רישא בעל גמל חייב דלא איבעי ליה לאפושי בטעינה סיפא חנווני חייב דלא איבעי ליה לאנוחי נרו מאבראי Consequently, in the first clause, the owner of the camel is liable, as he should not have overloaded the camel with flax to such a degree that it extended out so far from the sides that it could catch fire and ignite the store. But in the latter clause, the storekeeper is liable, as he should not have placed the lamp outside.
תא שמע המדליק את הגדיש והיה גדי כפות לו ועבד סמוך לו ונשרף עמו חייב עבד כפות לו וגדי סמוך לו ונשרף עמו פטור The Gemara attempts again to resolve the dispute: Come and hear a mishna (61b): With regard to one who ignites a stack of grain, and there was a goat tied to the stack, and there was also a Canaanite slave adjacent to it who was not tied to it, and both the goat and the slave were burned together with the stack of grain and killed, the one who ignited the fire is liable to pay compensation for both the stack and the goat, but he is exempt from paying for the slave because the slave should have run from the fire. Conversely, if the slave was tied to the stack and there was a goat adjacent to it that was not tied to it, and the slave and the goat were burned together with the stack of grain, the one who ignited the fire is completely exempt from payment for damage because he is liable to receive capital punishment for murder, and he is punished only for the greater transgression.
בשלמא למ"ד אשו משום חציו משום הכי פטור אלא למאן דאמר אשו משום ממונו אמאי פטור אילו קטל תוריה עבדא הכי נמי דלא מיחייב The Gemara clarifies: Granted, according to the one who says that one’s liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows, due to that reasoning he is exempt for the damage to the stack of grain in the second case, because it is as if he killed the slave with his arrows and consequently became subject to receive court-imposed capital punishment, and one who is subject to the death penalty is not liable to pay monetary compensation for the same act, as he receives the greater punishment of the two. But according to the one who says that liability for damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his property, why is he exempt? If his ox, which is his possession, were to kill a slave, would he also not be liable to pay for the damage?
אמר לך רבי שמעון בן לקיש הכא במאי עסקינן כשהצית בגופו של עבד דקם ליה בדרבה מיניה The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could have said to you: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he lit the body of the slave on fire, consequently becoming subject to the death penalty as would anyone who kills a slave, and therefore he receives the greater punishment, the death penalty, but he does not also have to pay for the damage.
אי הכי מאי למימרא לא צריכא בגדי דחד ועבד דחד The Gemara asks: If that is so, what is the purpose of stating this; what novel idea is it supposed to teach? One who lit a slave on fire is most certainly a murderer, and a murderer is exempt from paying for damage caused while committing the murder. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha for the case where the goat belonged to one person and the slave belonged to a different person; in that case one might have thought that since payment is due to someone other than the owner of the murdered slave, he would be required to pay the owner of the goat, despite being subject to the death penalty for killing the slave. Therefore, this mishna teaches that since he committed one act, for which he is liable to receive the death penalty, he is exempt from paying compensation to anyone as a result of that act.
ת"ש השולח את הבעירה ביד חרש שוטה וקטן פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים The Gemara attempts another resolution: Come and hear a mishna (59b): One who sends a fire, i.e., places a burning object, in the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor is exempt for any damage later caused by the fire according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven, meaning that he would not be held liable in court, but nevertheless he remains responsible to pay for what he has done.
בשלמא למ"ד אשו משום חציו חציו דחרש הוא אלא למאן דאמר אשו משום ממונו אילו מסר שורו לחרש שוטה וקטן הכי נמי דלא מיחייב The Gemara clarifies: Granted, according to the one who says that one’s liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows, this case is similar to the damage caused by the arrows of a deaf-mute or an imbecile or a minor, and this is why the one who gave them the fire is exempt from liability. But according to the one who says that one’s liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his property, if he were to convey his ox to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, would he also not be liable? That is impossible, as there is an explicit statement in a baraita (10a) saying that he would be liable.
הא אתמר עלה אמר ריש לקיש משמיה דחזקיה לא שנו אלא כשמסר לו גחלת וליבה אבל מסר לו שלהבת חייב מאי טעמא ברי היזיקא The Gemara answers: But it was stated already about this that Reish Lakish says in the name of Ḥizkiyya: They taught that one is exempt from the damage caused by a fire that he had entrusted in the care of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor only in a case where he conveyed a coal to him and the deaf-mute fanned the coal into a flame, which then caused damage. But if he conveyed an open flame to him and it caused damage, the one who gave him the flame is liable. What is the reason for this? This is because the damage is self-evident, i.e., it is clear that damage will ensue, and it is as if he placed a goring ox under his care. Therefore, if one’s liability for damage classified as Fire is due to its similarity to damage caused by one’s property, he would be liable in this case.
ורבי יוחנן אמר אפילו שלהבת פטור קסבר צבתא דחרש קא גרים לא מיחייב עד דמסר ליה גווזא סילתא ושרגא And Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that one’s liability for damage caused by fire is due to its similarity to one’s arrows, says that he is exempt even if he conveyed an open flame to him, because he holds that it is the deaf-mute’s handling of the flame that causes the blaze, and it is therefore not similar to a case of arrows shot; the one who conveys a fire to the deaf-mute does not become liable for the damage until he hands the deaf-mute chopped wood, kindling chips, and a lamp, as in that case, the damage that will ensue is self-evident and it is as if he started the blaze himself.
אמר רבא קרא ומתניתא מסייע ליה לרבי יוחנן קרא דכתיב (שמות כב, ה) כי תצא אש תצא מעצמה ישלם המבעיר את הבערה ש"מ אשו משום חציו Rava said: A verse and a baraita both support Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion. The verse supporting his opinion is as it is written: “If fire breaks out” (Exodus 22:5), indicating that the fire breaks out on its own; yet the verse continues, “the one who ignited the fire shall pay,” indicating that the fire was ignited by a person. Conclude from the verse that one’s liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to damage caused by his arrows, as the resolution of the apparent inconsistency in the verse is that it relates to the individual as if he had himself started the blaze, and that is why he is obligated to pay for the damage.
מתניתא דתניא פתח הכתוב The baraita supporting his opinion is as it is taught: The verse concerning liability for a fire opened