יש נעבד במחובר אצל גבוה או אין נעבד במחובר אצל גבוה The Gemara explains the dilemma: An animal that was worshipped is rendered unfit to be sacrificed as an offering in the Temple. The Gemara previously established a principle that objects attached to the ground are not rendered forbidden by idol worship. The question here is this: With regard to an item that is attached to the ground and that was worshipped, is it rendered unfit for the Most High, i.e., for the Temple, just like an animal? Or is the halakha that with regard to an item that is attached to the ground and that was worshipped, it is not rendered unfit for the Most High, just as it is not forbidden with regard to an individual’s deriving benefit from it?
את"ל יש נעבד במחובר אצל גבוה מכשירי קרבן כקרבן דמו או לא Furthermore, if you say that with regard to an item that is attached to the ground and that was worshipped, it is rendered unfit for the Most High, are the items that merely facilitate the sacrifice of an offering, such as the altar, viewed the same way as an offering itself, or not? Perhaps the principle that items worshipped in idolatrous practice are disqualified for use in the Temple applies only to offerings, and not to the items used to facilitate the bringing of offerings.
אמר רבא ק"ו ומה אתנן שמותר בתלוש להדיוט אסור במחובר לגבוה דכתיב (דברים כג, יט) לא תביא אתנן זונה ומחיר כלב לא שנא תלוש ולא שנא במחובר נעבד שאסור בתלוש להדיוט אינו דין שאסור במחובר לגבוה Rava says: The dilemma can be resolved with an a fortiori inference. The Torah prohibits the sacrifice of an animal as an offering or a donation to the Temple if it was given in payment to a prostitute or exchanged in the sale of a dog. And if it is so that concerning deriving benefit from an item that served as payment to a prostitute, which is permitted to an ordinary person even in a case where the item is detached from the ground, nevertheless, such an item is forbidden to use for the Most High even in a case where it is attached to the ground, as it is written: “You shall not bring the payment to a prostitute or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God for any vow” (Deuteronomy 23:19), where there is no difference whether the payment is unattached to the ground and there is no difference whether it is attached; concerning an object worshipped in idolatrous practice, which is rendered forbidden in a case where it is detached even for the use of an ordinary person, is it not logical that it should be prohibited to use it for the Most High even in the case of an object attached to the ground?
א"ל רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע לרבא או חילוף ומה נעבד שאסור בתלוש אצל הדיוט מותר במחובר לגבוה שנא' (דברים יב, ב) אלהיהם על ההרים ולא ההרים אלהיהם לא שנא להדיוט ולא שנא לגבוה אתנן שמותר בתלוש להדיוט אינו דין שמותר במחובר לגבוה Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava: Or one can reverse the claim. And if an object that was worshipped, which is forbidden in a case where it is detached from the ground even for the use of an ordinary person, is yet permitted for use even for the Most High in a case where it is attached to the ground, as it is stated that the mitzva is to destroy: “Their gods, upon the high mountains” (Deuteronomy 12:2), but not the mountains themselves that are their gods, and therefore with regard to such items, there is no difference between use for an ordinary person and for the Most High; concerning payment to a prostitute, which is permitted for use for an ordinary person in the case of a detached item, is it not logical that it should be permitted to use for the Most High in a case where the payment is an item attached to the ground?
ואי משום בית ה' אלהיך מיבעי ליה לכדתניא בית ה' אלהיך פרט לפרה שאינה באה לבית דברי ר"א וחכ"א לרבות את הריקועים Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, continues: And if one would say that it should still be prohibited to use it in the Temple due to that which the verse states: “You shall not bring the payment to a prostitute, or the price of a dog, into the House of the Lord your God,” which indicates a blanket prohibition, this verse is already necessary to teach another halakha, namely, that which is taught in a baraita: The phrase “into the House of the Lord your God” excludes its use as a red heifer, which is not brought to the Temple, rather it is sacrificed outside the city on the Mount of Olives; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: It is stated to include the prohibition against hanging in the Temple beaten plates of gold that were used in the payment of a prostitute. Even though they are not used in the Temple service, it is prohibited to hang them up.
א"ל אנא קאמינא לחומרא ואת אמרת לקולא קולא וחומרא לחומרא פרכינן Rava said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: I am stating an a fortiori inference that leads to a stringency, and you are stating an opposite a fortiori inference that leads to a leniency. And the principle is that whenever there is the option to employ an a fortiori inference that leads to a leniency or one that leads to a stringency, we infer the stringency.
א"ל רב פפא לרבא וכל היכא דאיכא קולא וחומרא לקולא לא פרכינן והא הזאה דפסח דפליגי ר' אליעזר ור"ע דר' אליעזר סבר לחומרא וקא מחייב ליה לגברא ור"ע לקולא ופטר וקא פריך ר"ע לקולא Rav Pappa said to Rava: And is it so that anywhere that there is an option to employ an a fortiori inference to infer a leniency or a stringency, we do not infer the leniency? But isn’t there the case of sprinkling the purifying water of a red heifer upon one who has contracted ritual impurity through contact with a corpse, in order to thereby obligate him in the sacrificing and eating of the Paschal offering? As Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree with regard to whether it is permitted to do this on Shabbat, each of them employing an a fortiori inference to support his opinion. As Rabbi Eliezer holds that a stringency should be inferred and he thereby deems the man obligated to purify himself and bring a Paschal offering, even if he can purify himself only on Shabbat, and Rabbi Akiva infers a leniency and exempts him from the obligation to bring the offering. And clearly, contrary to Rava’s claim, Rabbi Akiva infers a leniency.
דתנן השיב ר"ע או חילוף ומה הזאה שהיא משום שבות אינה דוחה השבת שחיטה שהיא דאורייתא לא כ"ש This is as we learned in a mishna (see Pesaḥim 65b) that Rabbi Eliezer reasoned: If slaughter, which is generally prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law, is permitted for the sake of sacrificing the Paschal offering, all the more so is it not clear that sprinkling the purifying water of a red heifer, which is prohibited on Shabbat merely due to a rabbinic decree, should override Shabbat? Rabbi Akiva replied: Or one can reverse the claim. And if sprinkling the purifying water on Shabbat, which is prohibited merely due to rabbinic decree, does not override Shabbat, then with regard to slaughter, which is prohibited by Torah law, all the more so is it not clear that it should not override Shabbat? Contrary to Rava’s claim, Rabbi Akiva clearly infers a leniency instead of the stringency inferred by Rabbi Eliezer.
התם ר' אליעזר גמריה ואייקר ליה תלמודא ואתא ר"ע לאדכוריה והיינו דא"ל רבי אל תכפירני בשעת הדין כך מקובל אני ממך הזאה שבות ואינה דוחה את השבת The Gemara answers: There, Rabbi Akiva does not employ a real a fortiori inference. Rabbi Eliezer himself taught him this halakha, which he knew as a tradition, but he had forgotten his own learning and Rabbi Akiva came to remind him of it by drawing an a fortiori inference that would cause Rabbi Eliezer to remember that which he himself had taught. The Gemara offers a support for this interpretation from the continuation of that discussion, which is recorded in a baraita: And this is what Rabbi Akiva said to him: My teacher, do not deny my contention at the time of judgement, i.e., during deliberation of this matter, as this is the tradition I received from you: Sprinkling is prohibited by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat.
בעי רמי בר חמא המשתחוה לקמת חטים מהו למנחות יש שינוי בנעבד או אין שינוי בנעבד § Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: In the case of one who bows to a stalk of wheat, what is the halakha with regard to using it for meal-offerings? Does the wheat lose its forbidden status after it is ground into flour, or not? Does a change in the form of a worshipped object revoke its forbidden status, or does a change in the form of a worshipped object not revoke its forbidden status?
אמר מר זוטרא בריה דרב נחמן ת"ש כל האסורין לגבי מזבח ולדותיהן מותרים ותני עלה רבי אליעזר אוסר Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, said: Come and hear a resolution from that which is taught in a mishna (Temura 30b): The principle is that concerning all items that are forbidden with regard to sacrificing them the altar, their offspring, i.e., whatever products are derived from them, are permitted. And it is taught with regard to this mishna: Rabbi Eliezer deems the offspring forbidden.
ולאו אתמר עלה אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה מחלוקת כשנרבעו ולבסוף עיברו The Gemara asks: But wasn’t it stated with regard to this dispute that Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The dispute is with regard to a case where it became prohibited to use the animals as offerings because a person engaged in bestiality with them and later they became pregnant.