(א) כָּל בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל מְצֻוִּין עַל קִדּוּשׁ הַשֵּׁם הַגָּדוֹל הַזֶּה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא כב לב) "וְנִקְדַּשְׁתִּי בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל". וּמֻזְהָרִין שֶׁלֹּא לְחַלְּלוֹ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא כב לב) "וְלֹא תְחַלְּלוּ אֶת שֵׁם קָדְשִׁי". כֵּיצַד. כְּשֶׁיַּעֲמֹד עוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים וְיֶאֱנֹס אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל לַעֲבֹר עַל אַחַת מִכָּל מִצְוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה אוֹ יַהַרְגֶּנּוּ יַעֲבֹר וְאַל יֵהָרֵג שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בַּמִּצְוֹת (ויקרא יח ה) "אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשֶׂה אוֹתָם הָאָדָם וָחַי בָּהֶם". וָחַי בָּהֶם וְלֹא שֶׁיָּמוּת בָּהֶם.
If someone tries to force a Jewish person to break one of the commandments of the Torah and threaten him or her with death if he or she doesn't obey, it is obligatory that he or she breaks the commandment and not be put to death, for it is said concerning the commandments: "That which a man may do and live by it" (Ibid. 18.5)—"live by it, but not die for it".
(ב) בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת חוּץ מֵעֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים וְגִלּוּי עֲרָיוֹת וּשְׁפִיכַת דָּמִים. אֲבָל שָׁלֹשׁ עֲבֵרוֹת אֵלּוּ אִם יֹאמַר לוֹ עֲבֹר עַל אַחַת מֵהֶן אוֹ תֵּהָרֵג. יֵהָרֵג וְאַל יַעֲבֹר
(2) What is the case we are talking about here? This only applies to all commandments, except for idolatry, adultery and murder. For regarding these three commandments, if someone says to him or her "Break one of the three, or die," he must rather die, and not break these three commandments.
These first two sources are from one of the most important rabbis ever to have lived, Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon, otherwise known as the Rambam or Maimonides. (1135 - 1204, Spain and Egypt).
Here he explains the rule of the three cardinal sins. We are taught that if someone orders us to break any of the commandments in the Torah or be killed then we should break these commandments.
However, if we are ordered to kill someone, commit adultery or idolatry then we have to die rather than be break these three commandments.
How is this relevant to the case of self-driving cars?
ושפיכות דמים גופיה מנלן סברא הוא כי ההוא דאתא לקמיה דרבא א"ל מרי דוראי אמר לי זיל קטליה לפלני' ואי לא קטלינא לך א"ל ליקטלוך ולא תיקטול מאי חזית דדמא דידך סומק טפי דילמא דמא דההוא גברא סומק טפי
The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to murder itself? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: This is similar to a certain man who came before Rava and said to him: A local official said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you. Rava said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. What did you think, that your blood is redder and more precious than his? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. Apparently, one may not save his own life by taking someone else’s.
This is one of the most important sources in our discussion.
What do you think the main idea is here?
How does this relate to self-driving cars?
תני סיעות בני אדם שהיו מהלכין בדרך פגעו להן גוים ואמרו תנו לנו אחד מכם ונהרוג אותו ואם לאו הרי אנו הורגים את כולכם אפי' כולן נהרגים לא ימסרו נפש אחת מישראל ייחדו להן אחד כגון שבע בן בכרי ימסרו אותו ואל ייהרגו א"ר שמעון בן לקיש והוא שיהא חייב מיתה כשבע בן בכרי ורבי יוחנן אמר אע"פ שאינו חייב מיתה כשבע בן בכרי
A group of Jews were on a journey and they met some idol worshipers who said "Give us one of your group so that we may kill him otherwise we will kill all of you!" Even if the entire group of Jews will be killed it is forbidden to give up a single Jew to be killed (in this situation).
However, if they demand a specific Jew by name, such as Sheva Ben Bichri (a person who rebelled against King David) you can give that person up and save the rest of the group. Rabbi Shimon Ben Lakish says this only applies if the person specified (like Sheva Ben Bichri) already had a death penalty upon him. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and says (that if the idol worshipers pick out one person specifically the group may give him over) even if he does not have the death penalty upon him.
(ה) נָשִׁים שֶׁאָמְרוּ לָהֶם עוֹבְדֵי כּוֹכָבִים תְּנוּ לָנוּ אַחַת מִכֶּן וּנְטַמֵּא אוֹתָהּ וְאִם לָאו נְטַמֵּא אֶת כֻּלְּכֶן יִטָּמְאוּ כֻּלָּן וְאַל יִמְסְרוּ לָהֶם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל. וְכֵן אִם אָמְרוּ לָהֶם עוֹבְדֵי כּוֹכָבִים תְּנוּ לָנוּ אֶחָד מִכֶּם וְנַהַרְגֶּנּוּ וְאִם לָאו נַהֲרֹג כֻּלְּכֶם. יֵהָרְגוּ כֻּלָּם וְאַל יִמְסְרוּ לָהֶם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל. וְאִם יִחֲדוּהוּ לָהֶם וְאָמְרוּ תְּנוּ לָנוּ פְּלוֹנִי אוֹ נַהֲרֹג אֶת כֻּלְּכֶם. אִם הָיָה מְחֻיָּב מִיתָה כְּשֶׁבַע בֶּן בִּכְרִי יִתְּנוּ אוֹתוֹ לָהֶם. וְאֵין מוֹרִין לָהֶם כֵּן לְכַתְּחִלָּה. וְאִם אֵינוֹ חַיָּב מִיתָה יֵהָרְגוּ כֻּלָּן וְאַל יִמְסְרוּ לָהֶם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל:
If idolaters will demand one woman from a group of women, saying: "Give us one of among you and we will rape her, if not we will rape all of you", let them all be raped, rather than give up one person to them. Likewise, if idolaters will say to a group of men: "Give us one of you and we will kill him, if not we will kill you all", let all of them be killed rather than give up one person. If, however, they single out the one, saying: "Give us that man, if not we will kill you all", if he be guilty of a crime that carries the death sentence, as, for example, Sheva son of Bichri, they may surrender him to them, but it is not ideal that they do this. If he be not guilty of a crime that carries the death sentence, they all must die rather than surrender the one person.
What can we learn from these sources about the importance of one versus the many?
Who is more important - one person or the group?
Why should it matter if the idol worshipers name a person to kill or not?
What does this source tell us about the trolley problem?
Chazon Ish (Rabbi Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz, 1878 - 1953, lived in Bnei Brak, Israel) on Sanhedrin #25
Imagine a case where an arrow or missile was launched towards many people and a person had the power to divert the arrow or missile so that it only killed one person rather than many. It is possible to argue that this case is not similar to giving over one person to a group of idol worshipers to be killed because in that case (the act of giving up the one person) is an act of achzarit (cruelty)...In our case, it is an act of haztalah (saving life) since one's intention is to save many...and only by chance, indirectly, will the one person die (because you diverted to arrow or missile).
How does the Chazon Ish disagree with the postions taken in sources 3 and 4?
Do you agree with the Chazon Ish or disagree? Why or why not?
אף זה ולא מיבעי האיך אלא הא דאמר שמואל מלכותא דקטלא חד משיתא בעלמא לא מיענשא שנאמר כרמי שלי לפני האלף לך שלמה למלכותא דרקיעא ומאתים לנוטרים את פריו למלכותא דארעא שמואל לא כת"ק ולא כי"א
Shmuel says: A monarchy that kills one of every six individuals in the world is not punished for doing so, as that is the right of a government.
Source 7 seems to suggest that there are different rules for governments and individuals. A government is allowed to kill up to 1/6 (16%) of a population before it is considered evil and is punished.
How is that relevant to the case of self-driving cars?
What role might the government play in setting laws about what self-driving cars should do?
Conclusion:
What do you think the Jewish view is on how self-driving cars should behave?
Should the car save the passengers or pedestrians?
Should the car try and kill one person or many?
How would you program the car if you had that chance?