בשדה סתם אבל בשדה זו לא
in a case where the seller was compelled to sell an unspecified field. Since he had a choice as to which field to sell, the presumption is that he sold it sincerely. But in a case where the one coercing him specified this specific field to be sold, the sale is not valid, as the seller did not decide freely on any aspect of the sale.
ובשדה זו נמי לא אמרן אלא דלא ארצי זוזי אבל ארצי זוזי לא
And even in a case where the one coercing him specified this specific field to be sold, we said that the sale is invalid only where the seller did not count [artzei] the money for the field, but if the seller did count the money, then we do not say that the sale is invalid.
ולא אמרן אלא דלא הוה לאישתמוטי אבל הוה ליה לאישתמוטי לא
And we said that the sale is invalid in the case of a specified field when money was not counted only where the seller had no way to avoid the coercion. But if the seller had a way to avoid the coercion and did not avoid it, then we do not say that the sale is invalid.
והלכתא בכולהו דהוו זביניה זביני ואפילו בשדה זו דהא אשה כשדה זו דמיא ואמר אמימר תליוה וקדיש קדושיו קדושין
The Gemara concludes: And the halakha in all of these cases is that the sale is valid, and this is so even in the case of a specified field. This can be inferred because the case of a woman forced to accept betrothal is comparable to the case of a specified field, as a specific man is performing the betrothal, and Ameimar says: If a man suspended a woman and betrothed her, his betrothal is valid, despite the fact that she was coerced.
מר בר רב אשי אמר באשה ודאי קדושין לא הוו הוא עשה שלא כהוגן לפיכך עשו עמו שלא כהוגן ואפקעינהו רבנן לקידושיה מיניה
Mar bar Rav Ashi said: In the case of a woman who was forced to accept betrothal, the betrothal is certainly not valid. This man acted improperly; consequently, the Sages acted improperly with him, and the Sages expropriated her betrothal from him.
אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי תינח דקדיש בכספא קדיש בביאה מאי איכא למימר אמר ליה שויוה רבנן לבעילתו בעילת זנות
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This works out well in a case where he betrothed his wife with money, as it is possible to say that the Sages expropriated from the possession of its owner the money used for the betrothal, resulting in a retroactive cancellation of the betrothal. But if he betrothed her by means of sexual intercourse, then what is there to say? Rav Ashi said to him: The Sages deemed his sexual intercourse as licentious sexual intercourse, which does not create a bond of betrothal.
טאבי תלא לפאפי אכינרא וזבין חתם רבה בר בר חנה אמודעא ואאשקלתא אמר רב הונא מאן דחתים אמודעא שפיר חתים ומאן דחתים אאשקלתא שפיר חתים
§ The Gemara relates: Someone named Tavi suspended another person named Pafi on a kinara and compelled him to sell his field. Rabba bar bar Ḥana signed both on Pafi’s preemptive declaration nullifying the sale (see 40b) and on the bill of sale [ashkalta]. Rav Huna said: The one who signed on the preemptive declaration acted well by signing, and the one who signed on the bill of sale acted well by signing.
מה נפשך אי מודעא לא אשקלתא ואי אשקלתא לא מודעא הכי קאמר אי לאו מודעא מאן דחתים אאשקלתא שפיר חתים רב הונא לטעמיה דאמר רב הונא תליוהו וזבין זביניה זביני
The Gemara challenges: Whichever way you look at it, Rav Huna’s statement is problematic. If the preemptive declaration is valid, then there is no place for a bill of sale. And if the bill of sale is valid, then there is no place for a preemptive declaration. How can Rav Huna commend signing on both of these mutually exclusive documents? The Gemara explains: This is what Rav Huna is saying: If it were not for his also having signed the preemptive declaration, the one who signed on the bill of sale acted well by signing. In this statement, Rav Huna conforms to his line of reasoning, as Rav Huna says: If one was suspended and thereby coerced to sell a certain item and he sold it, his sale is valid.
איני והא"ר נחמן העדים שאמרו אמנה היו דברינו
The Gemara asks: Is that so that Rabba bar bar Ḥana can, by means of the preemptive declaration, invalidate the bill of sale that he himself signed? But doesn’t Rav Naḥman say: With regard to witnesses who said: Our statement that we signed was a document of trust, i.e., a false promissory note given by one person to another, trusting that he will not make use of it until there is an actual loan,