Chullin 39aחולין ל״ט א
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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39aל״ט א

לא ילפינן ואתא רבי אליעזר למימר ילפינן חוץ מפנים ואתא רבי יוסי למימר אפילו בפנים נמי זה מחשב וזה עובד לא אמרינן

we do not derive in this manner. And Rabbi Eliezer comes to say that we derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, and therefore the intent of the gentile invalidates non-sacred slaughter. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that even inside the Temple, in a case where this owner has improper intent and that other person is performing the slaughter, we do not say that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter.

אתמר השוחט את הבהמה לזרוק דמה לעבודת כוכבים ולהקטיר חלבה לעבודת כוכבים רבי יוחנן אמר פסולה ר"ש בן לקיש אמר מותרת

§ It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to one who slaughtered an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, or to burn its fat for idol worship. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The slaughter is not valid, and benefit from the animal is forbidden. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The slaughter is valid and deriving benefit from the animal is permitted.

רבי יוחנן אמר פסולה מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה וילפינן חוץ מפנים

The Gemara elaborates. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The slaughter is not valid and benefit from the animal is forbidden. He holds that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. If, while slaughtering a sacrificial animal, one intends to perform one of the other sacrificial rites in an improper manner the offering is invalidated. And Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that we derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. Since that intent invalidates the slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, it invalidates the slaughter of non-sacred animals outside the Temple as well.

ריש לקיש אמר מותרת אין מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה ולא גמרינן חוץ מפנים

Reish Lakish says: The slaughter is valid, and deriving benefit from the animal is permitted. He holds that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. Therefore, while slaughtering the animal, only intent to perform the slaughter improperly invalidates the offering, but intent to perform another sacrificial rite improperly does not invalidate the offering. And Reish Lakish holds that we do not derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple.

ואזדו לטעמייהו דאתמר שחטה לשמה לזרוק דמה שלא לשמה רבי יוחנן אמר פסולה ר"ש בן לקיש אמר כשרה

And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish follow their standard line of reasoning, as it was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its own sake, but with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its own sake but for the sake of another type of offering, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit, and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the offering is fit.

רבי יוחנן אמר פסולה מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה וגמרינן ממחשבת פיגול ר"ש בן לקיש אמר כשרה אין מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה ולא גמרינן ממחשבת פיגול

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit. He holds that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and the reason is that we derive the halakha of slaughter of a sin offering not for its sake from the halakha of intent for piggul, i.e., performance of one of the sacrificial rites with the intent to sprinkle the blood of the offering beyond its appointed time. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the offering is fit because he holds that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and the reason is that we do not derive the halakha of any other improper intent from the halakha of intent for piggul.

וצריכא דאי איתמר בהא בהא קאמר ר"ש בן לקיש משום דחוץ מפנים לא ילפינן אבל פנים מפנים אימא מודי ליה לרבי יוחנן

The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases. As, if it were stated only with regard to that case of one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, perhaps one would conclude that it is specifically in that case that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish states his opinion that the slaughter is valid, due to the fact that we do not derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. But in the case of one who slaughters an offering for the sake of another offering, where we would be deriving the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple from the halakhot of another case of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, say that Reish Lakish concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that the offering is unfit.

ואי אתמר בהך בההיא קאמר רבי יוחנן אבל בהא אימא מודי ליה לר"ש בן לקיש צריכא

And if their dispute was stated with regard to this case of one who slaughters an offering for the sake of another offering, perhaps one would conclude that it is specifically in this case that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the offering is unfit, because he holds that one derives the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple from the halakhot of another case of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. But in that case of one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, say that Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that the offering is fit due to the fact that the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple are not derived from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. Therefore, it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases.

מתיב רב ששת א"ר יוסי ק"ו הדברים ומה במקום שמחשבה פוסלת במוקדשין אין הכל הולך אלא אחר העובד מקום שאין מחשבה פוסלת בחולין אינו דין שלא יהא הכל הולך אלא אחר השוחט

Rav Sheshet raises an objection to both Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish from the statement in the mishna with regard to one who slaughters for a gentile when the intent of the gentile is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosei says: The matter of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case as can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference. If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter, i.e., in sacrificial animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner, then in a place where intent does not invalidate the slaughter, i.e., in non-sacred animals, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?

מאי אין מחשבה פוסלת בחולין אילימא דלא פסלה כלל אלא זביחה דעבודת כוכבים דמיתסרא היכי משכחת לה

Rav Sheshet elaborates: What is the meaning of: Intent does not invalidate the slaughter in non-sacred animals? If we say that it means that intent does not invalidate the slaughter of non-sacred animals at all, but then how can you find a case of slaughter with intent for idol worship where the animal is forbidden?

אלא פשיטא מעבודה לעבודה וה"ק ומה במקום שמחשבה פוסלת במוקדשין מעבודה לעבודה אין הכל הולך אלא אחר העובד מקום שאין מחשבה פוסלת בחולין מעבודה לעבודה אלא באותה עבודה אינו דין שלא יהא הכל הולך אלא אחר השוחט

Rather, it is obvious that the meaning of that phrase in the statement of Rabbi Yosei is that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and this is what Rabbi Yosei is saying: If in a place where intent invalidates, i.e., in sacrificial animals, from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, everything follows only the intent of the one performing the slaughter, and the intent of the owners is irrelevant, in a place where intent does not invalidate, i.e., in non-sacred animals, from one rite to another rite but it does so only within the same rite, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?

פנים קשיא לר"ש בן לקיש חוץ קשיא לרבי יוחנן

According to this understanding of the contention of Rabbi Yosei in the mishna, the case of the slaughter of a sacrificial animal inside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as contrary to his opinion, Rabbi Yosei says that in that case one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. The case of slaughter of a non-sacred animal outside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan, as contrary to his opinion, Rabbi Yosei says that in that case one does not transfer intent from one rite to another rite.

בשלמא פנים לר"ש בן לקיש לא קשיא הא מקמי דשמעה מרבי יוחנן הא לבתר דשמעה מרבי יוחנן אלא חוץ קשיא לרבי יוחנן

Rav Sheshet continues: Granted, the case of inside the Temple is not difficult for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, because one can explain that he stated this statement that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite before he heard the mishna from Rabbi Yoḥanan, his teacher, and he stated that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite after he heard the mishna from Rabbi Yoḥanan. His dispute with Rabbi Yoḥanan is limited to transfer of intent for idol worship from rite to rite. But the case of slaughter of a non-sacred animal outside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan.

הוא מותיב לה והוא מפרק לה בארבע עבודות וה"ק ומה במקום שמחשבה פוסלת במוקדשין בארבע עבודות אין הכל הולך אלא אחר העובד

Rav Sheshet raises the objection, and he resolves it. That which Rabbi Yosei said, that intent inside the Temple disqualifies the slaughter of a sacrificial animal but intent outside the Temple does not disqualify the slaughter of a non-sacred animal, is unrelated to transfer of intent from one rite to another. Rather, Rabbi Yosei is referring to a case where one performed any of the four sacrificial rites with improper intent, e.g., to eat the offering beyond its appointed time. And this is what Rabbi Yosei is saying: If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter in sacrificial animals, if that intent was during performance of any of the four sacrificial rites, i.e., slaughter, receiving the blood, conveying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling the blood on the altar, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner,