ומקומו מושכר לו ועישור אחר שאני עתיד למוד נתון לעקיבא בן יוסף כדי שיזכה בו לעניים ומקומו מושכר לו and the place of the tithe is rented to him. Rabbi Yehoshua paid him a token sum to rent the field, which presumably became the equivalent of his courtyard, and thereby acquired the tithe. And another one-tenth that I will measure out in the future and separate from my produce as the poor man’s tithe is given to Akiva ben Yosef so that he will acquire it for the poor, and its place is rented to him.
וכי רבי יהושע ורבי עקיבא בצד שדהו של רבן גמליאל היו עומדין Rabbi Abba continued: But were Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva standing next to Rabban Gamliel’s field then? All of them were on the ship. Apparently, one’s courtyard effects acquisition for him even when he is not standing next to it.
אמר ליה דמי האי מרבנן כדלא גמרי אינשי שמעתא Ulla said to him: This one of the Sages seems like one who has not studied halakha. Ulla dismissed the question entirely, as he deemed it unworthy of consideration.
כי אתא לסורא אמר להו הכי אמר עולא והכי אותביתיה אמר ליה ההוא מרבנן רבן גמליאל מטלטלי אגב מקרקעי הקנה להם רבי זירא קבלה רבי אבא לא קבלה When Rabbi Abba came to Sura, he related the discussion to the local scholars, saying to them: This is what Ulla said, and this is how I challenged him. One of the Sages said to him: Rabban Gamliel transferred ownership of the movable property, the tithes, to them by means of renting them the land. The transaction concerning the tithes was effected not by causing the location of the produce to become the equivalent of a courtyard belonging to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, but rather by employing the principle that movable property can be acquired together with the acquisition of land. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Zeira accepted this response to Rabbi Abba’s objection, but Rabbi Abba did not accept it.
אמר רבא שפיר עביד דלא קבלה וכי לא היה להם סודר לקנות ממנו בחליפין אלא טובת הנאה אינה ממון לקנות ממנו בחליפין הכא נמי טובת הנאה אינה ממון לקנות על גבי קרקע Rava said: Rabbi Abba did well by not accepting this response, because if Rabban Gamliel had intended to transfer his ownership of the tithes to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, did they not have a cloth with which to acquire the tithes from him by means of a symbolic exchange? They could have acquired the tithes through symbolic exchange without renting the land. Rather, clearly the tithes were not considered the property of Rabban Gamliel, as he owned only the benefit of discretion, i.e., the benefit accrued from the option of giving the tithes to whichever Levite or poor person that he chose, and such benefit is not considered property that can be acquired by means of a symbolic exchange. Here, too, the transaction was clearly effected by means of a courtyard, as benefit of discretion is not property that can be acquired by means of acquiring land. Therefore, Rabbi Abba’s explanation must be correct, and one’s courtyard effects acquisition for him even when he is not standing next to it.
ולא היא מתנות כהונה נתינה כתיבא בהו חליפין דרך מקח וממכר הוא מטלטלין אגב מקרקע נתינה אלימתא היא The Gemara rejects Rava’s reasoning: But that is not so. With regard to gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled, and similarly with regard to tithes that are given to Levites and to the poor, the concept of giving is written in the Torah: “And have given it to the Levite, to the stranger, to the fatherless, and to the widow” (Deuteronomy 26:12). These gifts must be given and not sold or bartered. Therefore, since exchange is a form of buying and selling, it is an inappropriate mode of acquisition with regard to tithes. By contrast, transferring ownership of movable property by means of transferring ownership of land is a powerful form of giving. Consequently, Rabban Gamliel could not give them the tithes by means of a symbolic exchange using a cloth, but instead had to give it to them along with land. Therefore, since the transaction was not effected by means of a courtyard, it poses no difficulty to Ulla’s opinion.
רב פפא אמר דעת אחרת מקנה אותן שאני Rav Pappa said: Even if Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva acquired the tithes by means of a courtyard, this poses no difficulty to Ulla’s opinion. Since the tithes were not ownerless items, but rather another mind, i.e., Rabban Gamliel, transferred their ownership to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva, it is different, and the recipients did not need to stand next to the courtyard.
ומנא תימרא דתנן ראה אותן רצין אחר המציאה כו' ואמר רבי ירמיה אמר רבי יוחנן והוא שרץ אחריהן ומגיען ובעי רבי ירמיה במתנה היאך קבלה מיניה רבי אבא בר כהנא אע"פ שרץ אחריהן ואין מגיען מאי טעמא לאו משום דדעת אחרת מקנה אותן שאני And from where do you state this distinction? As we learned in the mishna: If one saw people running after a found ownerless animal, and said: My field has effected acquisition of this animal for me, it has effected acquisition of it for him. And Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that this halakha is true only in a case where he would be able to run after them and catch them. And Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: Does one acquire animals that are given to him as a gift in such a scenario? Rabbi Abba bar Kahana accepted the premise of the dilemma of Rabbi Yirmeya, and ruled that in the case of a gift one acquires the animals even if he would not be able to run after them and catch them. What is the reason for this distinction? Is it not because when another mind transfers their ownership, the halakha is different, in that the courtyard effects acquisition of the items with fewer limitations? This supports Rav Pappa’s explanation.
אמר ליה רב שימי לרב פפא הרי גט דדעת אחרת מקנה אותה ואמר עולא והוא שעומדת בצד ביתה או בצד חצרה שאני גט דאיתיה בעל כרחה Rav Shimi said to Rav Pappa: But what about the case of a bill of divorce, where another mind, the husband, transfers its ownership to the wife, and nevertheless Ulla says with regard to one who threw a bill of divorce into his wife’s house or courtyard: But it is a valid divorce only if she is standing next to her house or next to her courtyard? Rav Pappa responded: A bill of divorce is different, as it is possible to give it to one’s wife even against her will.
מתקיף לה רב ששת בריה דרב אידי ולאו קל וחומר הוא ומה גט דאיתיה בעל כרחה אי עומדת בצד ביתה ובצד חצרה אין אי לא לא מתנה דמדעתיה לא כל שכן Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, objects to this response: But is it not an a fortiori inference? If in the case of a bill of divorce, which is valid even if it is given to the wife against her will, nevertheless if she is standing next to her house or next to her courtyard she does acquire the bill of divorce, and if not she does not acquire it, then in the case of a gift, which one can receive only willingly, is it not all the more so correct that the recipient must be next to his courtyard for the transaction to take effect?
אלא אמר רב אשי Rather, Rav Ashi said that the distinction between the cases of a gift and a bill of divorce should be explained as follows: