ואין להן מחשבה
but they do not have the capacity to effect a halakhic status by means of thought.
אמר ליה מחשבה גרידתא לא קא מיבעיא ליה כי קא מיבעיא ליה מחשבתו ניכרת מתוך מעשיו
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami: With regard to a case of effecting a halakhic status by means of thought alone, Rabbi Yoḥanan does not raise a dilemma. When he raises a dilemma, it is with regard to a case where his thought is discernible from his actions.
כגון דהוה קיימא עולה בדרום ואתיוה בצפון ושחטה מאי מדאתייא בצפון ושחט איכוין לה או דילמא מקום הוא דלא איתרמי ליה
For example, in a case where an animal that is brought as a burnt offering was standing in the south of the Temple courtyard and a minor took it to the north of the courtyard, the designated place for its slaughter, and slaughtered it there, what is the halakha? Can one conclude from the fact that he took it to the north and slaughtered it there that he had the intent to slaughter the animal for the sake of a burnt offering; or perhaps he moved the animal to the north because a place did not happen to be available for him in the south?
הא נמי אמרה רבי יוחנן חדא זימנא דתנן המעלה פירותיו לגג מפני הכנימה וירד עליהם טל אינן בכי יותן ואם נתכוין לכך הרי הן בכי יותן
Rabbi Ami asked: But with regard to this matter, too, Rabbi Yoḥanan already said a conclusive resolution one time, as we learned in a mishna (Makhshirin 6:1): In the case of one who takes his produce up to the roof to protect it from insects, and dew fell upon it, the produce is not in the category of the verse: “But when water is placed upon the seed” (Leviticus 11:38), from which it is derived that produce becomes susceptible to ritual impurity only if it is dampened by one of seven liquids and its owner was agreeable to its dampening. And if after taking the produce up to the roof he intended that the produce would be dampened by dew, the produce is in the category of the verse “But when water is placed upon the seed.”
העלום חרש שוטה וקטן אף על פי שנתכוונו לכך אינן בכי יותן מפני שיש להן מעשה ואין להן מחשבה
That mishna continues: In a case where a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor took the produce up to the roof, even if they intended that the produce would be dampened by dew, the produce is not in the category of the verse “But when water is placed upon the seed” due to the fact that they have the capacity to perform an action but they do not have the capacity for halakhically effective thought.
וא"ר יוחנן ל"ש אלא שלא היפך בהן אבל היפך בהן הרי זה בכי יותן
And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The tanna taught this halakha only in a case where the minor did not turn them over. But if he turned them over, indicating that he wants them to be dampened by the dew, the produce is in the category of the verse “But when water is placed upon the seed.” Evidently, Rabbi Yoḥanan rules that when the intention of a minor is apparent from his actions, it is halakhically effective.
הכי קא מיבעיא ליה דאורייתא או דרבנן
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami that this is the dilemma that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises: In a case where the intent of a minor is clear from his actions, is the fact that his thought is effective by Torah law or by rabbinic law? That is one version of the exchange between Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rabbi Ami.
רב נחמן בר יצחק מתני הכי א"ר חייא בר אבא בעי רבי יוחנן קטן יש לו מעשה או אין לו מעשה
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak teaches their exchange in this manner. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma: With regard to a minor, does he have the capacity to perform an action that is halakhically effective or does he not have the capacity to perform such an action?
אמר ליה רבי אמי ותיבעי ליה מחשבה מאי שנא מחשבה דלא קא מיבעיא ליה דתנן אין להן מחשבה מעשה נמי לא תיבעי ליה דתנן יש להן מעשה
Rabbi Ami said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: And let Rabbi Yoḥanan raise this dilemma with regard to the thought of a minor. What is different about the thought of a minor that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not raise a dilemma? Is it due to the fact that we learned in a mishna (Kelim 17:15): A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor do not have the capacity for effective thought? With regard to action as well let him not raise this dilemma, as we learned in the same mishna: They have the capacity to perform an action.
הכי קא מיבעיא ליה דאורייתא או דרבנן ופשיט יש להן מעשה ואפילו מדאורייתא אין להן מחשבה ואפי' מדרבנן מחשבתו ניכרת מתוך מעשיו מדאורייתא אין לו מדרבנן יש לו
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami that this is the dilemma that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises: Is the fact that their actions are effective and their thought is ineffective by Torah law, and a minor’s action would consequently be effective even with regard to the sacrifice of a burnt offering, or is this fact by rabbinic law and it is merely a stringency? And Rabbi Yoḥanan resolves the dilemma: They have the capacity to perform an action and it is effective, even by Torah law. But they do not have the capacity for effective thought, even by rabbinic law. Nevertheless, in a case where his thought is apparent from his actions, by Torah law he does not have effective thought, and by rabbinic law he has effective thought.
בעא מיניה שמואל מרב הונא מנין למתעסק בקדשים שהוא פסול שנאמר (ויקרא א, ה) ושחט את בן הבקר שתהא שחיטה לשם בן בקר אמר לו זו בידינו היא לעכב מנין (ת"ל) (ויקרא יט, ה) לרצונכם תזבחוהו לדעתכם זבוחו:
§ Shmuel asked Rav Huna: From where is it derived with regard to one who acts unawares in the slaughter of sacrificial animals, i.e., he slaughtered without intending to perform the act of slaughter at all, that the offering is disqualified? Rav Huna said to him that it is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter the young bull” (Leviticus 1:5), indicating that the slaughter must be for the sake of a young bull, i.e., knowing that he is performing an act of slaughter. Shmuel said to him: we received this as an established halakha already that one must have intent to slaughter the animal ab initio. But from where is it derived that intent to slaughter is indispensable even after the fact? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “You shall slaughter it to your will” (Leviticus 19:5), indicating: Slaughter the animal with your intent, i.e., in the form of a purposeful action.
מתני׳ שחיטת עובד כוכבים נבלה ומטמאה במשא:
MISHNA: Slaughter performed by a gentile renders the animal an unslaughtered carcass, and the carcass imparts ritual impurity through carrying.
גמ׳ נבלה אין איסור הנאה לא מאן תנא א"ר חייא ברבי אבא א"ר יוחנן דלא כרבי אליעזר דאי ר"א האמר סתם מחשבת עובד כוכבים לעבודת כוכבים
GEMARA: The slaughter renders the animal an unslaughtered carcass, yes; an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited, no. Who is the tanna who taught the mishna? Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rabbi Abba, said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, doesn’t he say: The unspecified thought of a gentile is for idol worship.
רבי אמי אמר הכי קתני שחיטת עובד כוכבים נבלה הא דמין לעבודת כוכבים תנינא להא דת"ר שחיטת מין לעבודת כוכבים פיתו פת כותי יינו יין נסך ספריו ספרי קוסמין פירותיו טבלין וי"א אף
Rabbi Ami said that this is what the mishna is teaching: Slaughter performed by a gentile renders the animal an unslaughtered carcass, but slaughter performed by a heretic is for the sake of idol worship. The Gemara notes: We learn from an inference in the mishna that which the Sages taught explictly in a baraita: Slaughter performed by a heretic is for the sake of idol worship and deriving benefit from it is prohibited, the halakhic status of his bread is that of the bread of a Samaritan, the status of his wine is that of wine used for a libation in idol worship, his sacred scrolls that he writes are the scrolls of sorcerers and it is a mitzva to burn them, his produce is untithed produce even if he separated teruma and tithes, and some say: Even