יתירא הוא כיון דיתירא הוא שדייה אריחים ורכב is superfluous and therefore includes other utensils as well. Since it is superfluous, apply it as another prohibition upon the lower and upper millstones.
אבל הכא כי אם צלי אש לאו יתירא הוא דמבעי ליה לכדתניא בשעה שישנו בקום אכול צלי ישנו (שמות יב, ט) בבל תאכל נא בשעה שאינו בקום אכול צלי אינו בבל תאכל נא But here, with regard to the Paschal offering, the phrase “but roasted with fire” is not superfluous, as he requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: At the time when one is included in the mitzva to arise and eat the roasted Paschal offering, he is also included in the prohibition not to eat of it raw, but at a time when one is not included in the mitzva to arise and eat the roasted Paschal offering, he is not included in the prohibition not to eat of it raw either. Consequently, one who eats the Paschal offering at that time is not liable to receive lashes.
תניא כוותיה דרב יהודה חבל זוג של ספרים וצמד של פרות חייב שתים זה בעצמו וזה בעצמו אינו חייב אלא אחת § The Gemara returns to the dispute concerning the lower and upper millstones. It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda: If one took as collateral barbers’ scissors [zog] or a pair of cows, he is liable to receive two sets of lashes. If he took this one blade of the pair of scissors by itself or that one cow by itself, he is liable to receive only one set of lashes. According to this tanna, he is not liable for the general prohibition.
ותניא אידך חבל זוג של ספרים וצמד של פרות יכול לא יהא חייב אלא אחת ת"ל (דברים כד, ו) לא יחבול ריחים ורכב מה ריחים ורכב שהן מיוחדין שני כלים ועושין מלאכה אחת וחייב על זה בפני עצמו ועל זה בפני עצמו אף כל דברים שהן שני כלים מיוחדים ועושין מלאכה אחת חייב על זה בפני עצמו ועל זה בפני עצמו And it is taught in another baraita: If one took as collateral barbers’ scissors or a pair of cows, one might have thought that he is liable to receive only one set of lashes. Therefore, the verse states: “He may not take as collateral the lower or upper millstone,” which indicates that just as the lower and upper millstones are unique in that they are two distinct vessels and they perform one task together, and nevertheless one is liable separately for this and separately for that, so too, with regard to all items that are composed of two individual vessels, such as barbers’ scissors or a pair of cows, and they perform one task, he is liable separately for this and separately for that.
ההוא גברא דחבל סכינא דאשכבתא מחבריה אתא לקמיה דאביי א"ל זיל אהדריה דהוי ליה כלי שעושים בו אוכל נפש ותא קום בדינא עלה רבא אמר לא צריך למיקם בדינא עלה ויכול לטעון עד כדי דמיהן § The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who took as collateral a slaughtering knife from another. He came before Abaye to ask him what to do. Abaye said to him: Go and return it, as it is a vessel used in the preparation of food, and it is therefore forbidden to take as collateral, and go stand in judgment, i.e., litigate with the debtor in court, concerning how much money he owes you. Rava said: He does not have to stand in judgment for this. Since the knife is in his possession, he can claim the amount of the debt up to its value.
ואביי לית ליה ההיא סברא מאי שנא מהנהו עיזי דאכלי חושלא בנהרדעא ואתא מרא דחושלא ותפס להו וקא טעין טובא ואמר אבוה דשמואל יכול לטעון עד כדי דמיהן The Gemara asks: And does Abaye not accept that reasoning, that one who seized an item belonging to a debtor may claim the sum owed to him up to the value of the item? In what way is it different from the incident involving those goats that ate peeled barley [ḥushla] in Neharde’a, and the owner of the peeled barley came and seized the goats and claimed that their owner was indebted to him for a large amount, and Shmuel’s father, who acted as a judge in this case, said that he can claim a sum up to their value?
התם לאו מידי דעבדא לאושולי ולאוגורי הוא הכא מידי דעביד לאושולי ולאוגורי הוא דשלח רב הונא בר אבין דברים העשויין להשאיל ולהשכיר ואמר לקוחין הן בידי אינו נאמן The Gemara answers that there is a difference between the two cases: There, a goat is an item that is not usually lent out or rented. Consequently, the one who possesses them has a presumptive right of ownership upon which he can base his claim. Conversely, here, the slaughtering knife is an item that is usually lent out or rented. Therefore, he is not deemed credible without proof that it is his merely by virtue of its being in his possession. The Gemara supports this distinction: As Rav Huna bar Avin sent the following ruling: In a case of items that are usually lent out or rented, and one in possession of them says: They were acquired by me, he is not deemed credible by this claim alone. He must provide further proof, as he might have borrowed or rented them.
ורבא לית ליה האי סברא והא רבא אפיק זוגא דסרבלא וספרא דאגדתא מיתמי בדברים העשויין להשאיל ולהשכיר אמר לך רבא האי נמי כיון דמיפגמא קפדי אינשי ולא מושלי: The Gemara asks: And does Rava not accept this reasoning? But didn’t Rava himself remove scissors used for wool and a scroll of aggada from the possession of orphans as items that are usually lent out or rented? The Gemara answers: Rava could have said to you: With regard to this slaughtering knife too, since it is likely to be damaged, people are particular and do not lend it out. Therefore, it is not considered an item that is typically lent out, and the one in possession of it can claim the money owed to him up to the value of the knife.
הדרן עלך המקבל