות ולא בזכרים אף כשחייב כאן בנקבות ולא בזכרים

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of the Rabbis, i.e., the first tanna? Their reasoning is as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring would apply both to males and to females. But could one not derive this by logical inference, reaching the opposite conclusion: The Torah rendered one obligated here not to slaughter an animal and its offspring in a single day, and the Torah rendered one obligated with regard to a mother bird with its chicks not to seize them together, but to dispatch the mother. Just as when it rendered one obligated with regard to a mother bird with its chicks, the obligation applies to female birds but not to males, as the verse states: “And the mother sitting on the chicks” (Deuteronomy 22:6), so too, when it rendered one obligated here, with regard to an animal and its offspring, the obligation should apply to female animals, but not to males.

לא אם אמרת באם על הבנים שכן לא עשה בה מזומן כשאינו מזומן תאמר באותו ואת בנו שעשה בו מזומן כשאינו מזומן

One may respond: No, if you say that this is so with regard to a mother bird with its chicks, for which the Torah did not render prepared ones equivalent to unprepared ones, as the obligation to dispatch the mother bird applies only where one happens to encounter a mother bird with its chicks spontaneously, but not to ones that he keeps in his property, shall you also say that this is so with regard to the prohibition of an animal itself and its offspring, for which the Torah rendered prepared ones equivalent to unprepared ones, prohibiting an animal and its offspring even if they are prepared? If so, the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring should apply to both males and females.

ת"ל אותו א' ולא ב' אחר שחלק הכתוב זכיתי לדין חייב כאן וחייב באם על הבנים מה כשחייב באם על הבנים בנקבות ולא בזכרים אף כשחייב כאן בנקבות ולא בזכרים

Therefore, the verse states: “A bull or a sheep, it and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28). The superfluous word “it” indicates that this applies to only one parent, but not to two. The baraita continues: After the verse separated the parents, rendering the prohibition applicable to only one of them, I merited returning to the logical inference mentioned earlier: The Torah rendered one obligated here not to slaughter an animal and its offspring in a single day, and the Torah rendered one obligated to dispatch the mother with regard to a mother bird with its chicks. Just as when it rendered one obligated with regard to a mother bird with its chicks, the obligation applies to females but not to males, so too, when it rendered one obligated here, the obligation applies to females but not to males.

ואם נפשך לומר בנו מי שבנו כרוך אחריו יצא זכר שאין בנו כרוך אחריו

And if it is your wish to say that one can refute this, that refutation can be countered by the following derivation: The verse states: “It and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28), indicating that this applies to that parent whose offspring clings to it. This serves to exclude the male parent, whose offspring does not cling to it.

מה אם נפשך לומר וכי תימא אותו זכר משמע הרי הוא אומר בנו מי שבנו כרוך אחריו יצא זכר שאין בנו כרוך אחריו

The Gemara asks: To what possible refutation is the expression: If it is your wish to say, referring? The Gemara explains that the possible refutation is: And if you would say that the word “it,” in the verse denotes a male, as it is expressed in the masculine gender in the Hebrew, the response is that the verse also states “its offspring” in that verse, indicating that this applies to that parent whose offspring clings to it. This serves to exclude the male parent, whose offspring does not cling to it.