יַקְרִיב אֹתוֹ מְלַמֵּד שֶׁכּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ יָכוֹל בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר לִרְצוֹנוֹ הָא כֵּיצַד כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר רוֹצֶה אֲנִי With regard to one who pledges to bring a burnt-offering, the verse states: “If his offering be a burnt-offering of the herd, he shall offer it a male without blemish; he shall bring it to the door of the Tent of Meeting, according to his will, before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:3). The seemingly superfluous phrase “he shall offer it” teaches that they can coerce him to bring the offering. One might have thought that it can be offered entirely against his will, by taking it from his possession and sacrificing it. Therefore, the verse states: “According to his will” (Leviticus 1:3). How can these texts be reconciled? They coerce him with various punishments until he says: I want to bring the offering. This seems to prove that consent resulting from coercion is considered to be valid consent. Perhaps this principle can apply to acquisition, as a source for Rav Huna’s ruling.
וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּתִיהְוֵי לֵיהּ כַּפָּרָה וְאֶלָּא מִסֵּיפָא וְכֵן אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בְּגִיטֵּי נָשִׁים כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר רוֹצֶה אֲנִי The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps there it is different, since he is in fact amenable to achieving atonement, despite his earlier statement to the contrary. But rather, prove Rav Huna’s ruling from the latter clause of a mishna (Arakhin 21a): And similarly you find this halakha with bills of divorce, that when the court rules that he must divorce his wife, they coerce him until he says: I want to divorce my wife.
וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּמִצְוָה לִשְׁמוֹעַ דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים אֶלָּא סְבָרָא הוּא אַגַּב אוּנְסֵיהּ גָּמַר וּמַקְנֵה The Gemara rejects this proof as well: But perhaps there it is different, because it is a mitzva to listen to the statement of the Sages. The assumption is that when he is required by the court to divorce his wife, his real desire is to perform the mitzva of listening to the Sages, and therefore he actually wants to divorce her. This does not apply to the case of a transaction performed under duress. Rather, Rav Huna’s ruling does not have a source in a mishna or baraita, but is based on logical reasoning: By means of his being coerced, the seller then willingly decides to sell the field and transfers it.
מוֹתֵיב רַב יְהוּדָה גֵּט הַמְעוּשֶּׂה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל כָּשֵׁר וּבְגוֹיִם פָּסוּל וּבְגוֹיִם חוֹבְטִין אוֹתוֹ וְאוֹמְרִין לוֹ עֲשֵׂה מַה שֶּׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל אוֹמֵר לָךְ וְאַמַּאי הָתָם נָמֵי נֵימָא אַגַּב אוּנְסֵיהּ גָּמַר וּמְגָרֵשׁ Rav Yehuda raises an objection to Rav Huna’s ruling from a mishna (Gittin 88b): With regard to a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled by the court to write and give his wife, if he was compelled by a Jewish court it is valid, but if he was compelled by gentiles it is not valid. And with regard to gentiles, they may beat him at the request of the Jewish court and say to him: Do what the Jews are telling you, and the divorce would then be valid. The Gemara asks: But why is a bill of divorce compelled by a gentile court invalid? There too, let us say that as a result of his coercion, the husband decides to do what the court says and divorces her.
הָא אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא דְּבַר תּוֹרָה אֲפִילּוּ בְּגוֹיִם כָּשֵׁר וּמַה טַּעַם אָמְרוּ בְּגוֹיִים פָּסוּל כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת הוֹלֶכֶת וְתוֹלָה עַצְמָהּ בְּיַד גּוֹי וּמַפְקַעַת עַצְמָהּ מִיַּד בַּעְלָהּ The Gemara answers: In fact that reasoning is correct, as for this reason wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rav Mesharshiyya says: By Torah law a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled to give, even if he was compelled by gentiles, is valid. And what is the reason the Sages said that if it is compelled by gentiles it is not valid? It is so that each and every woman will not go and through temptation or bribery depend on a gentile to compel her husband to divorce her, and thereby release herself from her husband illegitimately.
מוֹתֵיב רַב הַמְנוּנָא לָקַח מִסִּיקָרִיקוֹן וְחָזַר וְלָקַח מִבַּעַל הַבַּיִת מִקָּחוֹ בָּטֵל וְאַמַּאי הָתָם נָמֵי נֵימָא אַגַּב אוּנְסֵיהּ גְּמַר וּמַקְנֵי Rav Hamnuna raises an objection to Rav Huna’s ruling from a mishna (Gittin 55b): If one purchased land from a Sicarius and afterward returned and purchased the same field from the prior owner, his purchase is void, as the prior owner of the field can say that he did not actually intend to sell the field to this buyer. But why is the sale invalid? There too, let us say that by means of his being coerced, the seller then willingly decides to sell the field and transfers it.
הָא אִתְּמַר עֲלַהּ אָמַר רַב לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ לֵךְ חֲזֵק וּקְנִי אֲבָל בִּשְׁטָר קָנָה The Gemara answers: In fact that reasoning is correct, as it was stated with regard to that mishna that Rav says: They taught that the purchase from the prior owner after the purchase from a Sicarius is void only when the prior owner said to the buyer at the time of the sale: Go take possession and thereby acquire the field, but did not write a bill of sale. But if the transaction was performed along with a bill of sale being given, the buyer acquires the field.
וְלִשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמַר אַף בִּשְׁטָר נָמֵי לֹא קָנָה מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר מוֹדֶה שְׁמוּאֵל הֵיכָא דִּיהַב זוּזֵי The Gemara asks: And according to Shmuel, who says: He does not acquire the field even if the transaction was performed along with a bill of sale being given, what can be said? The Gemara answers: Shmuel concedes that the sale is valid where the buyer gave money for the field even though the owner sold it under duress, as is the case in the ruling of Rav Huna.
וּלְרַב בִּיבִי דִּמְסַיֵּים בַּהּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן קַרְקַע אֵין לוֹ מָעוֹת יֵשׁ לוֹ מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר רַב בִּיבִי מֵימְרָא הוּא וּמֵימְרָא לְרַב הוּנָא לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Beivai, who concludes that statement of Rav Huna with a comment in the name of Rav Naḥman: The robber does not have rights to the land, but he does have rights to the money that he paid for the land, and the owner has to reimburse him, what can be said? Rav Beivai, who is referring to a case where there was a payment, as the robber is being reimbursed, seems to hold that the sale is invalid even where the robber paid for the field. The Gemara answers: The statement of Rav Beivai is an amoraic statement, not a citation of a tannaitic ruling, and Rav Huna, who is also an amora, does not hold in accordance with that amoraic statement.
אָמַר רָבָא הִלְכְתָא תַּלְיוּהוּ וְזַבֵּין זְבִינֵיהּ זְבִינֵי וְלָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא Rava says: The halakha is that if one was suspended and thereby coerced to sell a certain item, and he sold it, his sale is valid. And we said that this is the halakha only