וּמִקּוּלֵּי כְתוּבָּה שָׁנוּ כָּאן And the Sages taught here one of the leniencies that apply to a marriage contract. This manner in which the wife loses her right to receive payment of her marriage contract is a leniency for the husband, as an ordinary creditor does not lose money he is owed in this fashion.
תְּנַן רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר אִם קִבְּלָה עָלֶיהָ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא כָּתַב לָהּ אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מִכְּלָל דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר כְּתִיבָה וְקַבָּלָה בָּעֵי The Gemara questions this statement: We learned in the same mishna that Rabbi Yosei says that if she accepted the distribution upon herself, even if he did not write a document granting her any amount of land, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. By inference, it can be stated that the first tanna holds that both his writing a document granting her a piece of land and her acceptance of the distribution are necessary for her to lose her right, contrary to the interpretation of all three amora’im, i.e., Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, all of whom assumed that she need not affirmatively accept the distribution and that her silence is sufficient.
וְכִי תֵּימָא כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הִיא וְהָא תַנְיָא אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אֵימָתַי שֶׁהָיְתָה שָׁם וְקִבְּלָה עָלֶיהָ אֲבָל הָיְתָה שָׁם וְלֹא קִבְּלָה עָלֶיהָ קִבְּלָה עָלֶיהָ וְלֹא הָיְתָה שָׁם לֹא אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ תְּיוּבְתָּא דְכוּלְּהוּ תְּיוּבְתָּא And if you would say that the entire mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that either the husband’s writing a deed of gift or the wife’s acceptance of the distribution is sufficient, but isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: According to the first tanna, when does she lose her right to receive payment of her marriage contract? In a case where she was there at the time of the distribution and accepted it; but if she was there but did not accept it, or accepted it but was not there, she has not lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract, as she can claim that her acquiescence was only to please her husband and was not sincere. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinions of all the interpretations of the amora’im is indeed a conclusive refutation.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן הָא רַב הָא שְׁמוּאֵל הָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא מָר מַאי סְבִירָא לֵיהּ אֲמַר לֵיהּ שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר כֵּיוָן שֶׁעֲשָׂאָהּ שׁוּתָּף בֵּין הַבָּנִים אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ Rava said to Rav Naḥman: This is the opinion of Rav; this is the opinion of Shmuel; and this is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. What does the Master hold in this matter? Rav Naḥman said to him: As I say, that once he rendered her a partner in the property among the sons, she lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.
אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן כֵּיוָן שֶׁעֲשָׂאָהּ שׁוּתָּף בֵּין הַבָּנִים אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ Rav Naḥman’s opinion was also stated as a halakhic ruling: Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says that once he rendered her a partner in the property among the sons, she lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.
בָּעֵי רָבָא בְּבָרִיא הֵיאַךְ מִי אָמְרִינַן בִּשְׁכִיב מְרַע הוּא דְּיָדְעָה דְּלֵית לֵיהּ וְקָמָחֲלָה אֲבָל בְּבָרִיא סָבְרָה הָדַר קָנֵי אוֹ דִלְמָא הַשְׁתָּא מִיהַת לֵית לֵיהּ תֵּיקוּ Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a healthy person, what is the halakha? Do we say that the wife loses her right to receive payment of her marriage contract only in the case of a person on his deathbed, as she knew that he had no other property and nevertheless waived payment of the marriage contract, but in the case of a healthy person, she might have reasoned that he will then acquire other property from which she will be able to collect payment of her marriage contract, and that is why she accepted the distribution of the property? If so, she did not waive her right to receive payment of her marriage contract. Or perhaps, should it be reasoned that since in any event, now he has no other property, her acceptance should be interpreted as waiving her right? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
הַהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ פַּלְגָא לִבְרַת וּפַלְגָא לִבְרַת וְתִילְתָּא לְאִיתַּת בְּפֵירֵי אִיקְּלַע רַב נַחְמָן לְסוּרָא עוּל לְגַבֵּי רַב חִסְדָּא אֲמַר לֵיהּ כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא מַאי אֲמַר לֵיהּ הָכִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל אֲפִילּוּ לֹא הִקְנָה לָהּ אֶלָּא דֶּקֶל אֶחָד לְפֵירוֹתָיו אִבְּדָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ § There was a certain man on his deathbed who said to the people surrounding him: Give one-half of my estate to my daughter, and one-half to my other daughter, and one-third of the produce to my wife. Rav Naḥman happened to come to Sura. He entered the study hall to see Rav Ḥisda, who said to him: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him that this is what Shmuel says: Even if he transferred to her ownership only one palm tree for its produce, she has lost her right to receive payment of her marriage contract.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אֵימוֹר דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל הָתָם דְּאַקְנִי לַהּ בְּגוּפַהּ דְּאַרְעָא הָכָא פֵּירָא הוּא אֲמַר לֵיהּ מִטַּלְטְלִי קָא אָמְרַתְּ מִטַּלְטְלִי וַדַּאי לָא קָא אָמֵינָא Rav Ḥisda said to him: Say that Shmuel said his statement that she loses her right there, in a case where he gave her a palm tree for its produce, because he transferred rights in the land itself to her ownership, as the palm tree is connected to the ground. But here, in this case, it is only produce that he gave her, without any share in the land itself. Perhaps she does not lose payment of her marriage contract. Rav Naḥman said to him: You say that he gave her only movable property? I certainly did not mean to say that she loses her right even if he gave her only movable property such as produce. Rather, she receives payment of her marriage contract.
הַהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ תִּלְתָּא לִבְרַת וְתִלְתָּא לִבְרַת וְתִלְתָּא לְאִיתַּת שְׁכִיבָא חֲדָא מִבְּנָתֵיהּ סְבַר רַב פַּפֵּי לְמֵימַר לָא שָׁקְלָא אֶלָּא תְּלָתָא There was a certain man on his deathbed who said to the people surrounding him: Give one-third of my property to my daughter, and one-third to my other daughter, and one-third to my wife. One of his daughters died before he did, and her portion consequently returned to his possession. Rav Pappi thought to say that the wife takes only one-third. She cannot receive payment of her marriage contract from the two-thirds bequeathed to the daughters, as by entering a partnership with the daughters in ownership of the property, she waived payment of her marriage contract.