אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּלֵיכָּא דָּקָר נָעוּץ — לָא. אִי נָמֵי: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי בֵּית הִלֵּל הָכָא, אֶלָּא כֵּיוָן דְּמוּקְצֶה הוּא, בְּעוֹמֵד וְאוֹמֵר זֶה וְזֶה אֲנִי נוֹטֵל סַגִּי. אֲבָל הָתָם — לָא. However, where there is no embedded shovel, even Beit Shammai did not permit it. Alternatively, it is possible that Beit Hillel say their opinion only here, since a dove is muktze, which is prohibited by rabbinic law, and therefore when he stands and says: I will take this and that, it is enough. However there, where the prohibition applies by Torah law, they did not say so.
אֶלָּא, אִי קַשְׁיָא — הָא קַשְׁיָא: בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין נוֹטְלִין אֶת הָעֱלִי, לְקַצֵּב עָלָיו בָּשָׂר, וּבֵית הִלֵּל מַתִּירִין. אַלְמָא גַּבֵּי שִׂמְחַת יוֹם טוֹב בֵּית שַׁמַּאי לְחוּמְרָא וּבֵית הִלֵּל לְקוּלָּא, וּרְמִינְהִי הַשּׁוֹחֵט חַיָּה וָעוֹף, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וְכוּ׳! אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מוּחְלֶפֶת הַשִּׁיטָה. Rather, if there is a difficulty involving a contradiction, this is the difficulty, from a different mishna (11a): Beit Shammai say: One may not take a large pestle from a mortar, which is normally used for crushing wheat in the preparation of porridge, for any other purpose on a Festival, e.g., to cut meat on it; and Beit Hillel permit it. Apparently, with regard to rejoicing on the Festival, the opinion of Beit Shammai is stringent, and that of Beit Hillel is lenient. And the Gemara raises a contradiction: With regard to one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a fowl on a Festival, Beit Shammai say: He may dig earth with a shovel and cover the blood, and Beit Hillel say: He may not slaughter an undomesticated animal or a fowl, unless he had earth prepared for that purpose while it was still day. It was in this regard that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The attribution of the opinions is reversed.
מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא לָא הִיא: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי הָתָם אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא דָּקָר נָעוּץ, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּלֵיכָּא דָּקָר נָעוּץ — לָא, אִי נָמֵי: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי בֵּית הִלֵּל הָכָא אֶלָּא, דְּאִיכָּא תּוֹרַת כְּלִי עָלָיו, אֲבָל הָתָם לָא. The Gemara rejects this: From where do you know this? Perhaps it is not so. Rather, Beit Shammai say their opinion only there, where there is a shovel embedded and prepared the day before, but where there is no embedded shovel, they did not rule leniently. Alternatively, one can say that Beit Hillel say their opinion only here, with regard to a pestle, which at least has the status of a vessel, and therefore it is not completely muktze. However, there, in the case of slaughtering, Beit Hillel did not issue a lenient ruling.
אֶלָּא, אִי קַשְׁיָא — הָא קַשְׁיָא: בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין נוֹתְנִין אֶת הָעוֹר לִפְנֵי הַדּוֹרְסָן, וְלֹא יַגְבִּיהֶנּוּ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יֵשׁ עָלָיו כְּזַיִת בָּשָׂר. וּבֵית הִלֵּל מַתִּירִין. Rather, if there is a difficulty, this is the difficulty: It is taught in a mishna (11a): Beit Shammai say: One may not place an unprocessed hide before those who will tread on it, as this is an instance of the prohibited labor of tanning on a Festival. And one may not lift the hide from its spot, as it is considered muktze, unless there is an olive-bulk of meat on it, in which case it may be carried on account of its meat. And Beit Hillel permit one to place a hide before those who will tread upon it.
אַלְמָא, גַּבֵּי שִׂמְחַת יוֹם טוֹב בֵּית שַׁמַּאי לְחוּמְרָא וּבֵית הִלֵּל לְקוּלָּא, וּרְמִינְהִי: הַשּׁוֹחֵט חַיָּה וְעוֹף בְּיוֹם טוֹב וְכוּ׳, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מוּחְלֶפֶת הַשִּׁיטָה. Once again the Gemara states: Apparently, with regard to rejoicing on the Festival, the opinion of Beit Shammai is stringent, and that of Beit Hillel is lenient. And the Gemara raises a contradiction: With regard to one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a fowl on a Festival, Beit Shammai say, etc. Concerning this case, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The attribution of the opinions is reversed.
מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא לָא הִיא: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי הָתָם אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא דָּקָר נָעוּץ, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּלֵיכָּא דָּקָר נָעוּץ — לָא. אִי נָמֵי: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי בֵּית הִלֵּל הָכָא, אֶלָּא דַּחֲזֵי לְמִזְגֵּא עִלָּוֵיהּ, אֲבָל הָתָם לָא. Here too, the Gemara rejects this: From where do you know this? Perhaps that is not so. Rather, Beit Shammai say their opinion only there, where there is a shovel embedded and prepared the day before, but where there is no embedded shovel, they did not rule leniently. Alternatively, Beit Hillel say their opinion only here, with regard to a hide, which is suitable for people to recline upon, and therefore it is not completely muktze. However, there, in the case of slaughtering, they were not lenient.
אֶלָּא, אִי קַשְׁיָא — הָא קַשְׁיָא: בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין מְסַלְּקִין אֶת הַתְּרִיסִין בְּיוֹם טוֹב, וּבֵית הִלֵּל מַתִּירִין אַף לְהַחְזִיר. אַלְמָא, גַּבֵּי שִׂמְחַת יוֹם טוֹב בֵּית שַׁמַּאי לְחוּמְרָא וּבֵית הִלֵּל לְקוּלָּא, וּרְמִינְהִי: הַשּׁוֹחֵט חַיָּה וְעוֹף בְּיוֹם טוֹב וְכוּ׳. Rather, if there is a difficulty, this is the difficulty, as it is taught (11a): Beit Shammai say: One may not remove the shutters of a store on a Festival, to open the store by raising them, due to the prohibition against building and demolishing on a Festival; and Beit Hillel permit not only to open the shutters, but even to replace them. Apparently, with regard to rejoicing on the Festival, the opinion of Beit Shammai is stringent, and that of Beit Hillel is lenient. And the Gemara raises a contradiction: With regard to one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a fowl on a Festival, Beit Shammai say, etc.
בִּשְׁלָמָא בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אַבֵּית שַׁמַּאי לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָתָם דְּאִיכָּא דָּקָר נָעוּץ, הָכָא לֵיכָּא דָּקָר נָעוּץ. אֶלָּא בֵּית הִלֵּל אַבֵּית הִלֵּל קַשְׁיָא! Granted, the contradiction between one statement of Beit Shammai and the other statement of Beit Shammai is not difficult, as it can be explained as follows: There, in the slaughtering case, it is referring to a situation where there is a shovel embedded and prepared the day before; here, there is no embedded shovel, and therefore Beit Shammai are stringent. However, the contradiction between one statement of Beit Hillel and the other statement of Beit Hillel is difficult.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מוּחְלֶפֶת הַשִּׁיטָה. (אִי נָמֵי:) עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי בֵּית הִלֵּל הָכָא, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּאֵין בִּנְיָן בְּכֵלִים וְאֵין סְתִירָה בְּכֵלִים. אֲבָל הָתָם — לָא. It is with regard to this contradiction that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The attribution of the opinions is reversed. The Gemara comments: Alternatively, one can suggest a different answer without reversing the opinions: Beit Hillel say their lenient opinion only here, in the case of the shutters, because they maintain that there is no prohibition against building with regard to vessels and there is no prohibition against dismantling with regard to vessels, which means that no Torah prohibition is violated in removing the shutters. However, there, in the case of slaughtering, where there are no extenuating circumstances, Beit Hillel did not permit it. Consequently, there is no contradiction that necessitates a reversal of the opinions.
מַתְנִי׳ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: לֹא יִטּוֹל אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן נִעְנַע מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: עוֹמֵד וְאוֹמֵר ״זֶה וָזֶה אֲנִי נוֹטֵל״. MISHNA: Beit Shammai say: One may not take fledgling doves from a dovecote on a Festival, unless he shook the ones he wished to take while it was still day, thereby preparing them. And Beit Hillel say: It is not necessary to shake; rather, it is sufficient if one stands the day before and says: I will take this fledgling and that one.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב חָנָן בַּר אַמֵּי: מַחְלוֹקֶת בִּבְרִיכָה רִאשׁוֹנָה, דְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי סָבְרִי: גָּזְרִינַן דִּלְמָא אָתֵי לְאִמְּלוֹכֵי. GEMARA: Rav Ḥanan bar Ami said: The dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies to the first brood, the first pair of fledglings hatched in the first month of the year from a pair of doves. Those fledglings are usually left in the nest and are not used for food. As Beit Shammai hold: We issue a decree prohibiting taking them, as perhaps on the Festival he will come to reconsider after handling them and decide to leave them in their place, in which case he has moved them unnecessarily. However, once he has already shaken them, there is no further concern that he might change his mind on the Festival itself.
וּבֵית הִלֵּל סָבְרִי: לָא גָּזְרִינַן. אֲבָל בִּבְרִיכָה שְׁנִיָּה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל בְּעוֹמֵד וְאוֹמֵר ״זֶה וָזֶה אֲנִי נוֹטֵל״ סַגִּיא. And Beit Hillel hold: We do not issue a decree, as there is no concern that one might change his mind, and therefore a verbal commitment is sufficient. However, with regard to the second brood, the fledglings born on the second cycle in the following month, everyone agrees that it is enough for one to stand and say: I will take this one and that one.
וּבֵית הִלֵּל — לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמֵימַר ״זֶה וָזֶה אֲנִי נוֹטֵל״? לֵימָא: ״מִכָּאן אֲנִי נוֹטֵל לְמָחָר״? The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, why does one need to say: I will take this one and that one? Let him say: From here, this dovecote, I will take tomorrow. Why does one have to specify exactly which fledglings he plans to remove from the dovecote?
וְכִי תֵּימָא בֵּית הִלֵּל לֵית לְהוּ בְּרֵירָה, וְהָתְנַן: הַמֵּת בַּבַּיִת וְלוֹ פְּתָחִים הַרְבֵּה — כּוּלָּן טְמֵאִים. And if you say that Beit Hillel do not accept the principle of retroactive designation, i.e., they reject the idea that a person’s original intention can be clarified retroactively, and therefore it cannot be said that the fledglings one takes on the Festival were the ones he had in mind beforehand, but didn’t we learn in a mishna (Ohalot 7:3): If a corpse is located in a house, and the house has many entrances, whether they are open or closed, not only is the inside of the house ritually impure as a tent of the dead, but all the entrances are likewise ritually impure and impart impurity to the vessels they contain? The reason is that the corpse might be removed via any of the entrances, and therefore they all contract impurity.
נִפְתַּח אֶחָד מֵהֶן, הוּא טָמֵא, וְכוּלָּן טְהוֹרִין. חִשֵּׁב לְהוֹצִיאוֹ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן, אוֹ בְּחַלּוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ אַרְבָּעָה עַל אַרְבָּעָה — מַצֶּלֶת עַל כׇּל הַפְּתָחִים כּוּלָּן. If only one of the entrances was open after the person died, that entrance alone is ritually impure, as the corpse will certainly be removed through it, and all the other entrances remain ritually pure. The same applies if one decided from the outset to remove the corpse through one of the entrances, or to carry it out through a window that is four by four handbreadths in size, which is large enough for a corpse. This intention spares all the other entrances from ritual impurity, as it is clear that the corpse will not be removed through them.
בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: וְהוּא שֶׁחִשֵּׁב לְהוֹצִיאוֹ עַד שֶׁלֹּא יָמוּת הַמֵּת, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: אַף מִשֶּׁיָּמוּת הַמֵּת. With regard to this case, Beit Shammai say: This halakha applies only if one had decided to remove the corpse by a particular entrance before the person died, so that the entrance through which the body would be removed was already determined at the time of death. And Beit Hillel say: This halakha applies even after the person died, as the principle of retroactive designation is invoked, which means that the entrance through which the deceased will be removed is retroactively designated. This indicates that Beit Hillel do accept the principle of retroactive designation.
הָא אִתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַבָּה: לְטַהֵר אֶת הַפְּתָחִים מִכָּאן וּלְהַבָּא. וְכֵן אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: לְטַהֵר אֶת הַפְּתָחִים מִכָּאן וּלְהַבָּא. מִכָּאן וּלְהַבָּא — אִין, לְמַפְרֵעַ — לָא. The Gemara refutes this proof: Wasn’t it stated by amora’im with regard to this mishna that Rabba said: In this case, Beit Hillel referred only to purifying the entrances from that point forward. In other words, after one has decided on an entrance that he will use to remove the dead, any vessels in the space of the other entrances do not become ritually impure. However, vessels that were located inside the space of the other entrances before the decision was made remain impure. According to these amora’im, Beit Hillel do not accept the principle of retroactive designation. And, so too, Rav Oshaya said: This halakha is referring to purifying the entrances from that point forward, which indicates: From here onward, yes, the entrances are ritually pure; retroactively, no, they are not considered pure.
רָבָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם לְמַפְרֵעַ, וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא: דִּלְמָא מְטַלְטֵל וְשָׁבֵיק, מְטַלְטֵל וְשָׁבֵיק, וְקָא מְטַלְטֵל מִידֵּי דְּלָא חֲזֵי לֵיהּ. Rava said that there is a different way to resolve the conflicting rulings of Beit Hillel: Actually, in the case of ritual impurity, Beit Hillel maintain that all the entrances are ritually pure retroactively. And here, with regard to fledglings, this is the reason why Beit Hillel insist that one designate which particular fledglings one plans to take on the Festival: Perhaps one will move fledglings, and put them down, and again move them, and put them down until he finds the pair he wants, thereby moving an object that is not suitable for him, i.e., which is muktze.
וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ — בְּעוֹמֵד וְאוֹמֵר ״זֶה וָזֶה אֲנִי נוֹטֵל״ סַגִּיא! הָנֵי מִילֵּי מֵעֶרֶב יוֹם טוֹב, The Gemara raises an objection: But if this is indeed the concern, didn’t you say that it is enough if one stands and says: I will take this one and that one. In this case, too, he does not touch them. It is therefore possible that he may reconsider his choice of fledglings on the Festival after he handles them. The Gemara answers: This applies only when one made his choice on the eve of the Festival. Since he knows that he may not alter his decision on the Festival itself even if he does not like the ones he chose, he definitively decides to take those fledglings and will not handle others.