ייהרג ואל יעבור

(5) You shall keep My laws and My rules, by the pursuit of which man shall live: I am the LORD.

(1) 1) (18:1) "And the L rd said to Moses, saying: (2) Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: I am the L rd your G d." I am the L rd who spoke and caused the world to come into being. I am full of mercy. I am a Judge, who exacts payment, and who is trusted to reward.

(2) 2) It is I, who exacted payment from the generation of the flood, and from the people of Sodom, and from the Egyptians, and I am destined to exact payment from you if you follow in their ways.

(3) 3) Whence is it derived that there was no people whose acts were more detestable than those of the Egyptians? From (3) "As the deed of the land of Egypt … you shall not do." And whence is it derived that those of the last generation were the worst of all? From "As the deed of the land of Egypt where you dwelt you shall not do." Whence is it derived that (the deeds of the people of) the place where Israel dwelt were the worst of all? From "where you dwelt you shall not do." And whence is it derived that the dwelling of Israel (there) prompted them to all of these deeds? From "where you dwelt you shall not do."

(4) 4) And whence is it derived that there was no people whose acts were more detestable than those of the Canaanites? From (Ibid.) "And as the deed of the land of Canaan you shall not do." And whence is it derived that those of the last generation were the worst of all? From "to which I bring you." And whence is it derived that the coming of Israel (there) prompted them to all of these deeds? From "to which I bring you you shall not do."

(5) 5) R. Shimon says (Isaiah 41:4) "Who wrought and did? He who called forth the generations from the beginning." He readied (punishment) for the guilty generation, that Israel come and exact it of them.

(6) 6) R Yossi Haglili says: After Scripture equates the deed of the land of Egypt with that of the land of Canaan, and that of the land of Canaan with that of the land of Egypt, why did the Canaanites merit remaining in their land for forty-seven years, as it is written (Bamidbar 13:22) "And Chevron (in Canaan) was built seven years before Tzoan (in) Egypt" (and add forty years for their sojourn in the desert)? It was because they honored our father Abraham, saying (Bereshith 23:5) "Hear us, my lord, a prince of G d are you in our midst" — wherefore they merited remaining on their land forty-seven years.

(7) 7) R. Shimon b. Gamliel says in the name of R. Shimon b. Lakish: And thus is it written (Joshua 11:15) ("And the name of Chevron of yore was the city of Arba [Abraham]), the great man among the Anakim, and the land had rest from war." Men who honored the tzaddik merited that their land rest (from war).

(8) 8) If "As the deed of the land of Egypt and as the deed of the land of Canaan, you shall not do," I might think they should not build or plant as they do; it is, therefore, written (Ibid.) "and in their statutes you shall not walk." I have proscribed for you only those statutes which were instituted for them and for their forefathers and for the fathers of their forefathers. What did they do? A man would wed a man, and a woman, a woman. A man would wed a woman and her daughter, and a woman would wed two — wherefore Scripture states "and in their statutes you shall not walk."

(9) 9) (18:4) ("My judgments you shall do, and My statutes you shall heed to walk in them; I am the L rd your G d.") "My judgments" — these are the laws; "My statutes" — these are the midrashoth (exegetical derivations); "you shall heed" — this is the Mishnah; "to walk in them" — this is the deed; "shall you heed to walk in them" — It is not the Mishnah which conducts you (to the world to come), but the deed.

(10) 10) (18:5) "And you shall heed My statutes and My judgments, which a man shall do": to ascribe heeding and doing to statutes and heeding and doing to judgments, (the previous verse having ascribed only doing to judgments and heeding to statutes). (Ibid.) "and he shall live in them": in the world to come. If you would say, in this world, is it not one's end to die? How, then, is "and he shall live in them" to be understood? In the world to come. (Ibid.) "I am the L rd" — trusted to reward.

(1) The precepts were given to Israel for no reason other than for Israel to stay alive, for it is said of the precept, "Which if a man do, he shall live by them" (Lev. 18:5) - live by them and not die by them. Therefore, when there is danger to life, no precept is to be insisted on except those prohibiting idolatry, unchastity, and murder. When does the rule apply? Not in a time of religious persecution. But during a time of religious persecution, a man must be willing to give up his life even for the least demanding of precepts, as it is said, "You shall not profane My Holy Name - I am to be hallowed among the children of Israel" (Lev. 22:32).

(13) R. Yose said: Whence do we know that saving a life takes precedence over the Sabbath? As it is written. “…you shall observe my Sabbaths.” Is it possible that circumcision and the temple service and saving a life [do not take precedence over the Sabbath]? The Torah teaches “But” - a portion. There are times when you observe the Sabbath and times when you do not observe the Sabbath. R. Elazar says: Circumcision takes precedence over the Sabbath because one is punished for it by karet (excision) after time. And the matter is a kal va’homer. If for one limb of him the Sabbath can be superseded, it is logical that the Sabbath should be superseded for all of him. They said to him: according to your reasoning just as in that case it is certain and not uncertain, so too here it must be certain and not uncertain. R. Akiva said: And with respect to which was the Torah more stringent? With the temple service or with the Sabbath? [The Torah was more stringent] with the temple service than with the Sabbath, for the temple service takes precedence over the Sabbath and the Sabbath does not take precedence over the temple service. And the matter is a kal va’homer - if the temple service takes precedence over the Sabbath and a risk to life takes precedence over it, with regard to the Sabbath, which the temple takes precedence over - is it not logical that a risk to human life should supersede it? Behold, you have learned that a risk to life takes precedence over the Sabbath.

(14) R. Aha said in the name of R. Akiva. Behold, it says: “If a thief is found tunneling in…” Is the house’s owner certain or uncertain? You must say he is uncertain. If they kill a person to save a life in a case of uncertainty, it is logical that they should push off the Sabbath, in order to save a life in a case of uncertainty. Behold, the commandments were only given to Israel that they might live by them, as it is written “Which a man shall perform and live by them” - he shall live by them, and not die by them. Nothing takes precedence over saving a life, save idolatry, sexual sins, and murder. In which circumstances are these things said? When it is not a time of persecution. But, when it is a time of persecution, even when it comes to the smallest of small commandments, a person should die for it, as it is written: “Do not profane my holy name” (Leviticus 22) and “the Lord made everything for his own sake” (Proverbs 16).

Rav Pappa says: The ruling of the mishna, which lists his sister among those for whom he must pay a fine, is stated with regard to a young woman who was seduced, and in the case of seduction all agree that the woman is not saved at the cost of the seducer’s life, as the intercourse was consensual.

Abaye says: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a young woman who was raped in a case where one was able to save her by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, so that it was not necessary to kill him in order to achieve her rescue, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul says: If a pursuer was pursuing another to kill him, and one was able to save the pursued party without killing the pursuer, but instead by injuring him in one of his limbs, but he did not save him in this manner and rather chose to kill him, he is executed on his account as a murderer.

The Gemara explains: What is the reason of Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul? As it is written: “If men strive and strike a woman with child, so that her fruit departs, and yet no further harm ensues, he shall be punished, according to the demands that the woman’s husband makes on him; and he shall pay it as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22). And concerning this Rabbi Elazar says: The verse is speaking of striving to kill, where each man was trying to kill the other. The proof is that it is written: “But if any harm ensues, then you shall give life for life” (Exodus 21:23), and if there was no intention to kill, why should he be executed? And even so, the Merciful One states: “And yet no further harm ensues, he shall be punished,” teaching that he must pay the monetary value of the fetus to the woman’s husband.

Granted, if you say that in a case where one is able to save the pursued party by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, he may not save the pursued party at the cost of the pursuer’s life, and if he killed the pursuer rather than injure him he is liable to receive the death penalty, that is how you find the possibility that the one who ultimately struck the woman would be punished. This would be in a case where it was possible to save the man under attack, i.e., one of the men who were fighting, by injuring the pursuer, i.e., the other man, who ultimately struck the woman, in one of his limbs. In this case, the one who ultimately struck the woman was not subject to being killed. Therefore, he is subject to pay a fine.

But if you say that even if one is able to save the pursued party by injuring the pursuer in one of his limbs, he can also save him at the cost of the pursuer’s life, how can you find the possibility that the one who ultimately struck the woman would be punished? When he was going to strike the other man, he was at risk of being killed, as anybody could have killed him at that time, and the halakha is that anybody who commits an act warranting death exempts himself from any monetary obligation ensuing from that act.

The Gemara tries to refute this reasoning: Perhaps it is different here because his two liabilities are not on account of the same person; rather, his liability to be put to death is on account of this person, the man with whom he fought, while his liability to give payment is on account of that person, the woman he ultimately struck. Consequently, he is liable to receive both punishments.

The Gemara rejects this distinction: There is no difference. As Rava says: If a pursuer was pursuing another to kill him, and during the course of the chase the pursuer broke vessels belonging either to the person being pursued or to anyone else, he is exempt from paying for the broken vessels. What is the reason for this? The reason is that he is liable to be killed, since everyone is entitled to kill him in order to save the victim’s life, and one who commits an act rendering himself liable to be killed is exempt from any monetary obligation arising from that act, even if the payment were to be made to a person not connected to the act for which he is liable to be killed.

Rava continues: And if the pursued party broke vessels while fleeing from the pursuer, if those vessels belonged to the pursuer, the pursued party is exempt. But if they belonged to anyone else, he is liable to pay for them. The Gemara explains: If the vessels belonged to the pursuer, he is exempt. The reason for this is so that the pursuer’s property should not be more precious to the pursuer than his own body. Were the one being pursued to cause the pursuer bodily harm, he would be exempt; all the more so when the pursued one breaks the pursuer’s vessels. And if the vessels belonged to anyone else, he is liable, as he saved himself at the expense of another’s property, and that other person should not have to suffer a loss on his account.

Rava continues: But if one pursuer was pursuing another pursuer in order to save him, i.e., if he was trying to save the person being pursued by killing the pursuer, and while doing so he broke vessels belonging either to the pursuer or to the one being pursued, or to anyone else, he is exempt from paying for them. The Gemara comments: This is not by strict law, as if one who saves himself at another’s expense is liable to pay for the damage, certainly one who saves another at the expense of a third party should bear similar liability. Rather, it is an ordinance instituted by the Sages. This is because if you do not say that he is exempt, it will be found that no person will save another from a pursuer, as everyone will be afraid of becoming liable to pay for damage caused in the course of saving the pursued party.

§ The mishna teaches: But with regard to one who pursues an animal to sodomize it, or one who seeks to desecrate Shabbat, or one who is going to engage in idol worship, they are not saved at the cost of their lives. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: One who seeks to worship idols may be saved from transgressing at the cost of his life. This is derived through an a fortiori inference: If to avoid the degradation of an ordinary person, such as in the case of a rapist who degrades his victim, he can be saved even at the cost of his life, all the more so is it not clear that one may kill the transgressor to avoid the degrading of the honor of God through the worship of idols? The Gemara asks: But does the court administer punishment based on an a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai maintains that the court administers punishment based on an a fortiori inference.

It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: One who seeks to desecrate Shabbat may be saved from transgressing even at the cost of his life. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of his father, Rabbi Shimon, who says: The court administers punishment based on an a fortiori inference, and the halakha with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat is derived from the halakha with regard to idol worship by way of a verbal analogy between the word “desecration” mentioned in the context of Shabbat and the word “desecration” mentioned in the context of idol worship.

§ The Gemara now considers which prohibitions are permitted in times of mortal danger. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: The Sages who discussed this issue counted the votes of those assembled and concluded in the upper story of the house of Nitza in the city of Lod: With regard to all other transgressions in the Torah, if a person is told: Transgress this prohibition and you will not be killed, he may transgress that prohibition and not be killed, because the preserving of his own life overrides all of the Torah’s prohibitions. This is the halakha concerning all prohibitions except for those of idol worship, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. Concerning those prohibitions, one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress them.

The Gemara asks: And should one not transgress the prohibition of idol worship to save his life? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael said: From where is it derived that if a person is told: Worship idols and you will not be killed, from where is it derived that he should worship the idol and not be killed? The verse states: “You shall keep My statutes and My judgments, which a person shall do, and he shall live by them” (Leviticus 18:5), thereby teaching that the mitzvot were given to provide life, but they were not given so that one will die due to their observance.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that it is permitted to worship the idol in this circumstance even in public, i.e., in the presence of many people. Therefore, the verse states: “Neither shall you profane My holy name; but I will be hallowed among the children of Israel: I am the Lord Who sanctifies you” (Leviticus 22:32). Evidently, one is not required to allow himself to be killed so as not to transgress the prohibition of idol worship when in private; but in public he must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress.

The Gemara answers: Those in the upper story of the house of Nitza stated their opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might” (Deuteronomy 6:5). If it is stated: “With all your soul,” why is it also stated: “With all your might,” which indicates with all your material possessions? And if it is stated: “With all your might,” why is it also stated: “With all your soul”? One of these clauses seems to be superfluous.

Rather, this serves to teach that if you have a person whose body is more precious to him than his property, it is therefore stated: “With all your soul.” That person must be willing to sacrifice even his life to sanctify God’s name. And if you have a person whose property is more precious to him than his body, it is therefore stated: “With all your might.” That person must even be prepared to sacrifice all his property for the love of God. According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, one must allow himself to be killed rather than worship an idol.

From where is it derived that one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations and the prohibition of bloodshed? This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to the rape of a betrothed young woman it is written: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). But why would the verse mention murder in this context? But what do we learn here from a murderer?

Now, the mention of murder came in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes the case of a murderer to the case of a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her at the cost of the rapist’s life, so too, in the case of a murderer, one may save the potential victim at the cost of the murderer’s life.

And conversely, the Torah juxtaposes a betrothed young woman to a murderer to indicate that just as with regard to a potential murderer, the halakha is that if one was ordered to murder another, he must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of bloodshed, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman, if she is faced with rape, she must be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations.

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha with regard to a murderer himself, that one must allow himself to be killed rather than commit murder? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another, and therefore there is no need for a verse to teach this halakha. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: As when a certain person came before Rabba and said to him: The lord of my place, a local official, said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you, what shall I do? Rabba said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. Who is to say that your blood is redder than his, that your life is worth more than the one he wants you to kill? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. This logical reasoning is the basis for the halakha that one may not save his own life by killing another.

§ When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The Sages taught that one is permitted to transgress prohibitions in the face of mortal danger only when it is not a time of religious persecution. But in a time of religious persecution, when the gentile authorities are trying to force Jews to violate their religion, even if they issued a decree about a minor mitzva, one must be killed and not transgress.

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even when it is not a time of religious persecution, the Sages said that one is permitted to transgress a prohibition in the face of mortal danger only when he was ordered to do so in private. But if he was ordered to commit a transgression in public, even if they threaten him with death if he does not transgress a minor mitzva, he must be killed and not transgress.

The Gemara asks: What is a minor mitzva for this purpose? Rava bar Yitzḥak says that Rav says: