פירקן והכניסן לתוך ביתו פסק עד שלא מדד אין שניהן יכולין לחזור בהן מדד עד שלא פסק שניהן יכולין לחזור בהן ומדכליו דמוכר ברשות לוקח לא קנה כליו דלוקח נמי ברשות מוכר לא קנה
But in a case where he unloaded the merchandise from them and brought it into his house, if he fixed a price before he measured the merchandise, both parties are no longer able to renege on the sale. If he measured the merchandise before fixing a price, both of them are able to renege on the sale. The Gemara comments: And from the fact that the vessels of the seller when in the domain of the buyer do not effect acquisition of the merchandise for the seller, i.e., they do not prevent the buyer from acquiring the merchandise, one can derive that the vessels of the buyer in the domain of the seller do not effect acquisition of the merchandise on his behalf as well.
אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק בששפכן איקפד רבא מידי שפכן קתני פירקן קתני אלא אמר מר בר רב אשי במתאכלי דתומי
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The merchandise was not placed in the domain of the buyer in vessels belonging to the seller. Rather, the baraita is referring to a case where he emptied the vessels onto the ground. Conversely, if the merchandise remains in the seller’s vessels, the buyer does not acquire it. Rava became angry with Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak at his rejection of Rava’s proof, and retorted: Does the baraita teach: He emptied them? No; it teaches: He unloaded them, i.e., he kept the goods in vessels belonging to the seller. Rather, Mar bar Rav Ashi says: This proof can be rejected by means of a different interpretation, as the halakha of the baraita does not refer to vessels full of goods but is stated with regard to bundles of garlic that were tied together. Therefore, they are unloaded straight onto the floor in the buyer’s domain.
א"ל הונא בריה דמר זוטרא לרבינא מכדי פירקן קתני מה לי פסק ומה לי לא פסק א"ל פסק סמכא דעתיה לא פסק לא סמכא דעתיה
With regard to the matter itself, Huna, son of Mar Zutra, said to Ravina: Since the baraita teaches: He unloaded them, which indicates that unloading the merchandise constitutes the act of acquisition, what difference is there to me if he fixed a price, and what difference is there to me if he did not fix a price? Ravina said to him: If he fixed a price he has made up his mind to sell, and therefore the transaction can take place. If he did not fix a price, he has not made up his mind to sell and the transaction does not occur. In any event, no convincing proof has been found with regard to the halakha in a case where the vessels of the buyer are in the domain of the seller.
א"ל רבינא לרב אשי ת"ש דרב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו כליו של אדם קונה לו בכל מקום לאתויי מאי לאו לאתויי רשות מוכר התם דא"ל זיל קני
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a resolution, as Rav and Shmuel both say: A person’s vessel effects acquisition for him of any item placed inside it, in any place that it is situated. What is added by the phrase: In any place? Does it not serve to add the domain of the seller? Rav Ashi answered: There, it is referring to a specific case, where the seller said to him: Go and acquire it. In that situation, the buyer does acquire the merchandise. This does not refer to a standard case where the buyer’s vessels are located in the domain of the seller.
תנן התם נכסים שיש להן אחריות נקנין בכסף ובשטר ובחזקה ושאין להן אחריות אין נקנין אלא במשיכה בסורא מתנו לה להא שמעתא משמיה דרב חסדא בפומבדיתא מתנו לה משמיה דרב כהנא ואמרי לה משמיה דרבא לא שנו אלא דברים שאין דרכן להגביה אבל דברים שדרכן להגביה בהגבהה אין במשיכה לא
§ We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Kiddushin 26a): Property that is guaranteed, i.e., land, is acquired by means of money, or by means of a bill, or by taking possession of it. And property that does not have a guarantee, i.e., movable property, can be acquired only by means of pulling. In Sura they taught this following halakha in the name of Rav Ḥisda, while in Pumbedita they taught it in the name of Rav Kahana, and some say in the name of Rava: They taught that movable property is acquired by means of pulling only with regard to items that are not typically lifted due to their weight or for some other reason. But in the case of items that are typically lifted, then yes, they are acquired by means of lifting, but they are not acquired by means of pulling.
יתיב אביי וקאמר להא שמעתא איתיביה רב אדא בר מתנה לאביי הגונב כיס בשבת חייב שכבר נתחייב בגניבה קודם שיבא לידי איסור שבת
Abaye sat and related this halakha. Rav Adda bar Mattana raised an objection to Abaye from a baraita: One who steals a purse on Shabbat is liable for theft. Based on the principle that one who is liable to receive two punishments receives only the greater of the two, in this case one might think that he should be exempt from paying for the theft, as the performance of a prohibited labor on Shabbat is punishable by death. The reason he is liable in this case, in apparent contradiction to that principle, is that he already became liable for the theft as soon as he lifted the purse. This occurred before he came to violate the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat by carrying the purse into the public domain.
היה מגרר ויוצא מגרר ויוצא פטור שהרי איסור שבת וגניבה באין כאחד
The baraita continues: If he did not lift the purse but was dragging it on the ground and exiting the private domain, continuously dragging and exiting, he is exempt, as the prohibition of performing labor on Shabbat and the prohibition of theft are violated simultaneously the moment he drags the purse out of the owner’s property into the public domain. Therefore, he receives only the greater punishment, death, for carrying on Shabbat.
והרי כיס דבר הגבהה הוא ואפילו הכי קני במשיכה א"ל במיתנא אנא נמי במיתנא קא אמינא א"ל במידי דבעי מיתנא
Rav Adda bar Mattana explains his objection: But a purse is an item that can be lifted, and even so it is apparent from the baraita that one acquires it by means of pulling. How then can it be stated that items that are typically lifted are not acquired by pulling? Abaye said to him: The baraita is referring to a case where the thief pulled the purse with a rope. Rav Adda bar Mattana thought that Abaye meant that the thief happened to drag it with a rope, and he responded: I also state my question even in a case where he pulled the purse with a rope, as it is still evident that one can acquire the purse by means of pulling instead of lifting. Abaye said to him: I meant that the baraita is referring to an item that requires a rope. It is a purse that is so large that it cannot be lifted and must be pulled, therefore it is acquired by means of pulling.
תא שמע ברשות מוכר לא קנה עד שיגביהנה או עד שיוציאנה מרשותו אלמא מידי דבר הגבהה אי בעי בהגבהה קני ליה ואי בעי במשיכה קני ליה אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק לצדדין קתני מידי דבר הגבהה בהגבהה מידי דבר משיכה במשיכה
The Gemara raises another objection. Come and hear: If the merchandise is in the domain of the seller, the buyer does not acquire the merchandise until he lifts it or until he removes it from the domain of the seller. Apparently, with regard to an item that can be lifted, if he so desires he acquires it by lifting, and if he so desires he acquires it by pulling. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This is not a proof, as it can be explained that the tanna teaches it disjunctively, i.e., the two options are referring to two different cases: In the case of an item that can be lifted, he acquires it by lifting, whereas with regard to regard to an item that can be pulled, he acquires it by pulling.