לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ חַיָּיב וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא דִּכְמָנֶה לְאַחֵר בְּיָדְךָ דָּמֵי: Actually, I will say to you that one who responds to a claim that he does not know if he owes the one hundred dinars is obligated to pay; but here, in the case of the brothers, it is different. The brothers are not obligated to share their portion with the man in question because the brother who testified is like one who claims: Another person has one hundred dinars in your possession. Since the claimant is not the one who is owed the money, the other party can reject his claim by merely answering that he does not know whether he owes him.
מֵת יַחְזְרוּ נְכָסִים לִמְקוֹמָן בָּעֵי רָבָא שֶׁבַח שֶׁשָּׁבְחוּ נְכָסִים מֵאֲלֵיהֶם מַהוּ § The mishna teaches: If the man in question dies, the property he received from the father’s inheritance shall return to its place, i.e., to the possession of the brother who testified on his behalf, and if the man in question received property from elsewhere, it is inherited by all the brothers equally. Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to the enhancement of the property received by the man in question from the portion of the brother who testified, where its enhanced value was the result of an enhancement that happened naturally, as opposed to one that resulted from exertion, what is the halakha? Who inherits it?
בְּשֶׁבַח הַמַּגִּיעַ לַכְּתֵפַיִם לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ דְּכִי נָפְלוּ לוֹ נְכָסִים מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר דָּמֵי כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ בְּשֶׁבַח שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַגִּיעַ לַכְּתֵפַיִם כְּגוֹן דִּיקְלָא וַאֲלֵים אַרְעָא וְאַסְּקָא שִׂרְטוֹן מַאי תֵּיקוּ: The Gemara elaborates: With regard to enhancement that reaches shoulders, i.e., ripe produce that needs only to be harvested from the field, do not raise the dilemma, as it is considered like property that came into his possession from elsewhere. It is not considered part of the land that was given to him by the brother who testified, and it is therefore divided among all the brothers. Rather, let the dilemma be raised with regard to enhancement that does not reach shoulders, and is not considered separate from the ground, such as a palm tree that thickened, or land that yielded silt. What is the halakha in this case? Is the enhancement included in the property itself, or is it considered separate property? The Gemara comments: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
מַתְנִי׳ מִי שֶׁמֵּת וְנִמְצֵאת דְּיָיתֵיקֵי קְשׁוּרָה עַל יְרֵיכוֹ הֲרֵי זוֹ אֵינָהּ כְּלוּם זִיכָּה בָּהּ לְאַחֵר בֵּין מִן הַיּוֹרְשִׁין בֵּין שֶׁאֵינָן מִן הַיּוֹרְשִׁין דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין: mishna With regard to one who died, and a will written by a person on his deathbed [dayetikei] is found bound to his thigh, which clearly indicates that it was written by him and was not forged, this is nothing. The will is not valid, as he did not give it to anyone, and he may have reconsidered. If he transferred ownership of the will to the designated recipient through another person, whether one of the heirs or whether not one of the heirs, his statement stands.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן אֵיזֶה הִיא דְּיָיתֵיקֵי כֹּל שֶׁכָּתוּב בָּהּ דָּא תְּהֵא לְמֵיקַם וְלִהְיוֹת וְאֵיזֶה הִיא מַתָּנָה כֹּל שֶׁכָּתוּב בָּהּ מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה GEMARA: The Sages taught (Tosefta 8:10): Which deed is considered a dayetikei, and is collected by the designated recipient after the death of the giver? Any deed in which it is written: This will be to stand and exist after my death. And which type is considered a deed of gift? Any deed in which it is written: From today and after my death.
אֶלָּא מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה הוּא דְּהָוְיָא מַתָּנָה מֵעַכְשָׁיו לָא הָוְיָא מַתָּנָה אָמַר אַבָּיֵי הָכִי קָאָמַר אֵיזוֹ הִיא מַתְּנַת בָּרִיא שֶׁהִיא כְּמַתְּנַת שְׁכִיב מְרַע דְּלָא קָנֵי אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתָה כֹּל שֶׁכָּתוּב בָּהּ מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה The Gemara asks: Is it considered a deed of gift only if the expression: From today and after my death, is written, whereas if it is written only: From now, it is not considered a deed of gift? Abaye said that this is what the baraita is saying: Which deed of gift of a healthy person is considered like the deed of gift of a person on his deathbed, in that the recipient acquires it only after the death of the giver? Any deed in which it is written: From today and after my death.
יָתֵיב רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא בְּאַכְסַדְרָא דְּבֵי רַב וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן שְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁאָמַר כִּתְבוּ וּתְנוּ מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי וּמֵת אֵין כּוֹתְבִין וְנוֹתְנִין שֶׁמָּא לֹא גָּמַר לְהַקְנוֹתוֹ אֶלָּא בִּשְׁטָר וְאֵין שְׁטָר לְאַחַר מִיתָה § Rabba bar Rav Huna was sitting in the balcony of Rav’s study hall, and sat and said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: If there is a person on his deathbed who says: Write a deed of transfer, granting property of mine to another, and give with it one hundred dinars to so-and-so, and he then died, one does not write and give it. This is because perhaps he resolved to transfer it to him only with a deed of transfer, and since the deed was not written in his lifetime it cannot be written after his death, as a deed of transfer is not effective after the death of the owner.
אֲמַר לְהוּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אִיזְדְּהַרוּ בַּהּ רַב שֵׁיזְבִי אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמְרָה וַאֲמַר לְהוּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אִיזְדְּהַרוּ בַּהּ Rabba bar Rav Huna continued that when Rabbi Yoḥanan stated this halakha, Rabbi Elazar said to the other Sages: Heed this halakha; it is correct. Rav Sheizevi said: That is not what happened; Rabbi Elazar is the one who said this halakha, and it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who said to them: Heed this halakha.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק כְּוָתֵיהּ דְּרַב שֵׁיזְבִי מִסְתַּבְּרָא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אַמְרַהּ אִצְטְרִיךְ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְאַסְהוֹדֵי עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אַמְרַהּ אִצְטְרִיךְ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לְאַסְהוֹדֵי עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן רַבֵּיהּ Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It is reasonable to say that the incident was in accordance with the version presented by Rav Sheizevi. Granted, if you say that Rabbi Elazar said the halakha, Rabbi Yoḥanan needed to affirm the ruling of Rabbi Elazar. But if you say that Rabbi Yoḥanan was the one who said it, did Rabbi Elazar need to affirm the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan, his teacher?
וְעוֹד תָּא שְׁמַע דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אַמְרַהּ דִּשְׁלַח רָבִין מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ הֱווּ יוֹדְעִים שֶׁשָּׁלַח רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לַגּוֹלָה מִשּׁוּם רַבֵּינוּ שְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁאָמַר כִּתְבוּ וּתְנוּ מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי וּמֵת אֵין כּוֹתְבִין וְנוֹתְנִין שֶׁמָּא לֹא גָּמַר לְהַקְנוֹתוֹ אֶלָּא בִּשְׁטָר וְאֵין שְׁטָר לְאַחַר מִיתָה וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר תִּיבָּדֵק And furthermore, come and hear proof that Rabbi Elazar was the one who said this halakha, from another statement of his, as Ravin sent a message in the name of Rabbi Abbahu: Know that Rabbi Elazar sent a ruling to the exile in the name of our teacher, stating that if there is a person on his deathbed who says: Write a deed of transfer and give with it one hundred dinars to so-and-so, and he then died, one does not write and give it. This is because perhaps he resolved to transfer it only with a deed of transfer, and since the deed was not written in his lifetime it cannot be written after his death, as a deed of transfer is not effective after the death of the owner. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This ruling is correct; however, the wording of the deed should be examined.
מַאי תִּיבָּדֵק כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר דְּיָיתֵיקֵי מְבַטֶּלֶת דְּיָיתֵיקֵי שְׁכִיב מְרַע שֶׁאָמַר כִּתְבוּ וּתְנוּ מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי וּמֵת רוֹאִין אִם כִּמְיַפֶּה אֶת כֹּחוֹ כּוֹתְבִין וְאִם לָאו אֵין כּוֹתְבִין The Gemara asks: What did Rabbi Yoḥanan mean by saying that the wording should be examined? The Gemara answers: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he stated two halakhot. The first was that a dayetikei cancels a previous dayetikei. The second explains the examination to which Rabbi Yoḥanan was referring: If there is a person on his deathbed who said: Write a deed of transfer and give with it one hundred dinars to so-and-so, and he then died, the court must see what his intention was in instructing the other person to write a deed of transfer; if it was to enhance the recipient’s power by writing a document proving that he was given the gift, one writes the document even after his death, as he intended to give the money anyway. But if not, rather it was the giver’s intention to transfer the gift specifically through a deed of transfer, one does not write it and give the money, as a deed of transfer is not effective after the death of the owner.
מֵתִיב רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל בָּרִיא שֶׁאָמַר כִּתְבוּ וּתְנוּ מָנֶה לִפְלוֹנִי וּמֵת אֵין כּוֹתְבִין וְנוֹתְנִין הָא שְׁכִיב מְרַע כּוֹתְבִין וְנוֹתְנִין הוּא מוֹתֵיב לַהּ וְהוּא מְפָרֵק לַהּ בִּמְיַפֶּה אֶת כֹּחוֹ Rabbi Abba bar Memel raises an objection from a baraita: If there is a healthy person who said: Write a deed of transfer and give with it one hundred dinars to so-and-so, and he then died, one does not write and give it. Rabbi Abba bar Memel inferred: But if a person on his deathbed states this request, one writes and gives it. He raises the objection and he resolves it: The ruling of that baraita is in a case where he was enhancing the recipient’s legal power by writing him a document of proof.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי מְיַפֶּה אֶת כֹּחוֹ The Gemara explains: What are the circumstances under which it is apparent that he was enhancing his legal power?