ואחת שיחד לה בכתובתה ואחת שהכניסה לו שום משלה
and one that he specified to her as payment for her marriage contract, even though it was not stipulated explicitly in the contract; and one in a case where she brought into the marriage an appraisal of a field from her own property that she owned prior to the marriage, which took on the status of guaranteed property, meaning that she will receive it if her husband dies or divorces her. If a field of one of these three types is sold with her approval, she can claim that she did not truly consent to this sale, but stated her consent only in order to please her husband.
למעוטי מאי אילימא למעוטי שאר נכסים כל שכן דהויא ליה איבה דאמר לה עיניך נתת בגירושין ובמיתה
The Gemara clarifies: To exclude what type of property did Rabba specify these three types of fields? If we say that he intends to exclude the rest of the husband’s property secured to pay her marriage contract, it is all the more so the case that he will bear her enmity if she does not agree to the sale, as he will say to her: You have placed your eyes on divorce or on my death, i.e., you will not allow me to sell my property because you are expecting and planning for my death or our divorce. Therefore, she should be able to claim that she consented to the sale only in order to please her husband with regard to other property as well.
אלא למעוטי נכסי מלוג האמר אמימר איש ואשה שמכרו בנכסי מלוג לא עשו ולא כלום
Rather, these three types of fields were specified in order to exclude usufruct property, i.e., property that belongs to the wife and remains in her possession while the husband has the right to enjoy the profits, in which case if the wife consents to the sale, it is valid. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Ameimar say that if there was a man or a woman, i.e., a husband or a wife, who sold the wife’s usufruct property, they did not accomplish anything, as the sale does not take effect?
כי איתמר דאמימר היכא דזבין איהו ומית אתיא איהי ומפקא א"נ זבנה איהי ומתה אתא איהו ומפיק בתקנתא דרבנן וכדר' יוסי בר חנינא דאמר רבי יוסי בר חנינא באושא התקינו האשה שמכרה בנכסי מלוג ומתה הבעל מוציא מיד הלקוחות
The Gemara answers: When the statement of Ameimar was stated, it was to say that neither the husband nor the wife can sell the property unilaterally. Where he sold the property and then died, she can come and remove it from the buyer. Alternatively, in a case where she sold it and then died, he can come and remove it, due to a rabbinic ordinance, and in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, as Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: When the Sanhedrin convened in Usha, they instituted that in the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property in her husband’s lifetime and then died, the husband repossesses it from the buyers.
אבל היכא דזבינו תרוייהו לעלמא א"נ זבנה איהי לדידיה זבינה זביני
But where the two of them sold it to someone, or if she sold it to her husband, the sale is valid. The inference that the Gemara drew from the mishna, that if the husband produces evidence that his wife sold usufruct property to him then he is regarded as the owner, is relevant when she sells her usufruct property to him.
ואיבעית אימא אמימר דאמר כר' אלעזר
And if you wish, say instead that Ameimar said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who holds that one can sell property only if he possesses the item itself and also has the right to enjoy its profits.
דתניא המוכר את עבדו ופסק עמו שישמשנו שלשים יום
This is as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who sells his Canaanite slave to another, and contracted with him that the sale is on the condition that the slave will serve the seller for thirty days before he is transferred to the buyer, the outcome of this sale is that during those thirty days, the first master enjoys the use of the slave and the buyer is the owner of the slave himself. As detailed in the Torah (Exodus 21:18–21), if one strikes another and the injury leads directly to the victim’s death, the one who struck him is subject to court-imposed capital punishment. But if a master strikes his Canaanite slave, and the slave lingers with his injuries for more than a day or two days and then dies, the master is exempt from court-imposed capital punishment. The baraita addresses who is considered the owner of the slave with regard to this halakha.
ר' מאיר אומר הראשון ישנו בדין יום או יומים מפני שהוא תחתיו והשני אינו בדין יום או יומים מפני שאינו תחתיו
The baraita states four opinions: Rabbi Meir says that during those thirty days, only the first master is included in the halakha of “a day or two days” (Exodus 21:21). Rabbi Meir holds that in this case, the first master is included in this exemption, because the slave is under his authority, as he enjoys the use of the slave, but the second master is not included in the halakha of “a day or two days,” because the slave is not under his authority.
קסבר קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי
Rabbi Meir’s reasoning is that he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is like ownership of the item itself. The status of the first master as the owner negates the possibility that the second master would be regarded as the owner with regard to this halakha, and he would not be included in the exemption.
ר' יהודה אומר השני ישנו בדין יום או יומים מפני שהוא כספו הראשון אינו בדין יום או יומים שאינו כספו קסבר קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי
The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda says that the second master is included in the halakha of “a day or two days,” because the slave is “his money” (Exodus 21:21), i.e., his property; but the first master is not included in the halakha of “a day or two days,” because the slave is not “his money.” Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is that he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not like ownership of the item itself. Therefore, the first master, who currently enjoys the use of the slave, does not have the status of an owner with regard to this halakha.
ר' יוסי אומר
The baraita continues: Rabbi Yosei says that