נַחֲלָה הַבָּאָה לוֹ לְאָדָם מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר אָדָם מַתְנֶה עָלֶיהָ שֶׁלֹּא יִירָשֶׁנָּה וְכִדְרָבָא דְּאָמַר רָבָא כׇּל הָאוֹמֵר אִי אֶפְשִׁי בְּתַקָּנַת חֲכָמִים כְּגוֹן זֹאת שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ With regard to an inheritance that comes to a person from another place, i.e., an inheritance one will receive in the future, a person can make a condition about it from the outset that he will not inherit it, since one can waive his future rights to property that is not currently his. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as Rava said that with regard to anyone who says: I do not want to avail myself of an ordinance of the Sages such as this one that was instituted for my benefit, one listens to him.
מַאי כְּגוֹן זֹאת כִּדְרַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב יְכוֹלָה אִשָּׁה שֶׁתֹּאמַר לְבַעְלָהּ אֵינִי נִיזּוֹנֶת וְאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה The Gemara asks: What is meant by: Such as this one? The Gemara explains: Rava is referring to that statement of Rav Huna, who said that Rav says a certain ruling. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: A woman can say to her husband: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings. The Sages instituted that a husband must provide sustenance for his wife, and in exchange is entitled to her wages. Since this was instituted for the benefit of wives, the wife is able to opt out of this arrangement. Similarly, the husband may waive his rights to the profits from his wife’s land. It is in such a circumstance that the mishna rules that even if he relinquished his rights, he does not establish the presumption of ownership by enjoying the profits.
הָא רְאָיָה יֵשׁ תֵּימָא נַחַת רוּחַ עָשִׂיתִי לְבַעְלִי § The mishna teaches that a husband does not establish the presumption of ownership of his wife’s field by enjoying its profits. The Gemara suggests: By inference, the husband has the ability to bring proof that he purchased the field from his wife or received it as a gift from her and consequently be regarded as the owner of the field. The Gemara asks: Why is this proof decisive? Let her say: I did it, i.e., I gave or sold the field to my husband, only to please my husband, but I did not mean it.
מִי לָא תְּנַן לָקַח מִן הָאִישׁ וְחָזַר וְלָקַח מִן הָאִשָּׁה מִקָּחוֹ בָּטֵל אַלְמָא אָמְרָה נַחַת רוּחַ עָשִׂיתִי לְבַעְלִי הָכָא נָמֵי תֵּימָא נַחַת רוּחַ עָשִׂיתִי לְבַעְלִי The Gemara quotes a source for this claim: Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Gittin 55b): If one first purchased land from the husband and afterward returned and purchased it from the wife, i.e., he purchased her rights to this land for after the death of her husband or in the event of their divorce, as stipulated in her marriage contract, then his transaction is void. Apparently, she said: I did it, i.e., signed this bill of sale, only to please my husband, but I did not mean it. Here too let her say: I did it only to please my husband but did not mean to give or sell the field to him.
הָא אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא בְּאוֹתָן שָׁלֹשׁ שָׂדוֹת אַחַת שֶׁכָּתַב לָהּ בִּכְתוּבָּתָהּ The Gemara answers: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rabba bar Rav Huna says: The halakha that a woman can claim that she acted only in order to please her husband is not stated with regard to all of her property, but is necessary only with regard to those three types of fields that have special status: One field about which he wrote to her in her marriage contract that it would serve as payment of her marriage contract;