בִּסְתָמָא דְּלָא מִשְׁתַּעְבְּדָא לֵיהּ מַאי טַעְמָא מִטַּלְטְלֵי נִינְהוּ וּמִטַּלְטְלֵי לְבַעַל חוֹב לָא מִשְׁתַּעְבְּדִי וְאַף עַל גַּב דִּכְתַב לֵיהּ מִגְּלִימָא דְּעַל כַּתְפֵּיהּ הָנֵי מִילֵּי דְּאִיתַנְהוּ בְּעֵינַיְיהוּ אֲבָל לֵיתַנְהוּ בְּעֵינַיְיהוּ לָא in a case where he sold a cow or cloak without specification, where it is not liened to the creditor. What is the reason for this? It is because these items are movable property, and movable property is not liened to a creditor. And even though it is so that the debtor wrote to the creditor that he can collect the debt even from the cloak that is on his shoulders, that matter applies only when it is as is and in the possession of the debtor, but if it is not as is, since it is in the possession of the buyer, then no, the creditor cannot collect from movable property. Therefore, the debtor can testify on behalf of the buyer.
אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ עֲשָׂאוֹ אַפּוֹתֵיקֵי נָמֵי לָא מַאי טַעְמָא כִּדְרָבָא דְּאָמַר רָבָא עָשָׂה עַבְדּוֹ אַפּוֹתֵיקֵי וּמְכָרוֹ בַּעַל חוֹב גּוֹבֶה מִמֶּנּוּ שׁוֹרוֹ וַחֲמוֹרוֹ אַפּוֹתֵיקֵי וּמְכָרוֹ אֵין בַּעַל חוֹב גּוֹבֶה הֵימֶנּוּ The Gemara continues: But even in a case where he set the cow or cloak aside as designated repayment [apoteiki], the creditor cannot collect from it. What is the reasoning? It is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: If a master set aside his slave as designated repayment of a debt and then sold him, the master’s creditor collects the debt from the proceeds from the sale of the slave. But if one set aside his ox or his donkey as designated repayment and then sold it, the creditor does not collect the debt from the proceeds of the sale of the ox or the donkey.
מַאי טַעְמָא הַאי אִית לֵיהּ קָלָא וְהָא לֵית לֵיהּ קָלָא What is the reason for this distinction? This setting aside of the slave as designated repayment generates publicity, and that setting aside of the ox or donkey as designated repayment does not generate publicity. Therefore, when the slave had been set aside as designated repayment, the buyer would have been aware of this. Since he bought the slave while having this knowledge, the slave can be seized from him by the seller’s creditor. By contrast, the buyer of the cow or cloak would not have been aware that it had been set aside as designated repayment, so the seller’s creditor cannot seize it from him.
וְלֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא אַקְנִי לֵיהּ מִטַּלְטְלֵי אַגַּב מְקַרְקְעֵי דְּאָמַר רַבָּה אִי אַקְנִי לֵיהּ מִטַּלְטְלֵי אַגַּב מְקַרְקְעֵי קָנֵי מְקַרְקְעֵי קָנֵי מִטַּלְטְלֵי וְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא וְהוּא דִּכְתַב לֵיהּ דְּלָא כְּאַסְמַכְתָּא וּדְלָא כְּטוּפְסָא דִשְׁטָרֵי The Gemara asks: But let there be a concern that perhaps the debtor transferred the movable property to the creditor, not for him to own, but for him to have a lien on the movable property, by means of, i.e., together with, an acquisition of land, as Rabba said: If the debtor transferred movable property to the creditor as liened property by means of an acquisition of land, the creditor acquires the land and acquires the movable property, i.e., a lien is created with regard to both. And Rav Ḥisda said: And that is the halakha only where the debtor wrote to the creditor: This lien is not like a transaction with inconclusive consent [ke’asmakhta], which does not effect acquisition, and not like the template [ketofesa] for documents, which are not actually used to collect debts. Rather, it is a legally binding document.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן כְּגוֹן שֶׁלָּקַח וּמָכַר לְאַלְתַּר The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the debtor had purchased the movable property and immediately sold it, and there was no opportunity for him to have it become liened to a creditor. Therefore, there is no possibility of his being biased in his testimony due to a desire to repay his debt.
וְלֵיחוּשׁ דִּילְמָא דְּאֶיקְנֵי הוּא שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ דְּאֶיקְנֵי קָנָה וּמָכַר קָנָה וְהוֹרִישׁ לֹא מִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד The Gemara asks: But let there be a concern that perhaps it is a case in which the debtor wrote to the creditor: I will repay you even from that which I will acquire in the future, which would presumably mean that the creditor can collect from the buyer even though the debtor purchased the item after taking the loan. From the fact that this is not a concern, do you learn from it that even if the debtor wrote: I will repay you even from that which I will acquire in the future, and he then purchased and sold property or purchased and bequeathed it, that which he purchases is not liened to his creditor? This would seem to settle what is otherwise assumed to be an unresolved question.
לָא צְרִיכָא דְּקָאָמְרִי עֵדִים יָדְעִינַן בֵּיהּ בְּהַאי דְּלָא הֲוָה לֵיהּ אַרְעָא מֵעוֹלָם The Gemara rejects this proof: No, one need not reach that conclusion, as it is necessary to teach the halakha in a case where witnesses say: We know about this one who sold these items that he never had any land. Therefore, it cannot be that the creditor acquired a lien on the movable property by means of an acquisition of land.
וְהָאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא אַף עַל גַּב דַּאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן הַמּוֹכֵר שָׂדֶה לַחֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בְּאַחְרָיוּת וּבָא בַּעַל חוֹב וּטְרָפָהּ אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר עָלָיו נִמְצֵאת שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁלּוֹ חוֹזֵר עָלָיו The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rav Pappa say that even though the Sages said: In the case of one who sells a field to another without a guarantee, and a creditor came and repossessed it, the buyer cannot return to the seller, i.e. the debtor, who sold him the field, to claim reimbursement; but if it is found that the field was not the seller’s in the first place, the buyer can return to the seller to claim reimbursement. In this case, if the claimant establishes that the cow or cloak is his and was not the seller’s, the buyer will be able to claim reimbursement. The seller is therefore biased in his testimony, and should not be able to testify on behalf of the buyer.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן בְּמַכִּיר בָּהּ שֶׁהִיא בַּת חֲמוֹרוֹ The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the buyer admits that he recognizes that this is the offspring of the seller’s donkey, and will not claim in court that the seller had no right to sell it.
וְרַב זְבִיד אָמַר אֲפִילּוּ נִמְצֵאת שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁלּוֹ אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר עָלָיו דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ לְהָכִי זַבֵּינִי לָךְ שֶׁלֹּא בְּאַחְרָיוּת The Gemara returns to the statement of Rav Pappa and comments: But in contrast to the opinion of Rav Pappa, Rav Zevid says: Even if it is found that the field was not the seller’s, the buyer cannot return to the seller to claim reimbursement, as the seller can say to the buyer: It is for this reason that I sold it to you without a guarantee, i.e., so that if it is taken from you, I will not bear liability.
גּוּפָא אָמַר רָבִין בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל הַמּוֹכֵר שָׂדֶה לַחֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בְּאַחְרָיוּת אֵין מֵעִיד לוֹ עָלֶיהָ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּעֲמִידָהּ בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל חוֹבוֹ הֵיכִי דָּמֵי § The Gemara returns to Shmuel’s statement, in order to examine the matter itself. Ravin bar Shmuel says in the name of Shmuel: One who sells a field to another even without a guarantee that if the field will be repossessed the seller will compensate the buyer for his loss cannot testify with regard to ownership of that field on behalf of the buyer, because he is establishing the field before his creditor. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this halakha?