נִינְטְרַן. אָמַר רָבָא: כִּי הֲוָה אָזְלִינַן בָּתְרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, כִּי הֲוָה נָקֵיט סִפְרָא דְאַגַּדְתָּא — יָהֵיב לַן, כִּי הֲוָה נָקֵיט תְּפִילִּין — לָא יָהֵיב לַן, אָמַר: הוֹאִיל וּשְׁרוֹנְהוּ רַבָּנַן, נִינְטְרַן.
they will protect me. Although there were people on hand to whom he could have handed the phylacteries, he kept them to protect himself from danger. Rava said: When we would walk after Rabbi Naḥman, we would see that when he was holding a book of aggada, he would give it to us. When he was holding phylacteries, he would not give them to us, as he said: Since the Sages permitted to hold them, they will protect me.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לֹא יֹאחַז אָדָם תְּפִילִּין בְּיָדוֹ וְסֵפֶר תּוֹרָה בִּזְרוֹעוֹ וְיִתְפַּלֵּל. וְלֹא יַשְׁתִּין בָּהֶן מַיִם, וְלֹא יִישַׁן בָּהֶן לֹא שֵׁינַת קֶבַע וְלֹא שֵׁינַת עֲרַאי. אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: סַכִּין וּמָעוֹת וּקְעָרָה וְכִכָּר, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן.
The Sages taught: One may not hold phylacteries in his hand or a Torah scroll in his arm and pray, because his concern that the phylacteries or Torah scroll might fall will distract him from his prayer. And so too, with regard to sacred objects, one may not urinate with them in his hands and may not sleep with them in his hands, neither a deep sleep nor even a brief nap. Shmuel said: Not only should one holding phylacteries refrain from prayer, but one holding a knife, money, a bowl, or a loaf of bread have a similar status in that his concern that they might fall will distract him from his prayer.
אָמַר רָבָא אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: לֵית הִלְכְתָא כִּי הָא מַתְנִיתָא, דְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי הִיא. דְּאִי בֵּית הִלֵּל — הַשְׁתָּא בֵּית הַכִּסֵּא קָבוּעַ שְׁרֵי, בֵּית הַכִּסֵּא עֲרַאי מִיבַּעְיָא?!
Rava said that Rav Sheshet said: The halakha is not in accordance with this baraita, because it is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. As if it was in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, now Beit Hillel permitted to hold phylacteries in his hand when he defecates in a regular bathroom, is it necessary to say that it is permitted when he urinates in a makeshift bathroom?
מֵיתִיבִי: דְּבָרִים שֶׁהִתַּרְתִּי לְךָ כָּאן, אָסַרְתִּי לְךָ כָּאן. מַאי לָאו תְּפִילִּין? אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בֵּית הִלֵּל: הִתַּרְתִּי לְךָ כָּאן קָבוּעַ, אָסַרְתִּי לְךָ כָּאן בֵּית הַכִּסֵּא עֲרַאי. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי הָא לָא שָׁרוּ וְלָא מִידֵּי?
The Gemara raised an objection based on the second part of the baraita, where it was taught: Matters which I permitted you to do here, I prohibited you from doing there. In other words, there are matters that were permitted in a regular bathroom and not in a makeshift bathroom. What, is it not referring to phylacteries? Granted, if you say that the prohibition against urinating while wearing phylacteries is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, then we would understand the baraita as follows: Matters which I permitted you to do here, to hold phylacteries in a regular bathroom, I have prohibited you from doing there, in the makeshift bathroom. But if you hold that this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, they did not permit anything in a regular bathroom. What, then, is the meaning of matters which I permitted you to do here?
כִּי תַּנְיָא הַהִיא, לְעִנְיַן טֶפַח וְטִפְחַיִים. דְּתָנֵי חֲדָא: כְּשֶׁהוּא נִפְנָה — מְגַלֶּה לְאַחֲרָיו טֶפַח וּלְפָנָיו טִפְחַיִים. וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: לְאַחֲרָיו טֶפַח וּלְפָנָיו וְלֹא כְלוּם.
This challenge is rejected by the Gemara, which explains: When that baraita was taught it was not in reference to phylacteries, but with regard to the matter of one handbreadth and two handbreadths. As is it was taught in one baraita: When one relieves himself, he must maintain modesty and bare a single handbreadth of his flesh behind him and two handbreadths before him. And it was taught in another baraita: One may only bare a single handbreadth behind him and nothing before him.
מַאי לָאו אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בְּאִישׁ, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן לִגְדוֹלִים, כָּאן לִקְטַנִּים?
What, are not both this baraita and that one referring to a male, and the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot is not difficult, as here the baraita that states that one may bare a handbreadth behind him and nothing before him is referring to defecation, while here, the other baraita that states that one may bare a handbreadth behind him and two handbreadths before him is referring to urination. Accordingly, despite the fact that one may bare two handbreadths before him when urinating in a makeshift bathroom, matters that I have permitted you to do here, one may bare nothing before him when defecating in an established bathroom, I have prohibited you from doing there.
וְתִסְבְּרָא?! אִי בִּקְטַנִּים, לְאַחֲרָיו טֶפַח לְמָה לִי? אֶלָּא אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בִּגְדוֹלִים, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא בְּאִישׁ, הָא בָּאִשָּׁה.
The Gemara rejects this explanation: And how can you understand it that way? If that baraita is referring to urination, why do I need to bare one handbreadth behind him? Rather, both this baraita and that baraita are referring to defecation, and the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot is not difficult. This baraita that states that one may bare two handbreadths before him is referring to a man, who must bare himself in case he inadvertently urinates. That baraita that states that one may not bare anything in front is referring to a woman, who does not need to uncover herself to account for inadvertent urination.
אִי הָכִי הָא דְּקָתָנֵי עֲלַהּ, ״זֶהוּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר שֶׁאֵין עָלָיו תְּשׁוּבָה״ — מַאי ״אֵין עָלָיו תְּשׁוּבָה״? דַּרְכָּא דְמִלְּתָא הָכִי אִיתָא.
The Gemara challenges this: If so, then that which is taught with regard to this halakha in the baraita: This is an a fortiori inference for which there is no refutation, meaning that even though logically it would seem correct to be stricter in the case of defecating in a regular bathroom than in the case of urinating in a makeshift bathroom, that is not the ruling, is difficult. According to the distinction suggested above, what is the meaning of: for which there is no refutation? That is the nature of the matter; men and women need to uncover themselves differently.
אֶלָּא לָאו, תְּפִילִּין, וּתְיוּבְתָּא דְרָבָא אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת. תְּיוּבְתָּא.
Rather, is it not so that the baraita that states: Matters which I permitted you to do here, I prohibited you from doing there, is referring to phylacteries, and the a fortiori inference that cannot be refuted is similarly referring to phylacteries. And the refutation of that which Rava says that Rav Sheshet says, that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, is indeed a conclusive refutation.
מִכׇּל מָקוֹם, קַשְׁיָא, הַשְׁתָּא בֵּית הַכִּסֵּא קָבוּעַ שְׁרֵי, בֵּית הַכִּסֵּא עֲרַאי לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן!
The Gemara asks: Nevertheless, it remains difficult: Now, holding phylacteries in his hand when he defecates in a regular bathroom is permitted, all the more so that it is permitted when he urinates in a makeshift bathroom.
הָכִי קָאָמַר: בֵּית הַכִּסֵּא קָבוּעַ דְּלֵיכָּא נִיצוֹצוֹת, שָׁרוּ. בֵּית הַכִּסֵּא עֲרַאי דְּאִיכָּא נִיצוֹצוֹת, אָסְרִי.
The Gemara explains: It says as follows: When defecating in a regular bathroom, where one sits there are no drops of urine on one’s clothes or shoes, he need not dirty his hands to clean his garment, and therefore one is permitted to hold phylacteries in his hand. However, in a makeshift bathroom, where one stands, and there are ricocheting drops which he may touch with his hand, it is prohibited.
אִי הָכִי, אַמַּאי ״אֵין עָלָיו תְּשׁוּבָה״? תְּשׁוּבָה מְעַלַּיְתָא הִיא!
The Gemara challenges: If so, then why was it referred to as an a fortiori inference that “cannot be refuted”? This seems an excellent refutation that explains the distinction.
הָכִי קָאָמַר: הָא מִילְּתָא תֵּיתֵי לַהּ בְּתוֹרַת טַעְמָא, וְלָא תֵּיתֵי לַהּ בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר, דְּאִי אָתְיָא לַהּ בְּתוֹרַת קַל וָחוֹמֶר, זֶהוּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר שֶׁאֵין עָלָיו תְּשׁוּבָה.
The Gemara explains that it says as follows: Derive this matter based on the reason mentioned above that due to different circumstances the ruling is different. Do not derive it by means of an a fortiori inference, as if you were to derive it by means of an a fortiori inference, it would certainly be an a fortiori inference that cannot be rebutted.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הָרוֹצֶה לִיכָּנֵס לִסְעוּדַת קֶבַע, מְהַלֵּךְ עֲשָׂרָה פְּעָמִים אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, אוֹ אַרְבָּעָה פְּעָמִים עֶשֶׂר אַמּוֹת, וְיִפָּנֶה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִכְנָס.
The Sages taught: One who wishes to enter and partake of a regular meal that will last for some time, paces a distance of four cubits ten times, or ten cubits four times, in order to expedite the movement of the bowels, and defecates. Only then may he enter and partake of the meal. That way he spares himself the unpleasantness of being forced to leave in the middle of the meal.
אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: הַנִּכְנָס לִסְעוּדַת קֶבַע, חוֹלֵץ תְּפִילָּיו וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִכְנָס. וּפְלִיגָא דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא: מַנִּיחָן עַל שֻׁלְחָנוֹ, וְכֵן הָדוּר לוֹ.
On this same subject, Rabbi Yitzḥak said: One who partakes of a regular meal removes his phylacteries and then enters, as it is inappropriate to partake in a meal where there is frivolity while wearing phylacteries. And this statement disputes the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya, as Rabbi Ḥiyya said: During a formal meal one places his phylacteries on his table, and it is admirable for him to do so in order that they will be available to don immediately if he so desires.
וְעַד אֵימַת? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: עַד זְמַן בְּרָכָה.
The Gemara asks: And until when in the meal must he refrain from wearing phylacteries? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Until the time of the recitation of the blessing of Grace after Meals.
תָּנֵי חֲדָא: צוֹרֵר אָדָם תְּפִילָּיו עִם מְעוֹתָיו בַּאֲפַרְקְסוּתוֹ. וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: לֹא יָצוֹר.
It was taught in one baraita: One may bundle his phylacteries with his money in his head covering [apraksuto], and it was taught in another baraita: One may not bundle phylacteries and money together.
לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא דְּאַזְמְנֵיהּ. הָא דְּלָא אַזְמְנֵיהּ. דְּאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הַאי סוּדָרָא דִתְפִילִּין דְּאַזְמְנֵיהּ לְמֵיצַר בֵּיהּ תְּפִילִּין, צָר בֵּיהּ תְּפִילִּין — אָסוּר לְמֵיצַר בֵּיהּ פְּשִׁיטֵי, אַזְמְנֵיהּ וְלָא צָר בֵּיהּ, צָר בֵּיהּ וְלָא אַזְמְנֵיהּ — שְׁרֵי לְמֵיצַר בֵּיהּ זוּזִי.
The Gemara explains: This is not difficult, as one must distinguish and say that this baraita, which prohibits bundling phylacteries and money together, refers to a case where the vessel was designated for use with phylacteries, while this baraita, which permits one to do so, refers to a case where the vessel was not designated for that purpose. As Rav Ḥisda said: With regard to this cloth used with phylacteries that one designated to bundle phylacteries in it, if one already bundled phylacteries in it then it is prohibited to bundle coins in it, but if he only designated it for that purpose, but did not yet bundle phylacteries in it, or if he bundled phylacteries in it but did not originally designate it for that purpose, then it is permitted to bundle money in it.
וּלְאַבָּיֵי דְּאָמַר הַזְמָנָה מִילְּתָא הִיא: אַזְמְנֵיהּ אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא צָר בֵּיהּ. צָר בֵּיהּ, אִי אַזְמְנֵיהּ — אֲסִיר, אִי לָא אַזְמְנֵיהּ — לָא.
And according to Abaye, who said that designation is significant, as Abaye holds that all relevant halakhot apply to an object designated for a specific purpose, whether or not it has been already used for that purpose, the halakha is: If he designated the cloth, even if he did not bundle phylacteries in it, he is prohibited from bundling money in it. However, if he bundled phylacteries in it, if he designated the cloth for that particular use, it is prohibited to bundle money in it, but if he did not designate it, no, it is not prohibited.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב יוֹסֵף בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נְחוּנְיָא מֵרַב יְהוּדָה: מַהוּ שֶׁיַּנִּיחַ אָדָם תְּפִילָּיו תַּחַת מְרַאֲשׁוֹתָיו? תַּחַת מַרְגְּלוֹתָיו לָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לִי, שֶׁנּוֹהֵג בָּהֶן מִנְהַג בִּזָּיוֹן. כִּי קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לִי, תַּחַת מְרַאֲשׁוֹתָיו מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ הָכִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מוּתָּר, אֲפִילּוּ אִשְׁתּוֹ עִמּוֹ.
Rav Yosef, son of Rav Neḥunya, raised a dilemma before Rav Yehuda: What is the halakha; may a man place his phylacteries in his bed, under his head while he sleeps? He himself explains: With regard to whether or not one may place them under his feet, I have no dilemma, as that would be treating them in a deprecating manner and is certainly prohibited. My dilemma is whether or not one may place them under his head; what is the halakha in that case? Rav Yehuda said to him, Shmuel said as follows: It is permitted, even if his wife is with him in his bed.
מֵיתִיבִי: לָא יַנִּיחַ אָדָם תְּפִילָּיו תַּחַת מַרְגְּלוֹתָיו מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנּוֹהֵג בָּהֶם דֶּרֶךְ בִּזָּיוֹן, אֲבָל מַנִּיחָם תַּחַת מְרַאֲשׁוֹתָיו. וְאִם הָיְתָה אִשְׁתּוֹ עִמּוֹ — אָסוּר. הָיָה מָקוֹם שֶׁגָּבוֹהַּ שְׁלֹשָׁה טְפָחִים אוֹ נָמוּךְ שְׁלֹשָׁה טְפָחִים — מוּתָּר.
The Gemara raises an objection based on what was taught in a baraita: A man may not place his phylacteries under his feet, as in doing so, he treats them in a deprecating manner, but he may place them under his head. And if his wife was with him, it is prohibited even to place it under his head. If there was a place where he could place the phylacteries three handbreadths above or three handbreadths below his head it is permissible, as that space is sufficient for the phylacteries to be considered in a separate place.
תְּיוּבְתָּא דִשְׁמוּאֵל, תְּיוּבְתָּא.
This is a conclusive refutation of Shmuel’s statement. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.
אָמַר רָבָא: אַף עַל גַּב דְּתַנְיָא תְּיוּבְתָּא דִשְׁמוּאֵל, הִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ. מַאי טַעְמָא?
Rava said: Although a baraita was taught that constitutes a conclusive refutation of Shmuel, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in this matter. What is the reason for this?