Bekhorot 13bבכורות י״ג ב
The William Davidson Talmudתלמוד מהדורת ויליאם דוידסון
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13bי״ג ב
1 א

מה עמיתך באחת אף עובד כוכבים נמי באחת

Just as property is acquired from your counterpart through only one act of acquisition, i.e., pulling, so too, property is acquired from a gentile through only one act of acquisition, i.e., payment of money.

2 ב

אמרי ולאמימר דאמר משיכה בעובד כוכבים קונה הניחא אי סבר לה כר' יוחנן דאמר דבר תורה מעות קונות משיכה לא אהני לעמיתך לעמיתך בכסף לעובד כוכבים במשיכה

The Sages said: And according to the opinion of Ameimar, who says that pulling effects acquisition in the case of a gentile, this works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says: By Torah law, money effects acquisition, but pulling does not. If Ameimar accepts Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, then it can be derived from the phrase “of your counterpart” that transactions with your counterpart, i.e., a Jew, are effected through payment of money, whereas transactions with a gentile are effected by pulling.

3 ג

אלא אי סבר לה כר"ל דאמר משיכה מפורשת מן התורה לעמיתך במשיכה ולעובד כוכבים במשיכה לעמיתך למה לי

But if Ameimar holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who says: The act of acquisition of pulling is explicit in the Torah, then the halakha is that transactions with your counterpart are effected by pulling, and transactions with a gentile are also effected by pulling. Accordingly, why do I need the phrase “of your counterpart”?

4 ד

אמרי לעמיתך אתה מחזיר אונאה ואי אתה מחזיר אונאה לכנעני לכנעני (ויקרא כה יד) מאל תונו איש את אחיו נפקא

The Sages said in explanation: The phrase “of your counterpart” does not teach a halakha with regard to the method of acquisition. Rather, it is referring to the latter part of the verse: “And if you make a sale to your counterpart, or buy of your counterpart’s hand, a man shall not exploit his brother” (Leviticus 25:14). The verse is derived as follows: You must return the sum of exploitation to your counterpart, but you do not need to return the sum of exploitation to a gentile. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: The exemption from returning the sum of exploitation to a gentile is derived from the latter part of the verse alone: “A man shall not exploit his brother.” A gentile is not included in the category of “his brother.” Accordingly, the phrase “of your counterpart” remains extraneous.

5 ה

חד בכנעני וחד בהקדש וצריכי דאי כתב רחמנא חד הוה אמינא לכנעני הוא דאין לו אונאה אבל הקדש יש לו אונאה קמ"ל

The Gemara responds: One phrase is required to exclude a gentile, and one serves to exclude consecrated property. And both derivations are necessary, as, had the Merciful One written only one exclusionary phrase, I would say: It is with regard to transactions with a gentile that one is not subject to the prohibition of exploitation; but with regard to transactions involving consecrated property, one is subject to the prohibition of exploitation. Therefore, the other derivation teaches us that one is not subject to the prohibition of exploitation with regard to transactions involving consecrated property either.

6 ו

הניחא למ"ד גזילו אסור היינו דאצטריך קרא למישרי אונאה אלא אי סבר לה כמ"ד גזילו של כנעני מותר אונאה מיבעיא אמרי אי סבר לה כמ"ד גזילו מותר על כורחיך כר' יוחנן ס"ל

The Gemara remarks: This works out well according to the one who says that his robbery, i.e., robbing a gentile, is prohibited, as this is the reason that a verse is necessary to permit keeping the sum of the exploitation obtained from a gentile. But if Ameimar holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that his robbery is permitted, is it necessary to state that one may keep the sum of the exploitation obtained from a gentile? The Gemara accepts this reasoning: The Sages said: If Ameimar holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that his robbery is permitted, perforce he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan that money effects acquisition by Torah law, and therefore the difficulty does not arise.

7 ז

מיתיבי הלוקח גרוטאות מן העובד כוכבים ומצא בהן עבודת כוכבים אם עד שלא נתן מעות משך יחזיר ואם משנתן מעות משך יוליך הנאה לים המלח

§ The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion that property is acquired from a gentile by monetary payment. It is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who buys broken vessels [gerutaot] made of gold or silver from the gentiles and finds among them an object of idol worship, if he pulled the object of idol worship, thereby performing an act of acquisition, before he gave the money to the gentile, he may return the object of idol worship to the gentile. But if he pulled it after he gave the money to the gentile, he may not return it. Since the idol’s status was not revoked, he must take it and cast it into the Dead Sea.

8 ח

ואי אמרת מעות קונות משיכה ל"ל הכא במאי עסקינן שקיבל עליו לדון בדיני ישראל אי הכי מעות למה לי הכי קאמר אע"פ שנתן מעות אי משיך אין ואי לא לא

The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if you say that payment of money acquires items from gentiles, why do I need pulling in order to effect the Jew’s acquisition of the idol? The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where the gentile accepted upon himself to have this transaction adjudicated by Jewish law. The Gemara raises an objection: If so, why do I need the payment of money in order to effect the Jew’s acquisition of the idol? Pulling alone should be enough, in accordance with halakha. The Gemara explains that this is what the baraita means: Even though the Jew gave money to the gentile, the halakha still depends on the act of pulling: If he pulled the broken vessels, yes, he has acquired them, and if not, he has not acquired them.

9 ט

אי הכי קשיא רישא אמר אביי רישא משום דאיכא מקח טעות אמר ליה רבא רישא משום דאיכא מקח טעות סיפא ליכא מקח טעות

The Gemara asks: If so, then the first clause of the baraita is difficult, as it states: If he pulled the object of idol worship before he gave the money to the gentile, he may return the object of idol worship to the gentile. Evidently, pulling alone does not effect acquisition. Abaye said in explanation: The halakha in the first clause is ruled as it is because there is a mistaken transaction, as the Jew did not wish to purchase the idol. Rava said to Abaye: You maintain that the halakha of the first clause is ruled as it is because there is a mistaken transaction. Is that to say that in the latter clause there is no mistaken transaction? After all, the Jew does not wish to purchase the idol in either case.

10 י

אלא אמר רבא רישא וסיפא מקח טעות רישא דלא יהיב זוזי לא מיחזי כעבודת כוכבים ביד ישראל סיפא דיהיב זוזי מיחזי כעבודת כוכבים ביד ישראל

Rather, Rava said: The purchase in the first clause and the purchase in the latter clause are both a mistaken transaction, but in the case presented in the first clause, where the Jew did not pay him the dinars, it does not appear as though there is an object of idol worship in the possession of a Jew, and so he may return it. By contrast, in the latter clause, where the Jew did pay him the dinars, it appears as though there is an object of idol worship in the possession of a Jew, and therefore he must cast away the object rather than return it.

11 יא

ואביי אמר לך רישא מקח טעות דלא ידע דהא לא יהיב ליה זוזי סיפא לאו מקח טעות הוא דכיון דיהיב זוזי כי קא משיך איבעי לעיוני והדר מימשך

And Abaye could have said to you: The first clause involves a mistaken transaction, as he did not know that the idol was included, as he did not give him the dinars and therefore had not yet inspected the property being purchased. Conversely, the latter clause is not a case of a mistaken transaction, as since he already gave the dinars to the seller, when he came to pull it, he should have inspected the property and then pulled it. Since the Jew did not bother to inspect the property even after paying, the transaction is valid.

12 יב

רב אשי אמר מדרישא משיכה אינה קונה סיפא נמי משיכה אינה קונה ואיידי דתנא רישא משך תנא סיפא נמי משך

The Gemara cites two more interpretations of the baraita. Rav Ashi says: The baraita is in fact discussing a case where the transaction was subject to gentile law, according to which only monetary payment effects acquisition, and as for the aforementioned difficulty raised to the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya from the latter clause: If so, why do I need pulling in order to effect the Jew’s acquisition of the idol; pulling is not in fact required. Rather, from the fact that in the first clause, pulling does not effect acquisition, in the latter clause too, pulling does not effect acquisition. But since the first clause taught the word: Pulled, in order to teach that this method is ineffective, the latter clause also taught the word: Pulled, despite the fact that its mention is unnecessary.

13 יג

רבינא אמר מדסיפא משיכה קונה רישא נמי משיכה קונה ורישא הכי קאמר אם לא נתן ולא משך יחזור מאי יחזור יחזור בדברים

Ravina said: The baraita is discussing a case where it was agreed that the transaction would be subject to Jewish law. From the fact that in the latter clause, pulling effects acquisition, in the first clause too, pulling effects acquisition. And as for the difficulty with regard to the first clause, which states that the Jew may return the item even though he already pulled it, this is what the baraita is saying: If the buyer did not give the money to the gentile and also did not pull the item, he returns the item to the seller. The Gemara adds: What does the term: Returns, mean in this context? It means that the Jew returns, i.e., reneges, on his verbal commitment. In other words, he is not required to complete the purchase despite the fact he initially agreed to do so.

14 יד

קסבר דברים יש בהם משום מחוסרי אמנה והני מילי ישראל מישראל דקיימו בדבורייהו אבל ישראל מעובד כוכבים דאינהו לא קיימי בדבורייהו לא:

The Gemara elaborates: It was necessary for the tanna to teach this explicitly, as he holds: Reneging on a verbal commitment that was unaccompanied by an act of acquisition constitutes an act of bad faith between two parties. And he holds that this statement applies only to a case where a Jew purchases an item from another Jew, as they are assumed to uphold their verbal commitments. But in a case of a Jew who purchases an item from gentiles, as they are not assumed to uphold their verbal commitments, reneging on one’s word does not constitute an act of bad faith between the parties, since neither party relies upon the commitment of the other in the first place.