מְלֶאכֶת מַחְשֶׁבֶת אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה וּמְלֶאכֶת מַחְשֶׁבֶת לָא כְּתִיבָא: The Gemara answers: The Torah prohibited only planned, creative labor on Shabbat. An act of labor that is not intended, or whose result is unintended, or whose consequence is destructive, is not included in this category. Therefore, one who performs labor in this manner is exempt. And limitation of the prohibition against creative labor is not written anywhere in the Torah with regard to the laws of Shabbat. Admittedly, this principle is written in connection with the Tabernacle, and there is an established exegetical link between the building of the Tabernacle and Shabbat. Nevertheless, as this fundamental principle concerning the halakhot of Shabbat does not appear explicitly, it is compared to mountains suspended by a hair.
חֲגִיגוֹת מִיכְתָּב כְּתִיבָן לָא צְרִיכָא לִכְדַאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי מִמַּאי דְּהַאי וְחַגּוֹתֶם אוֹתוֹ חַג לַה׳ זְבִיחָה דִּלְמָא חוֹגּוּ חַגָּא קָאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא § The mishna taught that the halakhot of Festival peace-offerings are like mountains suspended by a hair. The Gemara asks: But they are written in the Torah. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to say this in accordance with that which Rav Pappa said to Abaye: From where is it derived that this verse: “And you shall celebrate it as a Festival [veḥagotem] to the Lord” (Leviticus 23:41), is referring to an animal offering? Perhaps the Merciful One is simply saying: Celebrate a Festival.
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה דִּכְתִיב וְיָחוֹגּוּ לִי בַּמִּדְבָּר הָכִי נָמֵי דְּחוֹגּוּ חַגָּא הוּא וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי נָמֵי וְהָכְתִיב וַיֹּאמַר מֹשֶׁה גַּם אַתָּה תִּתֵּן בְּיָדֵינוּ זְבָחִים וְעוֹלוֹת Abaye responded: However, if that is so, consider that it is written: “Let My people go, that they may hold a feast [veyaḥogu] to Me in the wilderness” (Exodus 5:1). So too, the meaning of this verse is that they will merely celebrate a Festival, and not bring an offering. And if you would say that is indeed so, that this means that they should celebrate a Festival, but isn’t it written: “And Moses said: You must also give into our hand sacrifices and burnt-offerings, that we may sacrifice to the Lord our God” (Exodus 10:25)? This shows that the command is referring to offerings.
דִּלְמָא הָכִי קָאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא אִכְלוּ וּשְׁתוּ וְחוֹגּוּ חַגָּא קַמַּאי לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ דִּכְתִיב וְלֹא יָלִין חֵלֶב חַגִּי עַד בֹּקֶר וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ דְּחוֹגָּא הוּא תַּרְבָּא לְחַגָּא אִית לֵיהּ The Gemara raises a difficulty. But perhaps this is what the Merciful One said: Slaughter animals so that you can eat, drink, and celebrate a Festival before Me, but no offerings are necessary. The Gemara answers: This cannot enter your mind, as it is written: “The fat of My Festival feast [ḥagi] shall not remain all night until the morning” (Exodus 23:18). And if it enters your mind to say that it is referring to a regular Festival feast and not an offering, does a Festival feast have forbidden fats?
וְדִלְמָא הָכִי קָאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא חֵלֶב הַבָּא בִּזְמַן חַג לֹא יָלִין The Gemara asks: But perhaps this is what the Merciful One states in the Torah: The fats of gift offerings that are brought during a Festival may not remain all night. If so, the phrase “My Festival feast” is not referring to a type of offering at all, but to a particular time.
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה הַבָּא בִּזְמַן חַג הוּא דְּלֹא יָלִין הָא דְּכׇל הַשָּׁנָה כּוּלָּהּ יָלִין כׇּל הַלַּיְלָה עַד הַבֹּקֶר כְּתִיב The Gemara answers: However, if that is so, this verse indicates that it is only those fats that are brought during a Festival that may not remain overnight. It may be inferred from here that fats which are brought throughout the year may remain all night. But it is written about burnt-offerings: “On its firewood upon the altar all night into the morning” (Leviticus 6:2). This shows that burnt-offerings must burn upon the altar all night.
דִּלְמָא אִי מֵהָהוּא הֲוָה אָמֵינָא הָהוּא לַעֲשֵׂה כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא הַאי לְלָאו The Gemara further asks: Perhaps if this halakha was derived from that verse, I would say that verse serves as the source of a positive mitzva. Therefore, the Merciful One writes this verse: “Shall not remain all night,” as a prohibition as well.
לְלָאו כְּתַב קְרָא אַחֲרִינָא וְלֹא יָלִין מִן הַבָּשָׂר אֲשֶׁר תִּזְבַּח בָּעֶרֶב בַּיּוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן לַבֹּקֶר וְדִלְמָא לַעֲבוֹר עָלָיו בִּשְׁנֵי לָאוִין וַעֲשֵׂה The Gemara responds. With regard to the prohibition against leaving over an offering on a Festival, another verse was written: “Neither shall any of the flesh, which you sacrifice the first day at evening, remain all night until the morning” (Deuteronomy 16:4). The Gemara asks: But perhaps the verse: “Shall not remain all night” comes to teach that one who does so violates two prohibitions and a positive mitzva.
אֶלָּא אָתְיָא מִדְבָּר מִדְבָּר כְּתִיב הָכָא וְיָחוֹגּוּ לִי בַּמִּדְבָּר וּכְתִיב הָתָם הַזְּבָחִים וּמִנְחָה הִגַּשְׁתֶּם לִי בַּמִּדְבָּר מָה לְהַלָּן זְבָחִים אַף כָּאן זְבָחִים Rather, the Gemara rejects this explanation in favor of the claim that the source for a Festival peace-offering comes from a verbal analogy between the term “wilderness” stated here and the term: “wilderness” stated elsewhere. It is written here: “They shall make an offering to Me in the wilderness” (Exodus 5:1), and it is written there: “Did you bring to Me sacrifices and offerings forty years in the wilderness, house of Israel?” (Amos 5:25). Just as there it is referring to actual animal offerings, so too here, it is referring to animal offerings, not merely the celebration of a Festival.
וּמַאי כַּהֲרָרִין הַתְּלוּיִין בִּשְׂעָרָה דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה מִדִּבְרֵי קַבָּלָה לָא יָלְפִינַן: The Gemara asks: And in light of this verbal analogy, in what way is this halakha like mountains suspended by a hair? The Gemara answers: The textual evidence is not that strong, as generally one does not derive Torah matters from texts of the tradition, i.e., Prophets and Writings. Since the prophets were not permitted to introduce new halakhot, as the Torah is the only authoritative source in that regard, this verbal analogy does not carry the same weight as a halakha derived from the Torah itself.
מְעִילוֹת מִיכְתָּב כְּתִיבָן אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא לֹא נִצְרְכָא אֶלָּא לִכְדִתְנַן הַשָּׁלִיחַ שֶׁעָשָׂה שְׁלִיחוּתוֹ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת מָעַל לֹא עָשָׂה שְׁלִיחוּתוֹ שָׁלִיחַ מָעַל § The mishna taught that the details of the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property are like mountains suspended by a hair. The Gemara asks: But they are written in the Torah (Leviticus 5:14–16). Rami bar Ḥama said: This statement is necessary only for that which we learned in a mishna (Me’ila 20a): With regard to an agent who performs his agency, e.g., when a homeowner sends someone to buy an object with consecrated money and the agent does as he was instructed, the homeowner has misused consecrated property and must bring an offering for the actions of the agent performed on his behalf. However, if the agent did not perform his agency, but in some way acted on his own account, the agent has misused consecrated property, and he is the one obligated to bring the offering.
וְכִי עָשָׂה שְׁלִיחוּתוֹ אַמַּאי מָעַל וְכִי זֶה חוֹטֵא וְזֶה מִתְחַיֵּיב הַיְינוּ כַּהֲרָרִין הַתְּלוּיִין בִּשְׂעָרָה The Gemara explains: And when he performed his agency, why is the owner considered to have misused consecrated property? And is it possible that this one sins and that one is rendered liable? Since this halakha is counterintuitive, it is not apparent from the verses. This is what the mishna was referring to when it said that these halakhot are like mountains suspended by a hair.
אָמַר רָבָא וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא דִּלְמָא שָׁאנֵי מְעִילָה דְּיָלְפָא חֵטְא חֵטְא מִתְּרוּמָה מָה הָתָם שְׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ אַף כָּאן שְׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ Rava said: And what is the logical difficulty with this halakha? Perhaps the transgression of misuse of consecrated property is different, as it is derived through a verbal analogy from the parallel term “sin” (Leviticus 5:6) and “sin” (Numbers 18:9), from the case of teruma: Just as there, with regard to teruma, the legal status of a person’s agent is like that of himself, and therefore the agent may separate teruma on behalf of the owner of the produce, so too here, with regard to misuse of consecrated property, the legal status of a person’s agent is like that of himself, which means that when the agent properly performs his agency the owner is liable.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא לֹא נִצְרְכָא אֶלָּא לְכִדְתַנְיָא נִזְכַּר בַּעַל הַבַּיִת וְלֹא נִזְכַּר שָׁלִיחַ שָׁלִיחַ מָעַל שָׁלִיחַ עַנְיָא מַאי קָא עָבֵיד הַיְינוּ כַּהֲרָרִין הַתְּלוּיִין בִּשְׂעָרָה Rather, Rava said: The mishna’s statement with regard to mountains is necessary only for that which is taught in a baraita: If, after he sent an agent to use a consecrated object, the homeowner remembered that it was a consecrated item and the agent did not remember, the agent has misused consecrated property despite the fact that he was merely performing his agency. This is because one is liable for the misuse of consecrated property only if he acted unwittingly. In this instance, what did the poor agent do? He simply performed his agency on behalf of the owner, and yet because the owner remembered about the consecrated object, the agent is liable. This is what the mishna is referring to when it says that these halakhot are like mountains suspended by a hair.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי מַאי קוּשְׁיָא דִּלְמָא מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַמּוֹצִיא מְעוֹת הֶקְדֵּשׁ לְחוּלִּין Rav Ashi said: And what is the logical difficulty with this halakha? Perhaps this is just as it is with regard to one who spends consecrated money for non-sacred purposes. Although this individual did not know that the money was consecrated, he is nevertheless obligated to bring an offering. Here too, once the owner canceled the agency upon realizing the money was consecrated, the agent unwittingly misused consecrated property, and therefore he is liable.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי לֹא נִצְרְכָא אֶלָּא לִכְדִתְנַן נָטַל אֶבֶן אוֹ קוֹרָה שֶׁל הֶקְדֵּשׁ הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא מָעַל נְתָנָהּ לַחֲבֵירוֹ הוּא מָעַל וַחֲבֵירוֹ לֹא מָעַל מִכְּדֵי מִישְׁקָל שַׁקְלַהּ מָה לִי הוּא וּמָה לִי חֲבֵירוֹ הַיְינוּ כַּהֲרָרִין הַתְּלוּיִין בִּשְׂעָרָה Rather, Rav Ashi said: The mishna is necessary only for that which we learned in a mishna (Me’ila 19b): If one picked up a consecrated stone or beam, he has not misused consecrated property merely by this action. However, if he gave it to another, he has misused consecrated property and the other person has not misused consecrated property. The Gemara analyzes this case: Since he picked it up, what difference is there to me if he keeps it, and what difference is there to me if he gives it to another? What is the basis for the distinction between the two cases? Rather, this is the case the mishna is referring to when it says that these halakhot are like mountains suspended by a hair.
וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא דִּלְמָא כְּדִשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל הָכָא The Gemara raises a difficulty. What is the logical difficulty with this halakha? Perhaps it should be explained in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: Here, this mishna is not referring to an ordinary person who picked up a consecrated stone for himself.