דְּמִתְעַכַּל קִטְרַיְיהוּ. their knot becomes worn and untied. Consequently, it is possible that someone took only one of the two pouches.
בְּתוֹךְ הַקֵּן וּמָצָא לִפְנֵי הַקֵּן — אֲסוּרִין. לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: רוֹב וְקָרוֹב — הַלֵּךְ אַחַר הָרוֹב! § The mishna taught that if one designated fledglings inside the nest and found them before the nest, they are prohibited. The Gemara comments: Let us say that this supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, as Rabbi Ḥanina said: In a case involving a majority and an item that is near, one follows the majority. Since doves from the outside world are more numerous than those that one designated, the assumption is that these fledglings are from the majority, and therefore they are prohibited.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: בְּדַף. רָבָא אָמַר: בִּשְׁנֵי קִנִּין זוֹ לְמַעְלָה מִזּוֹ עָסְקִינַן. וְלָא מִבַּעְיָא זִמֵּן בַּתַּחְתּוֹנָה וְלֹא זִמֵּן בָּעֶלְיוֹנָה, וּמָצָא בַּתַּחְתּוֹנָה וְלֹא מָצָא בָּעֶלְיוֹנָה — דַּאֲסִירָן, דְּאָמְרִינַן: הָנָךְ אֲזַלוּ לְעָלְמָא, וְהָנָךְ אִשְׁתְּרַבּוֹבֵי אִשְׁתַּרְבּוּב וּנְחוּת. Abaye said, in refutation of this claim: Here we are dealing with a ledge affixed to the front of the nest, where all the doves gather. Therefore, the principle pertaining to a majority and an item that is near does not apply to this case. Rava said: Here we are dealing with two nests, one above the other, i.e., adjacent nests rather than any two nests. And it is not necessary to state that in the case of one who designated the fledglings in the lower nest and did not designate those in the upper one, and he found fledglings in the lower one and he did not find fledglings in the upper one, that the fledglings are all prohibited. The reason is that we say: These that were in the lower nest went to the outside world, while these still present have dragged themselves and come down.
אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ זִמֵּן בָּעֶלְיוֹנָה וְלֹא זִמֵּן בַּתַּחְתּוֹנָה, וּבָא וּמָצָא בָּעֶלְיוֹנָה וְלֹא מָצָא בַּתַּחְתּוֹנָה — הָנָךְ נָמֵי אֲסִירִי, דְּאָמְרִינַן: הָנָךְ אֲזַלוּ לְעָלְמָא, וְהָנָךְ סָרוֹכֵי סָרוּךְ וּסְלִיקוּ. Rather, even if one designated fledglings in the upper nest and did not designate fledglings in the lower one, and he came and found fledglings in the upper one and did not find fledglings in the lower one, those in the upper nest are also prohibited, as we say: Those that he originally designated went to the outside world, and those in the lower nest have clutched and climbed. Therefore, there is cause for concern in both of these cases.
וְאִם אֵין שָׁם אֶלָּא הֵן — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מוּתָּרִין. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא בִּמְפוֹרָחִין, אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: הָנָךְ אֲזַלוּ לְעָלְמָא, וְהָנֵי אַחֲרִינֵי נִינְהוּ. The mishna states that if there are no others there apart from them, they are permitted. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that the mishna is dealing with fledglings that are already able to fly, it is possible to say that those that he designated went to the outside world, and the ones that are present are other ones.
אֶלָּא בְּמִדַּדִּין. אִי דְּאִיכָּא קֵן בְּתוֹךְ חֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה — אִדַּדּוֹיֵי אִדַּדּוֹ, וְאִי דְּלֵיכָּא קֵן בְּתוֹךְ חֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה — פְּשִׁיטָא דְּמוּתָּרִין, דְּאָמַר מָר עוּקְבָא בַּר חָמָא: כׇּל הַמְדַדֶּה — אֵין מְדַדֶּה יוֹתֵר מֵחֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה. Rather, the mishna must be referring to fledglings that can only hop from one place to another. However, if it deals with a case where there is another dove nest within fifty cubits, the fledglings might have jumped and come from that nest; and if there is no nest within fifty cubits, it is obvious that they are permitted, for from where could they have come? As Mar Ukva bar Ḥama said: With regard to any creature that hops, it does not hop more than fifty cubits.
לְעוֹלָם דְּאִיכָּא קֵן בְּתוֹךְ חֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה, וּכְגוֹן דְּקָיְימָא בְּקֶרֶן זָוִית. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: אִדַּדּוֹיֵי אִדַּדּוֹ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן כׇּל הֵיכָא דְּמִדַּדֵּה וַהֲדַר חָזֵי לְקִנֵּיהּ — מִדַּדֵּה, וְאִי לָא — לָא מִדַּדֵּה. The Gemara answers: Actually, it is referring to a case where there is another nest within fifty cubits, and it deals with a situation where the additional nest is situated around a corner from the first nest, rather than in a straight line from it. Lest you say: The fledglings jumped from one nest to the other, the mishna therefore teaches us that anywhere that a fledgling hops and turns and sees its nest, it will continue to hop. But if it can no longer see its original nest, it will not hop any farther.
מַתְנִי׳ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין נוֹטְלִים אֶת הָעֱלִי לְקַצֵּב עָלָיו בָּשָׂר, וּבֵית הִלֵּל מַתִּירִין. בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין נוֹתְנִין אֶת הָעוֹר לִפְנֵי הַדּוֹרְסָן. וְלֹא יַגְבִּיהֶנּוּ, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יֵשׁ עִמּוֹ כְּזַיִת בָּשָׂר, וּבֵית הִלֵּל מַתִּירִין. MISHNA: Beit Shammai say: One may not take a large pestle from a mortar, which is normally used for crushing wheat in the preparation of porridge, for any other purpose on a Festival, e.g., to cut meat on it; and Beit Hillel permit it. Likewise, Beit Shammai say: One may not place an unprocessed hide before those who will tread on it, as this constitutes the prohibited labor of tanning on a Festival. And one may not lift the hide from its place, as it is considered muktze, unless there is an olive-bulk of meat on it, in which case it may be carried on account of its meat; and Beit Hillel permit it in both cases.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנָא: וְשָׁוִין שֶׁאִם קִצֵּב עָלָיו בָּשָׂר — שֶׁאָסוּר לְטַלְטְלוֹ. GEMARA: The Sage taught in a baraita: And Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that if one already cut the meat he needs for the Festival on the pestle, it is prohibited to move the pestle farther on the Festival. The reason is that the vessel is muktze as a utensil whose primary function is a prohibited use, and therefore it is permitted to handle it only when one requires it.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בֶּעֱלִי, אֲבָל בְּתָבְרָא גַּרְמֵי — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מוּתָּר. פְּשִׁיטָא, עֱלִי תְּנַן! Abaye said: This dispute applies specifically in the case of a pestle; however, in the case of a wooden anvil used for breaking bones, everyone agrees that it is permitted. The Gemara asks: This is obvious; we learned in the mishna: A pestle. Why would one think that an object not even mentioned in the mishna is prohibited?
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ תָּבְרָא גַּרְמֵי נָמֵי. וְהַאי דְּקָתָנֵי עֱלִי, לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחָן דְּבֵית הִלֵּל, דַּאֲפִילּוּ דָּבָר שֶׁמְּלַאכְתּוֹ לֶאֱסוֹר נָמֵי שָׁרוּ — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. The Gemara answers: Abaye’s statement is necessary, lest you say: The same is true, i.e., Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree, even with regard to a wooden anvil used for breaking bones; and that which the mishna specifically teaches: A pestle, is to convey the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Beit Hillel, that they permitted moving even an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use. Abaye therefore teaches us that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to a wooden anvil used for breaking bones.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לֹא נִצְרְכָא אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ תָּבְרָא גַּרְמֵי חַדְתִּי, מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מִמְּלֵךְ וְלָא תָּבַר עֲלַהּ — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. Some say a different version of the previous discussion. Abaye said: It is necessary to say only: Even a new wooden anvil used for breaking bones is also permitted. Lest you say: Perhaps one will reconsider and not break bones on it, but rather set it aside for a different purpose, Abaye therefore teaches us that this is not a concern.
וּבֵית שַׁמַּאי לָא חָיְישִׁי לְאִמְּלוֹכֵי? וְהָתַנְיָא, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין מוֹלִיכִין טַבָּח וְסַכִּין אֵצֶל בְּהֵמָה, וְלֹא בְּהֵמָה אֵצֶל טַבָּח וְסַכִּין. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: מוֹלִיכִין זֶה אֵצֶל זֶה. The Gemara asks: And is that so? Are Beit Shammai not concerned about the possibility that one might reconsider? But isn’t it taught (Tosefta, Beitza 1:13): Beit Shammai say: On a Festival, one may not lead a butcher with a knife in hand to an animal located far from him, so that he can slaughter it; nor may one lead an animal to a butcher with a knife, lest he reconsider, in which case he will have handled the knife unnecessarily, which is prohibited; and Beit Hillel say: One may lead them from one to the other, as they are not concerned about unnecessary use of the knife.
בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין מוֹלִיכִין תַּבְלִין וּמָדוֹךְ אֵצֶל מְדוֹכָה, וְלֹא מְדוֹכָה אֵצֶל תַּבְלִין וּמָדוֹךְ. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: מוֹלִיכִין זֶה אֵצֶל זֶה! By the same reasoning, Beit Shammai say: One may not bring spices or a pestle to a mortar, nor a mortar to spices and a pestle, as he might change his mind and will have handled these utensils on the Festival for no purpose. And Beit Hillel say: One may bring one to the other, as there is no concern that he may reconsider. This shows that Beit Shammai are, in general, concerned that one might reconsider, as they prohibit one to handle items for this reason.
הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! בִּשְׁלָמָא בְּהֵמָה אָתֵי לְאִמְּלוֹכֵי, דְּאָמַר: נִשְׁבֹּק הַאי בְּהֵמָה כְּחוּשָׁה, וּמַיְיתֵינָא בְּהֵמָה אַחֲרִיתִי דְּשַׁמִּינָה מִינַּהּ. קְדֵרָה נָמֵי אָתֵי לְאִימְּלוֹכֵי, דְּאָמַר: נִשְׁבֹּק הַאי קְדֵרָה דְּבָעֲיָא תַּבְלִין, וּמַיְיתֵינָא אַחֲרִיתִי דְּלָא בָּעֲיָא תַּבְלִין. הָכָא מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? מִמְּלֵךְ וְלָא תָּבַר? כֵּיוָן דְּשַׁחְטַהּ — לִתְבִירָא קָיְימָא. The Gemara refutes this: How can these cases be compared? Granted, in the case of an animal, one is liable to come to reconsider, as he might say: Let us leave aside this animal, as it is thin, and we will bring a different animal, fatter than it. With regard to a pot, too, one is liable to come to reconsider, as he might say: Let us leave aside this pot of cooked food, as it requires spices and would take great effort to prepare, and I will bring a different one that does not require spices and can be cooked as it is. However, here, with regard to a wooden anvil used for breaking bones, what is there to say? Will one reconsider and not break the bones? Since he has slaughtered an animal, it stands ready for its bones to be broken, as it cannot be eaten in any other way.
בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין נוֹתְנִין אֶת הָעוֹר. תָּנָא: וְשָׁוִין שֶׁמּוֹלְחִין עָלָיו בָּשָׂר לְצָלִי. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא לְצָלִי, אֲבָל לִקְדֵרָה — לֹא. § It was taught in the mishna that Beit Shammai say: One may not place an unprocessed hide before the one who will tread on it. The Sage taught (Tosefta, Beitza 1:13): And Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that one may salt meat for roasting on this hide, and there is no concern that some of the salt will fall on the hide, which would be similar to tanning the hide by salting. Abaye said: They taught that one may salt meat only for roasting, in which case it is not salted a great deal. However, in the case of meat for a pot, i.e., for cooking, the Sages did not say that one may salt it on the hide, as meat must be well-salted on all sides before cooking, and a large amount of salt will inevitably spill onto the hide.
פְּשִׁיטָא — לְצָלִי תְּנַן! הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דַּאֲפִילּוּ לְצָלִי, כְּעֵין קְדֵרָה — אָסוּר. The Gemara asks: It is obvious the one may not salt meat for cooking in a pot, as we explicitly learned in the Tosefta just cited: For roasting, and not for cooking. The Gemara answers: This comes to teach us that even the permission to salt meat for roasting applies only if one does so in the usual manner. However, if one salts it in a manner of meat salted to be cooked in a pot, which requires more salt than is necessary for roasting, it is prohibited.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵין מוֹלְחִין אֶת הַחֲלָבִים וְאֵין מְהַפְּכִין בָּהֶן. מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אֲמַרוּ: שׁוֹטְחָן בָּרוּחַ עַל גַּבֵּי יְתֵדוֹת. The Sages taught: On a Festival, one may not salt the fats of an animal, which is done so that they will not decompose and emit a foul odor. This is true even if the animal was slaughtered on the Festival. And one may not turn them over. The fats are unfit for use on the Festival, and therefore they are muktze. They said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua: One may spread the fats out in the wind on pegs to prevent them from decaying.
אָמַר רַב מַתְנָה: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַב מַתְנָה: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ — אִצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא יָחִיד וְרַבִּים הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּים, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן הֲלָכָה כְּיָחִיד. Rav Mattana said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. Some say that Rav Mattana said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, this statement is necessary. Otherwise, it might enter your mind to say that since this is a dispute between an individual and the many, one should apply the principal that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the many. Rav Mattana therefore teaches us that, in this case, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the individual.
אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין הֲלָכָה — פְּשִׁיטָא, יָחִיד וְרַבִּים הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּים! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מִסְתַּבַּר טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ דְּאִי לָא שָׁרֵית לֵיהּ מִמְּנַע וְלָא שָׁחֵיט, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. However, according to the one who said that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, this is obvious. In a case involving an individual and the many, the halakha is in accordance with the many. The Gemara answers: This ruling is nevertheless necessary, lest you say: Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion is more reasonable, for if you do not permit him to air out the fats, he will refrain and not slaughter an animal at all. Rav Mattana therefore teaches us that this factor is not taken into consideration.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא מֵעוֹר לִפְנֵי הַדּוֹרְסָן? The Gemara asks: And in what way is this case different from placing a hide before those who will tread on it, which Beit Hillel, whose ruling is accepted as halakha, permit for the very reason that, if one is not allowed to do so, he will refrain from slaughtering animals?