אם אינו ענין לנשך כסף שהרי כבר נאמר (דברים כג, כ) לא תשיך לאחיך תנהו ענין לרבית כסף If the verse is not referring to the matter of neshekh with money, as it is already stated in that same verse: “You shall not lend with interest [tashikh] to your brother,” indicating that taking money as interest is prohibited, apply the expression “neshekh of money” to the matter of ribit, i.e., tarbit with money.
אין לי אלא בלוה במלוה מנין The baraita continues: I have derived a source for this prohibition only with regard to a borrower, for whom it is prohibited to pay interest on a loan. From where is it derived that there is also a prohibition stated with regard to a lender?
נאמר נשך בלוה ונאמר נשך במלוה מה נשך האמור בלוה לא חלקת בו בין בכסף בין באוכל בין בנשך בין ברבית אף נשך האמור במלוה לא תחלוק בו בין בכסף בין באוכל בין בנשך בין ברבית מנין לרבות כל דבר ת"ל (דברים כג, כ) נשך כל דבר אשר ישך The baraita answers: Neshekh is stated with regard to a borrower, and neshekh is stated with regard to a lender. Just as concerning neshekh that is stated with regard to a borrower, you did not distinguish with regard to it between a loan of money and a loan of food, or between whether the interest is forbidden as neshekh or as ribit, so too, concerning neshekh stated with regard to a lender, do not distinguish with regard to it between a loan of money and a loan of food, or between whether the interest is forbidden as neshekh or as ribit. The baraita concludes: From where is it derived to include in the prohibition interest of any sort? The verse states: “Neshekh of anything that is lent with interest.”
רבינא אמר לא נשך באוכל ולא רבית בכסף צריכי קרא דאי כתיב את כספך לא תתן לו בנשך ואכלך במרבית כדקאמרת השתא דכתיב את כספך לא תתן לו בנשך ובמרבית לא תתן אכלך קרי ביה הכי את כספך לא תתן לו בנשך ובמרבית ובנשך ובמרבית לא תתן אכלך Ravina said: An explicit verse is not required, neither to derive neshekh of food nor to derive ribit of money. As, if it were written: You shall not give him your money with neshekh and your food with marbit, juxtaposing neshekh with money alone and marbit with food alone, it would be as you say, that there is a need for the derivation of the baraita. But now that it is written: “You shall not give him your money with neshekh and with marbit you shall not give him your food,” interposing both neshekh and marbit between money and food, read into the verse this interpretation: Your money you shall not give him for neshekh and for marbit; and for neshekh and for marbit you shall not give your food.
והא תנא נאמר נאמר קאמר The Gemara asks: But isn’t the tanna of the baraita saying that neshekh of food and tarbit of money are derived by means of a verbal analogy: Neshekh is stated with regard to a borrower, and neshekh is also stated with regard to a lender? How can Ravina, an amora, state that the verbal analogy is not needed?
הכי קאמר אילו לא נאמר קרא הייתי אומר גזירה שוה עכשיו שנאמר קרא ג"ש לא צריך אלא גזירה שוה למה לי לנשך כל דבר אשר ישך דלא כתב במלוה The Gemara answers: This is what Ravina is saying: Had the verse not stated the terms neshekh and tarbit interposed between money and food, I would have said that the halakha that both terms apply to both money and food would be derived by means of a verbal analogy. Now, as the verse is stated in that manner, a verbal analogy is not necessary. The Gemara asks: Rather, why do I need this verbal analogy? The Gemara explains: I need the verbal analogy to teach that “neshekh of anything that is lent for interest” (Deuteronomy 23:20), which is written with regard to a borrower but not written with regard to a lender, applies to a lender as well.
אמר רבא למה לי דכתב רחמנא לאו ברבית לאו בגזל לאו באונאה § Rava said: Why do I need it to be that the Merciful One writes a prohibition with regard to interest, a prohibition with regard to robbery (see Leviticus 19:13), and a prohibition with regard to exploitation (see Leviticus 25:14), a transaction where one of the parties overcharged or underpaid? There appears to be one principle underlying all three prohibitions: One must not take possession of another’s money in illegitimate ways.
צריכי דאי כתב רחמנא לאו ברבית משום דחידוש הוא דאפילו בלוה אסרה רחמנא The Gemara explains: They are necessary. As, had the Merciful One written the prohibition only with regard to interest, one could not have derived the other prohibitions from it because it is a prohibition with a novel element that does not appear in other halakhot. This novel element is that the Merciful One prohibited a loan with interest even for the borrower. With regard to the two other prohibitions, there is a prohibition against taking another’s money, but there is no prohibition for the victim, who has his money taken.
ואי כתב רחמנא לאו בגזל משום דבעל כרחיה אבל אונאה אימא לא And had the Merciful One written the prohibition only with regard to robbery, one could not have derived the other prohibitions from it, as perhaps robbery is prohibited only due to the fact that it is an action taken against the will of the victim. But in the cases of exploitation and interest, where there is an element of consent, one would say they are not prohibited.
ואי כתב רחמנא לאו באונאה משום דלא ידע דמחיל And had the Merciful One written the prohibition only with regard to exploitation, one could not have derived the other prohibitions from it, as perhaps exploitation is prohibited only due to the fact that the victim does not know that he was the victim of exploitation and therefore cannot waive repayment. In the cases of interest and robbery, the borrower and the victim, respectively, are aware that their money was taken and waiving repayment is possible, so perhaps those actions are is not prohibited.
חדא מחדא לא אתיא תיתי חדא מתרתי הי תיתי לא לכתוב רחמנא לאו ברבית ותיתי מהנך מה להנך שכן שלא מדעת תאמר ברבית דמדעתיה The Gemara suggests: Although no one of these prohibitions can be derived from one of the other prohibitions, perhaps one of them can be derived from the other two. The Gemara clarifies: Which prohibition will you derive from the other two? Let the Merciful One not write the prohibition with regard to interest, and instead derive that prohibition from these two, robbery and exploitation. The Gemara rejects that suggestion: What is notable about these prohibitions? They are notable in that they are transgressed without the consent of the victim. Will you say the same with regard to interest, which the borrower gives with his consent, as he agrees to accept the loan under those conditions?
לא לכתוב רחמנא לאו באונאה ותיתי מהנך מה להנך שכן אין דרך מקח וממכר בכך The Gemara suggests: Let the Merciful One not write the prohibition with regard to exploitation, and instead derive that prohibition from these two, robbery and interest. The Gemara rejects that suggestion: What is notable about these prohibitions? They are notable in that they are not transgressed in the typical manner of buying and selling. Will you say the same with regard to exploitation, which is transgressed in the context of typical buying and selling?
אלא לא לכתוב רחמנא לאו בגזל ותיתי מהנך דמאי פרכת מה לרבית שכן חידוש אונאה תוכיח Rather, let the Merciful One not write the prohibition with regard to robbery, and instead derive that prohibition from these two, interest and exploitation. As what refutation will you offer? If you say: What is notable about interest? It is notable in that the prohibition of interest contains a novel element; the case of exploitation will prove that a novel element is not a factor, as the prohibition against exploitation contains no novel element.
מה לאונאה שכן לא ידע ומחיל רבית תוכיח If you say, what is notable about exploitation? It is notable in that in this case, the victim does not know that he was the victim of exploitation and therefore he cannot waive repayment; the case of interest will prove that the inability to waive repayment is not a factor, as the borrower is aware of the interest and able to waive repayment.
וחזר הדין לא ראי זה כראי זה ולא ראי זה כראי זה הצד השוה שבהן שכן גוזלו אף אני אביא גזל The Gemara comments: And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case, interest, is not like the aspect of that case, exploitation, and the aspect of that case, exploitation, is not like the aspect of this case, interest. Their common denominator is that one robs another of money, i.e., takes money from another that is not due to him. I will also bring the prohibition against robbery, which shares that common denominator, and derive it from the other two prohibitions.
אמרי הכי נמי אלא לאו בגזל למה לי לכובש שכר שכיר The Sages said: Indeed, the prohibition against robbery is superfluous. But if the prohibition against robbery can be derived from the prohibitions against interest and exploitation, why do I need the prohibition written in the Torah with regard to robbery? The Gemara answers: That verse is not written to prohibit a standard case of robbery; rather, it serves to prohibit the action of one who withholds the wages of a hired laborer. In that case, unlike robbery, the employer does not take money from the laborer; he merely fails to pay him his wages.
כובש שכר שכיר בהדיא כתיב ביה (דברים כד, יד) לא תעשוק שכיר עני ואביון לעבור עליו בשני לאוין The Gemara challenges: With regard to one who withholds the wages of a hired laborer, it is explicitly written: “You shall not oppress a hired laborer who is poor and destitute” (Deuteronomy 24:14). There is no need to derive this prohibition from the verse concerning robbery. The Gemara answers: It is written so that withholding the wages of a hired laborer always involves violating two prohibitions.
ולוקמה ברבית ואונאה ולעבור עליו בשני לאוין דבר הלמד מעניינו The Gemara asks: But let us interpret the verse concerning robbery as prohibiting interest or exploitation, and say that it is written so that these prohibitions always involve violating two prohibitions. The Gemara answers: The prohibition against robbery is applied to the case of withholding the wages of a hired laborer because it is a matter derived from its context,