Bava Batra 136bבבא בתרא קל״ו ב
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136bקל״ו ב

אמר רבי יוחנן לא קנה לוקח וריש לקיש אמר קנה לוקח

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property, and Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property.

רבי יוחנן אמר לא קנה לוקח קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי

The Gemara explains their reasoning: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the purchaser did not acquire the property because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Even though the property itself did not belong to the father, it is as though the father owned the property, because all of the produce belonged to him in practice. Therefore, the son’s sale can take effect only after the father’s death. If the son dies first, since he never attained ownership, his sale can never come to fruition.

וריש לקיש אמר קנה לוקח קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי

And Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property, because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Therefore, the father’s rights do not prevent the son, who owns the property itself, from selling it, and eventually the purchaser receives full rights to it.

והא איפליגו בה חדא זימנא דאיתמר המוכר שדהו לפירות רבי יוחנן אמר מביא וקורא וריש לקיש אמר מביא ואינו קורא

The Gemara asks: But didn’t they already engage in a dispute concerning this issue one time? As it was stated: With regard to one who sells his field for just its produce, meaning that he retains ownership over the field itself and he sells the rights to all of its produce to someone else, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The purchaser brings first fruits from this field to the Temple and recites the verses in the Torah associated with the bringing of the first fruits, in which he thanks God for: “The land that You, Lord, have given me” (Deuteronomy 26:10). And Reish Lakish says: The purchaser brings the first fruits, but he does not recite the verses, since it is not his field.

רבי יוחנן אמר מביא וקורא קסבר קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי וריש לקיש אמר מביא ואינו קורא קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי

The Gemara explains the reason behind the dispute: Rabbi Yoḥanan says he brings the first fruits and recites the verses because he maintains that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself. Even though the field itself does not belong to him, it is as if he acquired the field because all of the produce belongs to him in practice. And Reish Lakish says that he brings the first fruits and does not recite the verses because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like the ownership of the item itself. Why was it necessary for them to engage in a dispute concerning this issue twice?

אמר לך ר' יוחנן אף על גב דבעלמא קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי הכא אצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא אבא לגבי בריה אחולי אחיל קא משמע לן

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the dispute to be stated also in the context of one who sells his father’s property and then dies. This is because Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you that although in general ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself, here it was necessary to emphasize this principle, because it might enter your mind to say that with regard to a father and son, the father presumably waived his rights in the property itself. Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches us that even in this case, the father’s ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself.

ורבי שמעון בן לקיש אמר אף על גב דבעלמא קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי הכא אצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא כל לגבי נפשיה אפילו במקום בריה נפשיה עדיפא ליה קא משמע לן

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could have said that although in general ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like the ownership of the item itself, as one who sells the produce of his field retains full ownership of the land itself, here it was necessary to emphasize this principle, as it might enter your mind to say that in any sale concerning oneself, even vis-à-vis his son, one grants preference to himself. Accordingly, if one grants the property itself to his son, reserving the rights to the produce for himself, he retains the rights to the property itself as well. Reish Lakish teaches us that he does not retain the rights to the property.

איתיביה רבי יוחנן לריש לקיש נכסי לך ואחריך יירש פלוני ואחריו יירש פלוני מת ראשון קנה שני מת שני קנה שלישי

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita (Tosefta 8:4): If one states: My property will go to you after my death for your use during your lifetime, and after you die, so-and-so will inherit the property, and after the one who inherits after you dies, so-and-so will inherit the property, in this case, when the first recipient dies, the second acquires it, and when the second dies, the third acquires it.

מת שני בחיי ראשון יחזרו נכסים ליורשי ראשון

If the second dies during the lifetime of the first, the property returns after his death to the heirs of the first, and does not go to the third designated recipient, as his right was to inherit it from the second, who never received it.

ואם איתא ליורשי נותן מיבעי ליה

And if it is so that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself, the baraita should have stated that the property returns to the heirs of the giver, as the first and second recipients received only the right to use the property and enjoy its profits during their lifetimes, after which it was designated to be transferred to others. Therefore, in a case where the transfer does not apply, the property should return to the possession of the one who owns the property itself, namely the giver and his heirs.

אמר ליה כבר תרגמה רב הושעיא בבבל אחריך שאני וכן רמי רבה בר רב הונא קמיה דרב ואמר אחריך שאני

Reish Lakish said to him: Rav Hoshaya already interpreted in Babylonia that a case of after you, i.e., where the owner said to the recipient: After you die so-and-so will inherit the property, is different, as the giver intended to grant full ownership of the property to the first recipient as well, including both the rights to the produce and the property itself. And Rabba bar Rav Huna also raised this contradiction before Rav, and Rav said in response: After you, is different.

והתניא יחזרו ליורשי נותן

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in another baraita that if the second designated recipient dies before the first, after the death of the first the property returns to the heirs of the giver?