בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁל כְּרָמִים דְּאִם אִיתָא דְּמֵעָלְמָא אָתֵי כֵּיוָן דְּמִידַּדֵּי לָא מָצֵי אָתֵי דְּכׇל דְּמִידַּדֵּי וַהֲדַר חָזֵי לֵיהּ לְקִינֵּיהּ מִידַּדֵּי וְאִי לָא לָא מִידַּדֵּי We are dealing with a path that passes between vineyards, and these two dovecotes are situated there. As, if it is so that you claim the chick came from anywhere else in the world, since it only hops, it could not have come there. The reason is that any bird that hops and turns and sees its nest will continue to hop; but if it does not see its nest because it has gone too far, it will not hop farther. Consequently, this found chick that hops must have come from one of these two dovecotes.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא דָּם שֶׁנִּמְצָא בַּפְּרוֹזְדוֹר סְפֵיקוֹ טָמֵא שֶׁחֶזְקָתוֹ מִן הַמָּקוֹר וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיכָּא עֲלִיָּיה דִּמְקָרְבָא Abaye said: We learn in a mishna (Nidda 17b) as well that one follows the majority rather than proximity: With regard to blood that is found in the corridor [baperozdor], i.e., the cervical canal, and it is uncertain whether or not it is menstrual blood, it is ritually impure as menstrual blood, as there is a presumption that it came from the uterus, which is the source of menstrual blood. And this is the halakha even though there is an upper chamber, which empties into the canal, which is closer.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא רוֹב וּמָצוּי קָא אָמְרַתְּ רוֹב וּמָצוּי לֵיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר Rava said to Abaye, in response to this claim: You state a proof from a case where the factors of majority and frequency are both present. When there is majority and frequency, there is no one who says that one ignores the majority and follows proximity. Here, not only is the blood from the uterus greater in quantity, it also passes through the canal more frequently, as blood generally does not come from the upper chamber.
דְּתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא דָּם הַנִּמְצָא בַּפְּרוֹזְדוֹר חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו עַל בִּיאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְשׂוֹרְפִין עָלָיו אֶת הַתְּרוּמָה Rava cites a proof for his statement. As Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: Blood that is found in the corridor is considered definite menstrual blood, and therefore if she engages in sexual intercourse, both she and her partner would be liable as a result of it to receive karet for entering the Temple intentionally when ritually impure or to bring an offering for entering unwittingly. And one burns teruma due to it, if the woman touches such produce. Evidently, the status of this blood is not considered uncertain.
וְאָמַר רָבָא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִדְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא תְּלָת שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ רוֹב וְקָרוֹב הַלֵּךְ אַחַר הָרוֹב וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ רוּבָּא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אִיתָא לִדְרַבִּי זֵירָא And Rava says: Learn from that which Rabbi Ḥiyya said three conclusions: Learn from his statement that when the relevant factors are majority and proximity, follow the majority; and learn from his statement that the halakha that one follows the majority applies by Torah law, as teruma is burned in this case on account of the blood and she is liable to receive karet if she enters the Temple in this state; and learn from his statement that there is a source for that which Rabbi Zeira said.
דְּאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁדַּלְתוֹת מְדִינָה נְעוּלוֹת This statement of Rabbi Zeira was issued in reference to a case discussed in tractate Ketubot (15a). If there are ten stores in a city, nine of which sell kosher meat and one of which sells non-kosher meat, and one found meat outside the stores and he does not know from which store it came, one follows the majority. The Gemara there suggests that perhaps one follows the majority only in a case where the gates of the city are unlocked, when the meat could have come to the city from the majority of kosher meat outside in a circumstance where the majority of the meat sold in the surrounding area was kosher. In this case there are two majorities, the majority of kosher meat stores inside the city, and the majority from outside. The Gemara there explains that Rabbi Zeira says that even if the city gates are locked one follows the majority, and the meat is kosher, as there is a no need for a double majority.
דְּהָא אִשָּׁה דְּכִי דַּלְתוֹת מְדִינָה נְעוּלוֹת דָּמְיָא וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי קָא אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא The Gemara elaborates: The two cases are analogous, as the woman here is considered like the locked gates of the city, i.e., there is only a single majority, and even so we follow the majority.
וְהָא רָבָא הוּא דְּקָאָמַר רוֹב וּמָצוּי לֵיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר הֲדַר בֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵהַהִיא The Gemara asks: But Rava is the one who says with regard to the case of the blood that when there is majority and frequency, there is no one who says that one ignores the majority and follows the proximity. In other words, Rava rejected this case as proof of the principle that one follows the majority even when it is not frequent. Here, by contrast, Rava claims that one can learn from the ruling of Rabbi Ḥiyya that one follows the majority by Torah law. The Gemara answers: Rava retracted that claim in favor of the opinion that one follows the majority in all cases.
אִיתְּמַר חָבִית שֶׁצָּפָה בַּנָּהָר אָמַר רַב נִמְצֵאת כְּנֶגֶד עִיר שֶׁרוּבָּהּ יִשְׂרָאֵל מוּתָּר כְּנֶגֶד עִיר שֶׁרוּבָּהּ נׇכְרִים אֲסִירָא וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר אֲפִילּוּ נִמְצֵאת כְּנֶגֶד עִיר שֶׁרוּבָּהּ יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲסִירָא אֵימוֹר מֵהַאי דְּקִרָא אֲתַאי § It was stated: In the case of a barrel of wine that was found floating in a river, and the status of the wine was unknown, Rav says: If it was found opposite a town of which the majority of residents are Jews, the wine is permitted, as it can be assumed that the wine belongs to a Jew. If it was found opposite a town of which the majority are gentiles, it is forbidden, as it presumably belongs to a gentile. And Shmuel says: It is forbidden even if it was found opposite a town of which the majority are Jews. Why? Regardless of where it was found, one can say that it came from that place called Dekira, where the majority of people are gentiles. In other words, there is a distinct possibility that a floating barrel came from far away.
לֵימָא בִּדְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא קָא מִיפַּלְגִי דְּמָר אִית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא וּמָר לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that Rav and Shmuel disagree with regard to the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, in that one Sage, Shmuel, is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, and he rules based on the majority, which in this case includes even distant locales, and one Sage, Rav, is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, which is why he rules based on proximity.
לָא דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי דְּמָר סָבַר אִם אִיתָא דְּמֵהַאי דְּקִרָא אֲתַאי עִקּוּלֵי וּפָשׁוֹרֵי הֲוָה מַטְבְּעִי לַהּ וּמָר סָבַר חֲרִיפָא דְּנַהֲרָא נְקַט וַאֲתַאי The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; everyone agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, and here they disagree about this: As one Sage, Rav, holds that if it is so, that the barrel came from that place called Dekira, this cannot be, as the currents and bays of the river, where the river flow is weak, would have sunk it. Therefore, it is logical that the barrel came from a nearby town. And one Sage, Shmuel, holds that perhaps the force of the river caught the barrel and brought it, as it is evident that the flow of a river can bring items from far away.
הָהוּא חַצְבָּא דְחַמְרָא דְּאִישְׁתְּכַח בְּפַרְדֵּיסָא דְעׇרְלָה שַׁרְיֵא רָבִינָא לֵימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּסָבַר לַהּ דְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא The Gemara relates that Ravina deemed permitted a certain barrel of wine that was found hidden in a vineyard where there were orla grapes, and he was not concerned that the wine might be from the grapes of that vineyard. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this is because he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina that one follows the majority of vineyards, which are not orla, rather than proximity?
שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּאִי מִיגְּנִיב מִינֵּהּ אַצְנוֹעֵי בְּגַוֵּיהּ לָא מַצְנְעִי וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי חַמְרָא אֲבָל עִינְבֵי מַצְנְעִי The Gemara answers: It is different there, as, if thieves had stolen the barrel from that very vineyard they would not have hidden it there. Since the barrel was hidden there, it is reasonable to assume that it was stolen from somewhere else. The Gemara comments: And this matter, that thieves would not hide a stolen barrel in the same vineyard from which they stole it, applies only to wine; but they would hide grapes there, as grapes are not readily identifiable by the owner. Consequently, there is a concern that grapes found hidden there might be from that same vineyard.
הָנְהוּ זִיקֵי דְחַמְרָא דְּאִשְׁתְּכַחוּ בֵּי קוּפָאֵי שְׁרַנְהוּ רָבָא לֵימָא לָא סָבַר לַהּ לִדְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דְּרוּבָּא The Gemara further relates that there were these jugs of wine that were found between vines [bei kofa’ei] of a Jew. Rava deemed the contents permitted and was unconcerned that they might be wine owned by a gentile. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rava does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, who says that one follows the majority, in this case gentiles? The Gemara answers: There it is different, as the majority