Arakhin 5aערכין ה׳ א
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5aה׳ א

רגלה של זו עולה יכול תהא כולה עולה תלמוד לומר (ויקרא כז, ט) כל אשר יתן ממנו לה' יהיה קדש ממנו קודש ולא כולה קודש

The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, one might have thought that all of the animal will be a burnt offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And if it is an animal of those that they bring as an offering to the Lord, anything of it that one gives to the Lord, it shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:9). The verse indicates that the part of it that one gives will be sacred, but not all of the animal will be sacred.

יכול תצא לחולין ת"ל יהיה בהוייתה תהא הא כיצד תמכר לצורכי עולות ודמיה חולין חוץ מדמי אותו אבר שבה דברי ר"מ

A non-sacred animal with a consecrated limb may not be sacrificed. Accordingly, one might have thought that the consecrated limb may be redeemed and thereby transferred to non-sacred status. Therefore the verse states: “Shall be,” meaning: It shall be as it is, i.e., the limb remains consecrated. How is this possible, i.e., what should one do in this case? The animal should be sold for the needs of burnt offerings, i.e., to an individual who will sacrifice the entire animal as a burnt offering, and the payment received for the animal will be non-sacred, except for the payment received in exchange for that limb of it that was consecrated. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

רבי יהודה ורבי יוסי ור"ש אומרים מנין לאומר רגלה של זו עולה שכולה עולה תלמוד לומר כל אשר יתן ממנו לה' יהיה קדש לרבות את כולה

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: From where is it derived that in the case of one who says: The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, all of the animal becomes a burnt offering? The verse states: “All that any man give of such to the Lord shall be holy” (Leviticus 27:9). The term “shall be” serves to include all of the animal, indicating that it all becomes sacred.

ואפילו למ"ד אין כולה עולה הני מילי דאקדיש דבר שאין הנשמה תלויה בו אבל דבר שהנשמה תלויה בו קדשה כולה

And even according to the one, Rabbi Meir, who says that if one states: The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, not all of the animal is a burnt offering, that statement applies only if one consecrated an item that its life does not depend on, e.g., its leg. But if he consecrated an item that its life depends on, such as its head, the entire animal is consecrated. This presents a difficulty for Rava, who holds that the baraita that discusses consecration of the head is referring to items consecrated in order to purchase offerings for the altar. Why, then, isn’t the entire animal consecrated?

(אלא) לא קשיא הא בקדושת הגוף הא בקדושת דמים

Rava responds: Rather, both baraitot are referring to items consecrated for the altar, and even so it is not difficult. This baraita, which indicates that if one consecrated the head the entire animal is consecrated, is referring to inherent sanctity, i.e., where he consecrated the head for the purpose of sacrificing it on the altar. That baraita, which teaches that if he consecrated the head it alone is consecrated, is referring to sanctity that inheres in its value, that is, where he consecrated the head for the sake of purchasing offerings.

והא מר הוא דאמר מקדיש זכר לדמיו קדוש קדושת הגוף

Abaye responded: But wasn’t it you, Master, who said that if one consecrated a male animal for its value, it is sanctified with inherent sanctity and it is itself sacrificed? This undermines the distinction that Rava is attempting to draw between inherent sanctity and sanctity that inheres in value.

לא קשיא הא דאקדיש כולה הא דאקדיש חד אבר

Rava responds: It is not difficult. This statement, that an animal that was consecrated for its value attains inherent sanctity, applies only in a case where he consecrated the entire animal. There, in the baraita discussing the consecration of the head, it is referring to a situation where he consecrated only one limb. In such a case, the animal does not attain inherent sanctity.

חד אבר נמי איבעויי איבעיא לן דבעי רבה הקדיש אבר לדמיו מהו

Abaye replied: Actually, we also raised a dilemma with regard to a case where one consecrated only one limb. As Rabba raised a dilemma: If one consecrated a limb for its value in order to bring an offering with the proceeds, what is the halakha as to whether or not the entire animal is consecrated? If your interpretation of the baraita is correct, Rabba can resolve his question based on the baraita and conclude definitively that the entire animal is not sanctified for the altar.

כי איבעי לן בתם הכא בבעל מום דומיא דחמור

Rava responded: We raised this dilemma and entertained the possibility that the entire animal might be sanctified to the altar only in a case where the animal is unblemished, and is therefore fit to be used as an offering. But here, the baraita is referring to a blemished animal, similar to the parallel case of the donkey, which is unfit to be sacrificed. Since the animal in question is unfit for the altar, it is clear that the entire animal is not sanctified.

בעל מום נמי איבעויי איבעיא לן דבעי רבה דמי ראשי לגבי מזבח מהו כי אבעיא לן מקמי דאשמעה להא מתניתא השתא דשמעה הא מתניתא לא מיבעיא לן

Abaye responded: In fact, we also raised a dilemma with regard to a case where the animal is blemished and unfit to be sacrificed. As Rabba raised a dilemma: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate the value of my head to purchase offerings to be sacrificed on the altar, what is the halakha? Is he obligated in his entire value or not? A person is certainly not fit to be an offering, and yet Rabba does not resolve his question based on the baraita. Rava answered: We only raised this dilemma before hearing this baraita. Now that we have heard this baraita, we no longer raise this dilemma, as we concluded from the baraita that the entirety of the animal is not consecrated.

גופא בעי רבה דמי ראשי לגבי מזבח מהו נידון בכבודו או אינו נידון בכבודו

§ The Gemara returns to the aforementioned matter itself. Rabba raised a dilemma: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate the value of my head to purchase offerings to be sacrificed on the altar, what is the halakha? Is it assessed by the significance of the body part in question, and since he consecrated a vital organ he is obligated in his entire value? Or perhaps it is not assessed by the significance of the body part in question, and only the head is consecrated.

לא אשכחן בדמים דאינו נידון בכבודו או דלמא לא אשכחן לגבי מזבח דנידון בכבודו תיקו

The Gemara explains the underlying issue: It can be argued that we have not found a case of assessments that is not assessed by the significance of the body part that was specified. Therefore, if one obligated himself in the value of a vital organ he should have to pay the entity’s entire value. Or perhaps he should be obligated only in the value of the head, as we have not found a case of an animal that is sacrificed on the altar that is assessed by the significance of the body part in question, i.e., that if one consecrates the value of one vital organ the entire animal is consecrated. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand [teiku] unresolved.

בעי רבא ערכי עלי לגבי מזבח מהו נידון בהשג יד או אין נידון בהשג יד

Rava raised a further dilemma: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation for the altar, rather than for Temple maintenance, as is usually the case, what is the halakha? Is this case determined based on affordability if he is poor, like regular valuations? Or perhaps it is not determined based on affordability, and he is obligated in the full valuation even if he is poor.

לא אשכחן בערכין דאין נידון בהשג יד או דלמא לא אשכחן לגבי מזבח דמיפריק אלא בשויו תיקו

The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: One can argue that we have not found a case of valuations that is not determined based on affordability. Therefore, the principle of affordability should apply even when one vows for the purpose of sacrificing offerings on the altar. Or perhaps this case should not be determined based on affordability, as we have not found an item that is consecrated for the purpose of sacrificing offerings on the altar that is redeemed in a manner other than according to its value. The Gemara again concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי רב אשי הקדיש שדה אחוזה לגבי מזבח מהו מי אמרינן לא אשכחן שדה אחוזה דמיפרקא אלא בית זרע חומר שעורים בחמשים שקל כסף או דלמא לא אשכחן לגבי מזבח דמיפריק אלא בשויו תיקו:

Rav Ashi raised a similar dilemma: If a person consecrated an ancestral field for the purpose of sacrificing offerings on the altar, rather than for Temple maintenance, as is usually the case, what is the halakha? Do we say that we have not found a case of an ancestral field that is redeemed other than by the standard rate established by the Torah, which is that an area fit for the sowing of a ḥomer, a kor, of barley seed is redeemed for fifty silver shekels? Or perhaps it should be redeemed according to its market value, as we have not found a case of an item that is consecrated for the purpose of sacrificing offerings on the altar that is redeemed in a manner other than according to its value. Once again, the Gemara states: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

מתני׳ פחות מבן חדש נידר אבל לא נערך:

MISHNA: A child less than one month old is the object of a vow if others vowed to donate his assessment, but is not valuated if one vowed to donate his fixed value, as the Torah did not establish a value for anyone less than a month old.

גמ׳ ת"ר המעריך פחות מבן חדש ר"מ אומר נותן דמיו וחכמים אומרים לא אמר כלום

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to a case of one who takes a vow of valuation concerning a child less than one month old, Rabbi Meir says: The person who valuated is obligated to give the child’s assessment. The Rabbis say: He has said nothing, i.e., he is not obligated to give anything.

במאי קמיפלגי ר"מ סבר אין אדם מוציא דבריו לבטלה יודע שאין ערכין לפחות מבן חדש וגמר ואמר לשם דמים ורבנן סברי אדם מוציא דבריו לבטלה

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Meir holds: A person does not issue his statement of consecration for naught. The assumption is that a person knows that there are no valuations for a child less than one month old, and therefore he intended and said his statement for the sake of assessments, i.e., he meant to vow to give the child’s market value. And the Rabbis hold that a person does make his statement of consecration for naught. Therefore, his statement is taken at face value, and he is not obligated to give anything.

כמאן אזלא הא דאמר רב גידל א"ר האומר ערך כלי עלי נותן דמים כר"מ פשיטא דכר"מ אתיא

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rav Giddel says that Rav says: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of this utensil, is obligated to give its assessment? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that a person does not issue a statement of consecration for naught. Since utensils are not subject to valuation, he presumably intended to obligate himself in its assessment. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir? Why was it necessary for the Gemara to state this?

מהו דתימא אפילו כרבנן התם הוא דטעי סבר כי היכי דאיכא ערכין לבן חודש איכא נמי לפחות מבן חודש

The Gemara explains that it was necessary to state that Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, lest you say that it is even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who exempt one who valuates a child under a month old. The Gemara elaborates: One could say that it is only there, in the case of the child, that one errs and thinks that just as there are valuations for a child who is one month old, there are also valuations for a child less than one month old. Since his vow was based on an error, he is not obligated to pay anything.

אבל הכא דליכא למיטעי ודאי אדם יודע שאין ערך לכלי וגמר ואמר לשם דמים קמשמע לן

But here, in the case of one who valuates a utensil, where there is no possibility of erring, it can be argued that a person certainly knows that there is no valuation for a utensil, and he therefore intended and said his statement for the sake of assessments, i.e., he meant to vow to donate the utensil’s value. Therefore, the Gemara teaches us that Rav’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir only, and not with that of the Rabbis. The Rabbis hold that a person does issue a statement of consecration for naught even in such a case, and therefore his declaration is taken at face value.